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EDITORIAL: OBSERVAnONS ON THE CHANGING
SOCIETAL MOSAIC OF NEPAL
We have decided to continue on with the idea of giving a thematic title to
the Occasional Papers in Sociology and Anthropology by calling the
Tenth Volume "Observations on the Changing Societal Alosaic of
Nepar'. As editors, we deem it essential to declare our reasons for
selecting this particular title to represent the papers included in this
volume. Any perceptive observer of Nepali society will agree with us
that the societal mosaic of Nepal (defined by plurality of religions,
caste/ethnic groups, mother tongues spoken, etc.) has never been simple
and rigid but has rather been quite complex and fluid or transient all the
time. Just as time does not stand still the nature of the social relationships
and the resulting structures too have been dynamic-subject to
constructions and reconstruction by the agencies inherent in the peoples.
A careful reading of the six papers in this collection will reveal that
'change', "development', and 'transfonnation' stand out as high priority
agenda for contemporary scholars and researchers engaged in the
Sociology and Anthropology of Nepal, The preferred vocabulary or the
language used by the authors of the six papers in this volume in order to
convey the ideas resulting from their-respective observations of Nepali
social and cultural life may be different Nonetheless, they all seem to be
talking about similar trends and processes in Nepal~that is,
transformations, the changing social formations, defining and re-defining
of social spaces, etc.
Chaitanya Mishra's article reviews the state of sociological works in
Nepal, His diagnosis (primarily based on a review of selected
publications in some journals) is that sociology in Nepal remains
underdeveloped amidst growth. He cogently argues that the social
transfonnative cauldron in Western Europe in the 19th century created the
space for sociological thinking. He then proceeds to critically examine
the conditions for the emergence as well as florescence of the specific
nature of sociology in general and that of Nepal in particular, As a keen
observer of Nepali society, Professor Mishra suggests that a better
sociology of Nepali society and their dynamics is possible by \vay of
embedding the m icro-level research agenda \vithin the macro
perspectives.
The Norwegian anthropologist. Professor Tone Bleic appears to
concur with the suggestion of Professor Mishra \vith regard to the need
for a choice of \vider canvas even \vhen discussing apparently localised
phenomena. She argues that the unravelling of the intricate interplay
between internal and external structural conditions and major national
political events over nearly five decades challenges any facile
characterisation of the Maoist rebellion as an internal conflict only. The
main analytical focus of this article is on the structural conditions and
agency actions that resulted in 1996 in a Maoist-led rebellion in Nepal.
Using the rights-based perspective, Bleie has discussed how the
negotiations over the defining attributes of state authority and of state-
society relations at important conjunctures in Nepal's recent political
history are related to political and economic conditions with national,
regional and global outreach over many years.
Sondra L. Hauser, in her paper relates the dynamics of three border
tovms, focusing on Nepal's southern Tarai-a preferred destination of
hill migrants in the country. This paper focuses on the contemporary
geopolitical reality of the Tarai as a place in which both hill migrants
congregate and through \vhich migrants leave Nepal and travel to the
Indian plains, in search of work, safety, and opportunity. Hausner
critiques the rhetoric of trafficking as the sole measure through which the
development industry - both international and national - views the
movement of women across the Nepal-India border and opts rather to
focus on the labour conditions of voluntary sex workers in Tarai towns.
She contends that prostitution in border towns may appear as a localised
problem while in reality it not the case.
David Holmberg examines the case of inequality within a
supposedly egalitarian Tamang society. He does this by discussing how
Tamangs treat the Kamis (Blacksmiths) living together in a hill village.
He argues that the framework for ethnographic comparison in South Asia
must move beyond the confines of the insular discourse of a
Western/Hindu to include systems like that of the Tamang which treats
Kamis as untouchables while freely interacting with them in a number of
day to day social spheres.
David N. Gellner and Sarah LeVine, examine how caste, class, and
gender determine the benefits which monastics in the Thera\:a.da
community of contemporary Nepal commonly provide for their fm11llies
f .. They note that monks, who in recent decades have beeno ongm.
. f· ndrecruited mainly from poor families belonglt1g. to .annll1~ a.
occupational castes, are more likely to focus on helpmg their relatlv~s Il1
practical ways, whereas the focus of the nuns, wh.o tend to come. frol~
more prosperous higher-caste families, is to provide m~mbers ~t their
extended kinship network with opportunities to ca.rn. soc~al ~re~tlge and
spiritual merit through high-profile donations to religIOUS ll1stltutlons.
F· 11 Don Messerschmidt, Gautam Yadama and Bhuvan Silwal,lOa y, f h h rthave elaborately discussed the manifestations and impacts 0 t e s 0 -.
lived National Development Service (NDS) movement that waS part of
the graduate studies program at Tribhuvan University durlOg the 1970s.
The paper also focuses on the rise of CIVIC service and volunteensm m
Nepal. The authors argue that the NDS which required all the graduate
students to dedicate one year during their Masters degree studIes to
service in a rural community was considered by many to. have been a
catalytic social development experiment. They have alsopomted out that
the NDS had profound effects upon both its participants and host
communities. Their analysis reveals that NDS in Nepal m the 1970s
became the magnet for democratic participation in the absence of other
legitimate avenues of democracy during the partyless Panchayat era.
We believe that these articles provide a good sample of
contemporary sociological and anthropologic~1 rescar.ch undert~ken by
scholars in Nepal. As such, the questions and Issues raised and dIscussed
in these papers should be of interest to the faculty and students at TU as
well as other social scientists in general with an Jl1~erest on. Nepall
societal mosaic and the dynamics and or the transfonnatJOns therem.
Editors
Ram Bahadur Chhetri
Laya Prasad Uprety
Kathmandu, April 2007
SOCIOLOGY IN NEPAL:
UNDERDEVELOPMENT ADMIST GROWTH l
Chaitanya Mishra
Rise of Sociology
The rise of the social sciences in post_16th century Western Europe has
widely been attributed to the enormous political, economic and cultural
contradictions-and struggles generated by the twin crises of feudalism
and religious faith, the working out of reformation and renaissance, the
rise of capitalism and, later, of the structure of democracl· This large-
scale and drawn-out dislocation and crises could find resolution only
with a radical reorganization of life and society. This reorganization
involved the creation, among others, of an expanded European and
global market for wage labor, commodity production and reinvestment of
profit; the class and state systems; a relatively centralized production
regime which gradually reduced the role of the household as a site of
production; spatially and socially distanced and "tree", often migrant and
urbanized, labor; a culture of "faithless" reason, doubt, empiricism,
"scientific temperament"; human and historically generated, rather than
supernaturally delivered and preordained, progress; and norms of
citizenship. It also involved the democratic and liberating influences of
the American and French revolutions, the industrial revolution, the
Soviet and other socialist revolutions as well as the much more drawn-
out processes of decolonization, state formation, democratization,
nationalism, modernity and developmentalism within the newly
independent regions and countries.
The comprehension and explanation, control and reshaping, and
prediction of this large-scale political, economic and cultural struggles
and transformation, which generated a wide ranging and intense
departure from the established order at multiple levels-ranging from
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individual and group identity to the nature and relationships among
individuals, households, states, classes and the multifarious constituents
of the global system, were the planks on which the social sciences were
founded. Intellectual frameworks aligned with feudalism and faith were
rendered incommensurate for the comprehension, explanation, prediction
of, and intervention into, the processes of struggle and transformation as
also of the transformed social world. Further, the transformation, by its
very nature, signified an end to the stability of the old world and
generated successively new rounds of systemic as well as anti-systemic
struggles and transitions at the local, intermediate and global levels and
in the structure of relationship among them. The altered and ever-
changing social world, in turn, necessarily demanded a mode of social
enquiry that was based upon the assumptions that the social world was
historically (rather than divinely) constructed, that it was eminently
knowable (rather than mysterious and humanly unfathomable) and that it
could, within the limits and facilities set by historical processes as well as
conscious and organized human social action, be consciously reshaped
and reorganized. The altered and ever-changing social world would also
demand an empirical, as opposed to authoritatively received, mode of
social inquiry. Not only was the larger structural and state level political
authority consistently challenged, but the social world, which was
diverse, unstable, complex and changing and, by most accounts
becoming ever more so, demanded that even social scientific authority,
including those which emanate from specific metatheories, established
research practices and organizational structures, for example, the
university system undergo a "reality check" on a continuing basis and
revalidate itself in the process. The new social world both obliged and
encouraged newer social visions, theories, sets of infonnation,
interpretations, critiques, modes of social control and platforms for
action. The social sciences in Europe and later the USA were founded
within the context of this large-scale transformation.
Specialized fields within the social sciences largely evolved during
the 19th century in response to the expansion and intensification of the
process of transformation itself, popular struggles that this transformation
entailed, multifarious impacts on religious affairs, polity, administration
(including colonial administration), law, economy, culture, etc., it
generated, and the emergent structures the transformation created, for
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example, state, market, urbanity, impoverishment, crime. The demands
of the state structure for information, analysis and policy- making~and
implementation thereof~ in order to selectively contain, expedite and
streamline the process of transformation and its effects, as well as the
struggles of urban workers and their unions, activities of social refonners
and charities as well as the social science academia played significant
proximate roles in the evolution of the specialization in the social
sciences. The social science academia was slowly gaining legitimacy as
an interpreter of specific aspects of the new and evolving social world
and as a potential "fixer" of the multifarious "social problems" generated
by the transformation. The success gained by the already relatively
specialized natural sciences contributed both to the legitimacy of the
social sciences in general as also to the "promise" held out by
specialization within the "science of society". The part played by the
social sciences, in particular, political science, public administration,
economics, law and anthropology, during the colonial era further
justified their utility.
It was within this space that sociology was gradually erected in
Europe over the 19'h century. The nature of the new, un-feudal,
"faithless", familially and spatially "unhinged' migrant-, urban-,
industrial-, capitalist-, class-based and conflict-ridden society, with
pockets of extreme poverty, exploitation and seeming hopelessness was
not only relatively unfettered from a host of traditional anchors of order
and control, but it also raised the specter of rootlessness and
formlessness. Uncertainties loomed large. Further, the rapidity of the
transfonnation, and the successive waves of transition in social lives, and
the relative of unpredictability of the future course of transformation
were being widely and intensely discussed and acted upon.
It was this a transformative cauldron which created the space for
sociological thinking. Sketching and elaborating the features of the new
society, as contrasted with the older forms, expectedly, was the first item
in the agenda of such thinking. Comte's "law of three stages" and
Durkheim's explorations of the bases of religion, education, anomie,
individualism (egotism) and social integration in the new society were
symptomatic of the thinking. Durkheim's explorations also constituted a
significant quest for the bases of order and stability in the new society.
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Similarly, Weber's vast corpus sought to map this transfonnation in
economic, political, administrative, social and psychological terms
within a deeply historical and cross-societal comparative matrix. Marx's
even vaster corpus, in turn, laid bare the history and functioning of the
emerging mega structure of capitalism- the mother of all transfonna-
tions, the contradictions that it produced and sharpened, and the impact it
had on everyday social and personal lives. The Marxist corpus, in
addition, also made the case for political action to challenge the capitalist
transformation. All four sociologists, in addition, elaborated new
epistemologies necessary in order to investigate the new society:
empiricism; non-reductionism and "socioiogization"; historical analysis,
interpretation and disenchanted objectivity; and historical-dialectical
materialism. For Comte, Durkheim and, to a certain extent, Weber, the
new investigative perspectives would also legitimize sociology as an
independent discipline in its own right. The institutional and financial
bases of sociology, within the university system and with a certain level
of public support, were rather painstakingly built upon during this period.
It must be said, however, that the activities of many grassroots social
reform associations lent legitimacy to sociology and to the strengthening
of its institutional and financial base.
Following the relatively sterile interwar years, during which rural
and urban sociology, symbolic interactionism, the "theory of action" and
a couple of other broadly ahistorical perspectives (with the exception of
critical theory, which emerged in Germany during the 1920s ) made their
beginnings, the functionalist perspective gained a near-hegemonic
metatheoretical status in sociology and anthropology, particularly in the
US. The rise and high dominance of this conservative perspective, which
lasted till the mid-60s has legitimately been attributed to the historically
nnprecedented economic growth and prosperity in the US during the
aftennath of World War 11, the masking of latent conflicts that such rise
in prosperity afforded, the absence of major and overt conflicts, and to
the elevation of the US to the preeminent position in the global hierarchy.
Two of the key features of the post-World War 11 scene, particularly
with respect to the colonized and other third-world countries, were
decolonization and modernization-led development. Decolonization and
modernization were at once liberating and imperializing (excepting, to a
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certain extent in the socialist countries): The "natives" were liberated
from particular colonial countries while at the same time that capitalist
imperialism was strongly revitalizing itself to incorporate the globe
following a live-decade long hiatus characterized by two world wars, the
rise of the soviet system and one great depression. The image that the
modernization framework cast was one of unilinear growth and
development within which the more modern and developed economies,
cultures and peoples, including those within the modernized and
developed states, in effect, constituted the future of the less modern and
less developed. The states and peoples which were "traditional", non-
modern and less developed had only to traverse a path that had already
been charted, including in relation to the generation and utilization of
knowledge (including sociology) at the "local" level. It was merely a
matter of filling in. This perspective was mirrored at the national level as
well. Global, state and market-as well as most non-govemmental-
structures and institutions had just begun to engage in the search for
"system-compatible and usable" information and interpretation. The
search for such information and interpretation, which was large in scale,
fonned the bulk of social science work. The job market for sociologists
was decidedly influenced by the search for such "usable" infonnation
and interpretation put at the service of modernization and development.
These processes, which, among others, transformed the non-western
settings and people into the "other" and coalesced within "oriental ism",
were, in turn, laid bare and severely criticized, during the 70s, among
others, by Edward Said, Talal Asad and others.
Within the Western countries themselves, the rise of the civil rights
movement, anti-Vietnam war protests, and women's and student
movements during the late 60s and the early 70s, however, led to a
serious questioning of the functionalist position, as also of the empiricist
and ahistorical stance. These movements and protests have also had the
effect of substantially expanding the sub-fields of sociology as well as
the job market for sociologists within the governments, semi-
governmental institutions, the private sector, international institutions
and the universities.
The post-70 sociological thinking, in turn, has remained "pluralist":
Even as the functionalist, empiricist and historical stances remain
•6 Occasional Papers, Vol10
widespread and legitimate, the last two decades have encouraged
introspection (for example, Gouldner 1971, Clifford and Marcus 1986,
among others); textual analyses, powerful interpretations of the inter-
connecttion between power and knowledge and the interconnectedness of
macro and the micro structures and processes. The world-systems
perspective has been a singular contribution of the post-70 sociology, as
is the feminist perspective. In addition, the post-70 period has seen the
elaboration of a host of other frameworks, which seek to include the
experience and struggle of a variety of excluded groups, for example, the
races, ethnic groups, caste groups, migrants, senior citizens, disabled.
History, holism, conflict and contradiction are in. Expansion of sub-
fields and the job market, in the meanwhile, has continued, albeit at a
slower pace, not the least due to the rightist neo-liberal and state
minimalist position advocated and practiced since the 80s. Within the
"developing" countries, the embracing of developmental ism and its
corollaries-international financial assistance and "policy guidelines",
international non-governmental organizations, etc.-have further opened
the job market for sociologists and social anthropologists. Ethnic,
regional and other voices and struggles for inclusion and wider demands
for democratization and public services have also opened up the
professional space for sociologists and social anthropologists. The
obverse has been the case as well: Some sociologists and social
anthropologists, at times, have disagreed to honor the agenda and themes
put forth by modernization, developmental ism and globalization,
critiqued them and found and worked with other trames and themes.
Finally, during the 80s and the 90s, serious questions have been
raised on the legitimacy of the existing disciplinary contours and
boundaries in the social sciences as well as on the legitimacy of the
accepted theory and practice of the social sciences including sociology
and social anthropology. Calls have been made for tearing down the old
but strong walls between the social sciences on account of the fact that
they inhibit insightful inquiry of the new social conditions. Calls have
also been made for modes of social inquiry, which are historically and
politically self-conscious and are at the same time plural, local as well as
universal (Said 1978, Clifford and Marcus 1986, Wallerstein et al. 1997,
Wallerstein 1999, also see Amin 1997: 135-52, Sardar 2002). The
widespread call for indigenization of sociology and anthropology raised
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primarily although not exclusively by non-western academics, including
those in Nepal (see below), are also at least in part based on the lack of
fit between political, economic and cultural conditions within the global
metropolis, on the on hand, and the peripheral regions, on the other. The
academic work of the metropolis is seen to misrepresent the social work
of the outlying regions, societies and peoples.
Embedding
This rather long-winded introduction has been intended as a platfonn to
enter into a discussion of the state of sociology in Nepal .It has argued
among others that.
The emergence as well as the specific nature of evolution of
sociology (as well as other social sciences) is predicated on the scale
and intensity of social struggle and social transfonnation. Large-
scale and intense social struggle and transfonnation in Europe,
particularly during the 18'h and 19'h centuries led to a zeitgeist, which
insisted on a historical and worldly rather than mythical and
ecclesiastical nature of the social domain. This revolutionary
zeitgeist systemically and gradually transformed all social practices,
for example, forms of government, fonns of economic transaction,
structure of the household, identity of an individual, as well as all
branches of social expression, for example, art and literature,
physical and biological sciences and to the emergence and
transformation of "sciences of society", including sociology and
anthropology, Even as the Nepali society is a making a salient
transition away from faith directed and feudal traditions and towards
a more democratic political culture at various levels and sectors, and
even as the sciences of society are seeking to learn from the Western
academic tradition, the peripheral, dependent and unsustained nature
of the capitalist transition; the restricted nature of the urban and
public domains; the miniscule, underdeveloped and non-polyvocal
bourgeoisie; together with largely state dependent organization of
higher education, relatively non-demanding and relatively unprofe-
ssionalized academic systems as well as functionalist and
developmental emphases that the carriers of sciences of society have
taken on has inhibited the development of social sciences in general
8 Occasional Papers, Vol1 0
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and sociology in particular. The hegemonic impact of the Western
academia, on the other hand, has also led to an inordinate emphasis
on receiving rather than generating knowledge.
The specific nature of evolution of sociology is also pt:,edicated on
the nature of the transition, that is, what and which political and
economic structures and regions, ideologies, institutions, classes,
groups are driving the transition; hO\v the dominant structures are
negotiating the transition \vith other less dominant struttures; and the
relative strength of the other less powerful, but nonetheless
competing, structures. The more powerful generally usurp the right
to characterize and speak for the less powerful. This essentially is
the crux of the practice of "orientalism" (see Sardar 2002 for
summary as well as critique). Speaking for others, however. is not a
monopoly of the orientalist tradition, a point \vhich is powerfully
brought out in Clifford and Marcus (1987). Such "filtering
frameworks" also operate at the national level in the developing
countries and bear significant implication for the development of the
social sciences (Guru 2002). lnterconnectedness between power and
knowledge implies that the pO\verful, unless system~tically resisted
and exposed, cannot but seek to usurp the authority of representing,
often misrepresenting. the "other". This strain is strong in Nepal and
comes in the disguises of "salvage anth.ropology (and sociology)",
romanticism and a strong reformist, developmentalist and modernist
sociology and social anthropology. There has b~en, since the last
decade, some improvement on this front, however. Encompassing
political debates and transitions (after the 1990 political transition
and during the ongoing "Maoist struggle") as well as ethnic, regions
and to a certain extent, "gender", perspectives and voices have been
in ascendance during the last decade. While not all of these have yet
been translated into the sociological and social anthropological
proper, these cannot but leave marks within the discipline within the
next decade--even as the urban, the upper class and upper caste,
statist, modernist and developmentalist interests may 'very well
continue to dominate the sociological enterprise. The ethnic and
regional voices are already being translated into sociological and
social anthropological agenda. Further democratization of the polity
•
in Nepal, which is inevitable in many ways, is likely to push these
academic initiatives further.
The specific nature of evolution of sociology and social
anthropology in the West and the rest of the world are of an
embedded nature. This embeddedness was principally founded upon
the structure and processes of the colonial and capitalist transition
that the non-Western polities, economies and cultures underwent
heginning the 17'h century (see Frank 1998 for the interface between
Asia and the rest of the world). In addition, between the 1880s and
the 1950s, many of these countries also underwent further capitalist
and imperialist as well as anti-colonial, nationalist and democratic
transitions and struggles. The social sciences-together with other
fonns of knowledge and expression-in these structures and
countries developed both as constitutive components and critiques of
these specific struggles and transitions. The social sciences there
also developed both as constitutive components and critiques of the
post World War 11 global and local structures and ideologies and
practices related to developmental ism and modernization, capitalism
and imperialism, formation of new state structures, nationalism and
statism, as well as democratization, the enlargement of the public
domain, expansion of public administration and the empowennent of
the newly created citizens. The affinnation and remapping of the
identities, political roles and life chances of the diverse class, caste,
ethnic, religious, regional, linguistic, gender and other groups
mandated by encompassing political, economic and cultural
transitions also shaped and reshaped the social sciences and
sociology and anthropology. The stamps of these structures and
processes can be found in sociology and social anthropology in
Nepal as welL Academic organizations at the higher level are largely
financed by the state, although there is a growing private presence
there. (Most private higher education structures, however, gain ITom
indirect state support as well as more direct subsidy ITom state-
financed academic organizations, principally in the [onn of teachers
who agree to work on low part-time wages in private colleges
because they continue to receive full-time wages and pensions ITom
state financed colleges.) Developmentalism is a strong theme within
the syllabi and it largely drives the research agenda. The state is
10 Occasional Papers, Vol10
CHAITANYA MISHRA :Sociology in Nepal: Underdevelopment Amidst Growth 11
•
almost universally seen as playing the most significant role In
relation to development and modernization. Nationalism remains a
key and Qverarching reference point in syllabi, research outputs and
discourses on development, modernization and even class, caste,
ethnicity, gender and regionalism. The syllabi do emphasize
critiques of these dominant preoccupations, but only a small number
of academics view these transitions critically enough.
Embedding has become much more intense during the post-World
War 11 phase of globalization. The expansion and intensification of
the global political, economic and cultural interface has had a
pronounced implication for the shaping and reshaping of sociology
and social anthropology in non-Western countries and, lately, within
Western countries as well. The evolution of sociology and social
anthropology in the non-Western world, in this specific sense, is an
heir to sociology and social anthropology in the West and thus to a
substantial extent inherits both the promise and the pitfalls held out
by the discipline. In a rather curious but highly significant twist, this
embedddeness, among others, is also beginning to reshape the
discipline in the west (for example, Clifford and Marcus 1986). This
embedding encompasses multiple dimensions, among which the
economic interface and its political and military (for example, the
"war on terrorism") implications have been widely discussed. This
embedding, however, also shapes what is defined as knowledge, the
identification of valid modes of generating knowledge as well as the
production and distribution of knowledge The West remains highly
privileged on all these accounts. As such, it is privileged in
developing the frameworks of social science inquiry and defining the
agenda of the social sciences (cf. Wallerstein et aL) 1997: 33-69,
Wallerstein 1999: 169-184 in particular as well as in the production
and distribution of texts and references, including specialized
disciplinary journals. This privilege allows the Western academic
establishments a much higher level of access to global information
and literature, organizational competitiveness, resources and
professionalization. The search for the nomothetic, the general, the
grand theories and the metatheories, and universal laws, privilege the
west. These, in turn, generously contribute to the powerful edge that
Western sociology and social anthropology has over the practice of
•
•
the discipline in other areas of the world. The larger economic and
political privilege necessarily rubs off on Western academia in as
much as the West not only has "been there" already, but also gauged
and weighed alternatives and possibilities and the rest is at the stage
of "catching up". Within the context of the embeddedness of the
larger political and economic system and the hierarchy therein, the
production of homologous and unequal intellectual and academic
hierarchies are rendered inevitable.
Nonetheless, and despite the gn1\ving salience of global structures
and processes in the evolution of specific structures and processes
that shape the polity, economy and culture in Nepal, sociologists and
social anthropologists often continue to visualize societies in Nepal
as uniquely local products. The significance of the macro and the
long run in shaping the character of the micro and the present and
the short run remain highly underemphasized both in the syllabi and
the research agenda. The sociology of the interconnectedness of the
global, the national and the local, the dynam ics 0 f this interconnect-
tion and the implications this interconnection have on the present
and future lives of different social categories such as region, class,
gender, ethnic group, caste group, the poor, etc., remains under-
emphasized. In addition, the significance of world-systemic
processes on macroeconomic and sectoral public policies and their
implications for processes such as centralization, democratization,
etc., have largely been neglected in sociology and social anthro-
pology in NepaL Similarly, the developmentalist and functionalist
perspective which remains dominant in Nepal, has inhibited teaching
and research on frameworks and themes such as politics conflict,
struggle, resistance, etc., despite, among others, the ongoing
"Maoist" rebellion.
The de-linking of the global, on the one hand, and the national and
the local, on the other, becomes clear from a perusal of the "state of
sociology" writings in NepaL Most such writings fail to see the
multiple levels of embeddedness involved in the evolution of
sociology and social anthropology in NepaL embeddedness of the
polity and economy and the evolution of the discipline in the West
itself, global and national embeddedness at the level of
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encompassing political-economic frameworks-which contribute to
disciplinary embeddedness and embeddedness of political economy
and the evolution of sociology and social anthropology within
Nepa!. This is an area that needs to be urgently redressed.
Sociology in Nepal: Institution and Growth
We can now discuss the overarching as well as much more proximate
institutional bases for the emergence and growth of social accounts, the
social sciences and "pre-sociology" in Nepal. It must be emphasized
right away, however, that the roots of such sociological endeavors have
to be sought not only in other disciplines such as literature and in
economic, political and social history, but also in more lay accounts of
emerging social reform associations, agrarian conditions, labor
migration, structures of resistance, popular struggles, etc. Both "proper
literature" and lay social accounts, however, remain extremely sparse
right till the 20'h century. It has to be recalled that the literacy rate in
1950 was approximately 5 percent, the first college was established in
1917 and the 1846-1951 Rana regime was politically highly controlled
and autocratic. The tradition of oral and/or reconstructive history and
sociology has been weak as well (See Burghart 1984, Oppitz 1971,
Blaikie, Cameron and Seddon, 1980, Mikesell 1988, Ortner 1989,
Shrestha 1971, among others, however.) This is an area where significant
contributions can be made. Nepali sociologists and anthropologists who
have remained almost exclusively preoccupied within the agenda of
future, that is, modernization and development, have been particularly
unproductive in reconstructing the past as also in analyzing a historically
informed present. Such reconstructions would have to take on the task of
describing and explaining emerging transitions in Nepal during the 1850-
1950 period. We should also be reminded that in the past those who
dared to word the contradictions and transitions during the period were
often discouraged, incarcerated, exiled or killed altogether
Nonetheless, there is significant scope for sociological reconstruct-
tion based on historical accounts. Mahesh Chandra Regmi's document-
tation-based historical accounts, particularly those related to the agrarian
features of the 19" century Tarai, the conditions of life of the peasants
and tenants there and their relationship with the state and its
intennediaries as well as the social implications of the agrarian regime
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(Regmi 1978, t984), has proved an extremely fertile site for a variety of
social science disciplines. There is no doubt either that Regmi's corpus
will continue to fuel much sociological reconstruction in the future. The
pain and suffering of the early 191h century Hill peasants under conditions
of the impending Nepal-East India Company war has been well sketched
by Ludwig Stiller (1973, 1976) as well. Similarly, accounts provided by
historians and others such as Prayag Raj Sharma, Kamal Prakash Malla,
Harka Gurung, the Itihas Samsodhan Manda!., etc., have created a
productive platfonn for sociological reconstruction. More recently
Bhattarai's (2003) Marxist account of Nepal's political economy has
provided a rich source for further reconstruction of socio-spatial
relationships in Nepal. The old ··colonial" account by William
Kirkpatrick, (1811) francis Hamilton (1819) and Brian Hodgson (1880)
also constitute good source materials for a historical analysis.
If struggles and transitions make and reshape social experiences
and, therefore, social accounts (including pre-sociological accounts),
modem social accounts of Nepal would have to begin from the period of
the risc of the world colonial capitalist bastion of the East India
Company and the implications it had on the reorganization of states,
markets and peoples in the north Indian region, including Nepal. The
shaping and reshaping of Nepal and the peoples who inhabited it would
have to be interpreted and explained within this specific global and
regional context. The accounts of Mahesh Regmi and Ludwig Stiller
(including The Rise afHause afGarkhas) constitute a "local", "insider"
and Nepali perspective on these events and processes, but it is obvious
that the shaping and reshaping of Nepal and its peoples was far more
than a domestic event. Regardless, this shaping and reshaping resulted,
among others, in the "silent cry" among the peasants of the Hills (Stiller
1976), as also in the creation of semi-capitalist agrarian conditions in the
Tarai (Mishra 1987). It is likely that the encompassing Civil Code of
1854 (Hofer 1979) prepared and implemented during the early phase of
the centralized Rana regime constituted an attempt to come to tenns
with, and regulate and reshape, the political, economic, ideological and
normative transitions during the first half of the 19" century within a
broadly autocratic, statist, Hindu, modemizing, rationalizing (in the
Weberian sense), East India Company (and British Empire)- friendly,
and dependent-capitalism promoting set up.
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Some of the economic, agrarian, social and international implica-
tions of the set lip have been described in considerable detail by Regmi
(among others, in Regmi 1978, 1984; also see Mishra 1987). There were
other implications as well, particularly in the overtly political and
apparently, in the class, caste, ethnic and gender arenas. Several cases of
resistance against the state have been recorded, for example, the revolt
led by Sripati Gurung in Lamjung and Gorkha and the apparently larger
revolt led by Lakhan Thapa, both of which took place in the 1870s, the
longer running movement of Yogmaya, which ended d in a mass suicide
in 1942 and the furor caused by a book on social and economic refonns
by Subba Krishna Lal Adhikari (see Karki and Seddon 2003: 3-5). In
addition, relatively oblique satires, more forthright criticisms as well as
agendas for political retonn and change were making their way into the
public domain. More importantly perhaps, there were transitions of a
morc directly "political" nature. The short lived Prachanda Gorkha
rebellion and the more genuinely political Praja Parishad movement
constituted a social account and a political agenda, which underlined the
contradictions bet\\'een the "old and defunct" autocratic regime which
was losing its popular legitimacy and a new, yet to become democratic
state of Nepal. Then, of course, there were the Nepali Congress Party and
the Nepal Communist Party, together with a number of others, whose
accounts and agendas had touched the lives and imaginations of a sizable
number of independent peasants, skilled workers, urban dwellers,
merchants and a section of the disgruntled but politically potent
aristocraty. In addition, the global and, in particular, the Indian anti-
colonial struggle, the struggle of various emerging political parties and
their political actions as well as the emerging discourses on the new,
post-World War 11 world order and modernization and development
gradually delegitimized the authority of existing states, economic
structures and values and norms, and generated new and alternative
imaginations, visions and practices. The implications of some of the
social, cultural, political and ethnic and value-related transitions and the
local implications of global processes between 1921 and 1951-
including the material and normative changes brought about by the
demobilized Gurkhas forces-both at the "grassroots" and national levels
are sketched in an engaging manner by Pande (1982).
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The details of the emergence and practice of applied sociology as
such immediately following the 1951 transition has been sketched (see
Thapa 1973 in particular). The interconnection between the emergence
and practice of sociology and the larger emerging, developmentalist,
modernist, international financial and policy assistance driven, statist and
liberal democratic national and international agenda, however, appears to
have been given a short-shrift in the search for details. What is clear
enough is that in keeping with these agendas, and in keeping with the
emerging concepts and categories in sociology, particularly those in the
US, this early period of the practice of sociology in Nepal, like in many
other parts of the developing world, found itself implicated and applied
in a newly instituted "Village Development Program". The program
aimed at training development extension agents in the areas of rural
family and society and in community development. The training package
changed and expanded considerably with the advent of the monarchy-led
and undemocratic Panchayat political system and the expansion of the
state apparatus. The Panchayat Training Center was charged with
training the Panchayat political cadres as well as the senior staff of the
bureaucracy and conducted courses on rural society, group dynam ics,
communication, local leadership and social survey and planning, and
sought to justifY the notion that the Panchayat political system was
inherently development friendly (cf Thapa 1973). In addition, a number
of trained sociologists and anthropologists \vere hired by the state in
elaborating the ideological framework of the political system and
elaborating a national scale educational program. Anthropologists
(apparently including at least one reputed international anthropologist)
were also enrolled to conceptualize and administer a remote area
development program within which the clergy (Buddhist in this case)
would play a significant role. It was no mere coincidence that the
program was fTamed and instituted along the northern reaches of the
country (which lay contiguous to the Tibetan Chinese border), at a time
when the Cultural Revolution was on the ascendant in the People's
Republic of China. Similarly, the resettlement program, under which
landless and marginal landowners in the hills, as well as ex-military
personnel, were resettled in selected locations along the southern Tarai
plains, also availed the services of several anthropologists. These
"strategic alliances" during this period between the state, on the one
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hand, and sociologists and anthropologists, on the other, however, must
not be overemphasized. The state was the largest employer of trained
specialists and there were only a few trained Nepali sociologists and
anthropologists so employed. Nonetheless, it does appear that the early
interface between the state, on the one hand, and sociologists, on the
other, was aligned with statist interest.
The nature of this early interface, the state's "imperative" to
introduce "Nepal" to the \vIder, principally \Vestern and aid giving
world, the rapidly increasing demand for sociologists made by
international funding agencies in Nepal-- some of \\'hose senior statf had
been trained in the discipline itself, globally expanding developmental-
ism and the demand for sociologists therein-primarily for ascertaining
the "specificities" of the local, "rural" and "project site" structures and
processes. crystallized together into an agenda for instituting a formal
academic and degree granting program in the discipline. Emest Gellner's
1970 report on the desirability and feasibility of a Department of
Sociology in Tribhmvan University, which emphasized that "social
research should be closely tied both to social development and to the
exploration of the national culture", and Alexander Macdonald's
enrolment as the first professor of sociology (For both events see
Macdonald 1973) as well as Dor Bahadur Bista's appointment as the first
professor of anthropology \vere responses to these agenda. While this
venture had its share of problems (Dahal 1984: 39-40), it did serve to
augment the legitimacy of the discipline in the eyes of the state. several
international development agencies and Tribhuvan University.
These processes and initiatives culminated in the formation of a
Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Tribhuvan University in
1981. The department initiated a Master's level program and, in
collaboration with the Sociology Subject Committee at the University,
took steps to initiate bachelor's level programs in several campuses and
colleges affiliated with the university. The initial course offerings,
thematic emphases and the mode of expansion of the discipline have
been described and critiqued by a number of participants (among others,
Dahal 1984, Bhattachan 1987, 1996, Bhandari 1990, GUflIng 1990
GUflIng 1996, Bista 1987, 1996, 1997, Bhattachan and Fisher 1994; also
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refer to Table I). The next section elaborates these descriptions and
critiques.
Organizationally, the academic program on sociology and
anthropology has expanded rapidly within Tribhuvan University and is
making a slow headway in other universities. Currently, a Master's
program is being conducted in seven campuses, in Kirtipur, Patan,
Trichandra, Biratanagar, Pokhara and Baglung. In addition, the
Purbanchal University also conducts one Master's level program in the
discipline. It should be emphasized that in part because most students
enter the Master's level only after 10 years of high school and four years
of college, the academic level of the majority of the students is
internationally comparable to the Bachelor's level. Some of the students,
on the other hand, compare well with graduate students of Western
universities. The duration of schooling at the school level, however, is
gradually shifting and the 12-year nonn may be universalized in the next
5- I0 years.
The Bachelors' level in the discipline is conducted in 17 campuses
within Trihuvan University. In addition, Purbanchal University conducts
two bachelor's level program. Further, courses on sociology and
anthropology is also offered within various other disciplines, for
example, development studies, rural development, forestry, agriculture
and animal sciences, medicine, environment, and computer sciences. It is
also offered in some higher secondary schools as an elective subject.
The discipline attracts a larger number of students: In terms of
popularity among the Master's level students, it is likely that only
economics rates higher. Part of the reason for this popularity is the fact
that, unlike several other disciplines, entry to sociology and anthropology
remains partially open to students from other disciplines, including
physical sciences and technology. The root of this attraction, however,
lies in the rather widely shared notion that graduates in the discipline
enjoy an easier access to jobs in the development and "project" industry,
for example, those implemented by international development and donor
agencies, INGOs and some development agencies within the
government.
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In recent years, on average, the number of annual entrants to the
master's level at all the participating campus has exceeded 1,200.
However, one-half of the entrants drop during the second year. The
proportion that graduates within a period of two years-the official
duration of the course-is very small and possibly does not exceed 10 to
20 percent of those who attend the final examination. All in all, a rough
estimate indicates that only about 1,500 students may have completed
their Master's degree during the last 20 years.
There is a high level of variation in the quality of teaching at the
Master's and, presumably, Bachelor's level in different campuses. In
particular, the majority of the senior faculty teaches at the Kirtipur
campus. The Dean's Office, the University's academic committee on
sociology and anthropology and the Central Department of Sociology-
the three principal agencies charged with promoting the discipline at
Tribhuvan University-have accomplished precious little to bridge the
wide gap in the quality of teaching across campuses in the University.
Illustratively, during the last five years, the Dean's Office has organized
only one experience-sharing event among teachers from various
graduates and undergraduate departments. The Academic Committee has
not met even once during the last four years. In addition, the Committee,
though charged with the responsibility of overseeing the overall
academic perfonnance within the discipline, has historically interpreted
its mandate extremely narrowly and focused only on the preparation of
the courses of study. The Central Department, qualified as such because
of the academically supervisol)' role it is expected to carry out in relation
to other sister departments of sociology and anthropology within the
University, has not pursued this mandate in a sustained manner.
The design of the syllabi at the Master's level remains uneven.
Some of the courses are internationally competitive while a few others
leave much to be desired. While the syllabi must remain sensitive to the
job prospects of graduates, there are indications that job prospects are
weighing much more heavily on the syllabi and the basics of the
discipline are beginning to receive a short shrift. Bureaucratic bottle-
necks, the centralized examination system, in particular, as well as the
lack of initiative and unprofessional resistance among teachers often
discourages attempts to revise the syllabi regularly.
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Access to literature for both students and teachers remains
extremely restricted. This, in part, is attributable to the facts that very few
good texts have been prepared locally and international publications are
generally highly expensive. Most of the departments do not have a
library of their own. Even the Central Library of Tribhuvan University,
which is located in Kathmandu, is perennially starved of funds and a
large proportion of the meager collection of journals is availed through
often irregular and short-tenn donations. Principally because of financial
reasons, it cannot procure ne\.... high quality books, either. However, a
couple of departments have initiated a system of generating funds from
the students body and utilizing the funds to procure texts and reference
materials. The low level of competence of the majority of the students as
well as many teachers in the English language also inhibits their access
to high quality international publications in English.
The incentives given to university teachers, though broadly
compatible with the incentives given to public officials, generally fails to
attract new high quality teachers, particularly those with Ph.Ds and those
who have graduated from reputed universities outside Nepal. Thus, many
such graduates prefer to work for national and international non-
governmental agencies and international development agencies which are
much more paying. The criteria for the promotion of teachers through the
academic hierarchy, while much more systemized within the last decade,
nonetheless continue to prize seniority rather than research output and
the quality of teaching. The centralized hiring and promotion mecha-
nisms at Tribunal University often have foregrounded non-academic
criteria and opted for semi-closed rather than open evaluations and
contests. Such mechanisms, in addition, have encouraged the inclusion of
non-professionals in organs charged with hiring and promotion.
The most significant and long-term problem that plagues teaching
and learning at Tribhuvan University and the one that it shares with
many other universities in the underdeveloped as well as some developed
countries is the pervading climate of uncritical and unreflexive
"intellectual" work. The severe lack of critical and reflexive outlooks
bears serious negative consequences in the long run, among others, on
the development of the social sciences and sociology and anthropology.
The texts, generally, are both taught and learned not as platforms for
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Table 1: Key Arguments in Reviews of the State of Sociology and Social
Anthropology
the government and so forth. While many of the reviewers are Nepali
nationals, some are international academics. Further, while at least half
of the reviewers were at relatively an early stage of their academic career
at the time they prepared the review, the rest were in their mid-career or
had had a long and rather distinguished career behind them. Finally,
some of the reviewers have assessed the discipline more than once and at
different stages of their career. This paper, however, collapses such
reviews and does not attempt to investigate possible changes in such
assessment.
playful and creative thinking, as windows that facilitate a view of the
wider world and as instruments that allow intimate dialogue with the self
and society, but as something which constitutes the last word on the
subject and as one which must be passively received. Many students and
some teachers read but not engage with books. To a certain extent, this is
understandable as well. The fact that many of texts and references they
are required to read often do not address key attributes or problems of the
society they live in does feed disengagement. In addition, many of the
teachers fail to link, whether by way of illustration, comparison or
critique, the text with the world the students inhabit. Such texts, in such a
context, often acquire a fictive character. The apparently universal text,
because it does not encompass the local or gives it a short shrift, fails to
acquire local authenticity and, as a result, does not excite the imagination
of the students. An unperceptive and uncritical mentor who fails to read
the implicit meaning of the apparently universal text for local life and
society, in turn, does not make the task of engagement any easier.
Review of State of Sociology
For a discipline that has a relatively short history, the number of state-01'-
sociology-and~social-anthropology-in_Nepal reviews has been rather
astounding. These writings, expectedly, vary widely in quality with
respect to quality of insight offered on these questions. While some of
these writings are responses to periodic review events organized by
Tribhuvan University, many such writings do represent deep personal
concerns with what sociology is and is not doing, where it is headed and
what it can and should do. These reviews also touch upon some of the
key debates surrounding social sciences in general and sociology and
anthropology in particular (in Nepal). I shall utilize this section both to
summarize the reviews and to explore some of the key epistemological
and substantive debates on the sociology and anthropology of Nepal
A couple of caveats are in order to put this review of reviews In
context. First, because these reviews have been prepared at different
periods of fhe evolution of sociology in Nepal, the arguments raised have
to be read with reference to the period of publication of the assessment.
Some of the assessments prioritize teaching, some focus on research and
many others cover both the domains. Some even implicate the university,
Author, Year
Gellner 1970'
McDonald t973
Mishral980, t984"
Thapa 1973
Key Arguments
Romanticism (exploration) and midwifery (social
development) complementary, particularly in Nepal
where past is very much present
At this early stage, should focus on training of
researchers, studies of change; utility of research an
important consideration; high significance of national
academic contexts for all, including international
researchers; romantic midwifery possible; should shun
building an intellectual enclave and should connect with
the state as well as international organizations; multi~
disciplinary studies required
Should centcr on the linkage between concrete everyday
experiences and structural, dialectical and critical
approach; recognizing and transcending the politics of
sponsored research; going beyond the empirical and
linking it with theoretical categories; dismantling
barriers among the social sciences; locating the micro
within the macro context; connecting the syllabi to local
experiences
Discipline should serve the needs of society and the
social problems; should assess the impact or major
national political initiatives on social organization
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Dahal 1993 Inquiry into theoretically informed ethnography.
national building. migration. poverty important; micro-
level studies vital; infrastructurat problems hinder
pedagogy; reservations on a single department of
sociology and anthropology; the anthropology of the
IIimalayan region characterized by undue emphasis on
the micro: neglect of interaction with outside; undue
emphasis on search for "natives" and romantic locale
Gurung. G. 1997 \Vhile relative lack or theory consciousness should
concern us, wc arc in an carly stage of disciplinary
evolution. and some progress has heen made in this
direction; JinanciaJ rrobkms hurting quality of teaching
Bhattachan 1987. 1997 Disciplinary progress much too slmv; no original
theoretical contribution even allcr five decades;
preoccupied \\'ith "filling in" of details: should focus on
local experiences. synthesizing Western and the
indigenous: equality and social justice should become
key themes; students should have ample opportunity for
field research: many more c1ectives required:
departmental autonomy and higher financial incentives
10 teachers required; regular review of department and
teachers necessary: split the department into two. i.e.
sociology and anthropology
Rai 1971. 1984 International researchers should not be required to
respond to national imperatives, although they should be
sensitive to them; "salvage anthropology" required;
language barrier should and can be reduced; essence of
anthropology must be honored by guarding against
intrusion of other social sciences as well as ';pseudo
anthropology"
Devkota 1984,200 I Romanticism and ;;otherness", not action-orientedness,
remain predominant and promote intellectual colonial~
ism; coordination required between teaching depart-
ments and research centers; popular resistance to state
and modernization and poverty and environmental
deterioration should become key areas of investigation
Bista 1).1987, 1996***,
1997
Bista .K. 1973
13erreman 1994
Fisher 1987
Bhattachan and
Fisher 1994
Mikesell 1993
Should attend to literature published in the Nepali lang-
uage: should emphasize needs of thc count!)', national
identity. integrative processes and modernization rather
than on nostalgia: bland ethnography not useful; dealing
\\'ith real political. economic and social issues; short-
staying international researchers cannot comprehend
historical context purposeful institutions key to
disciplinary development; not all sponsored research
sides with the "overdog": important to link social!
ideological leatures and development
High significance of applied anthropology; "salvage
anthropology" important but "costly"; accounts by
transient international anthropologists sometimes
divisive; efliJrts required to reduce harrier posed by the
English language
Should contribute to public education principally
through comparative. holistic and contextual studies and
by giving voice to the oppressed; approves lvan 111ich's
call for "counter-research on alternatives to prepackaged
solutions" as well as C Wright Mills's call for social
science to practice the politics of truth
"Romanticism" and development ;'often vacuous";
extent of "reverse romanticism" high and problematic;
priority to large-scale and long~range perspective and
critical ,... ision of the big picture much more important
than myopic and small-scale field studies; priority to
universal problems and timeless issues
Theorizing remains weak; phy'sical, financial and organ-
izational hurdles hindering disciplinary growth;
sponsored research inhibiting the emergence of focal
themes within the discipline
Elaborating concrete conditions that shape life in Nepal
and that are very different from those in the West;
critiquing ;'developmenC that embodies imperialism and
giving voice to the minorities important
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A number of running Ihemes emerge in these reviews of the state of
sociology in Nepal. The theme of romanticism (which is often defined as
*In Macdonald. 1973; ** Reviews social sciences in general; *** In James Fisher
1996; **** Reviews the theor)' and practice of development in Nepal, not on
sociology
f1achhethu 2002**
Gurung, 1990
Bhandari 1990
Cameron 1994****
Lack of serious academic work by sociologists and
anthropologists because of the lure of consultancy;
tinancial incentives much higher in international
agencies. INGOs, NGOs. private research centers and
colleges; both students and teachers in the social
sciences as a \\'ho1c at Tribhuvan University (TU) regard
their work in the institution as less than a full time job;
erosion of personal honesty and integrity among both
teachers and students; 'I'll mismanaged and underfunded
Inadequate physical infrastructure and educational
materials constrain both teaching and research;
discipline can serve the policy maker and the people as a
social and cultural interpreter; this. in turn, requires
political-economic and historical familiarity; need to
de.'elop local theory and methods
Unattractive academic and financial incentives for
teachers; texts not available in the Nepali language;
Nepali language should become the medium of
instruction in classrooms: expansion of career
opportunities for students needs emphasis; emphasis
required on policy component in teaching and research
Shifting international fashions in development theory
have rendered the image of Nepal fuzzy and shifting;
this journey has been one of sound and fury a<> well as
one in which the outsiders have been predominant;
interdisciplinary efforts should be emphasized; priority
to the inquiry of the global dimension that shows how
interests of external agencies condition options available
for internal choice; priority should be given to issues of
power and accountability
a preoccupation with and glamorization of the past as well as the
currently existing) versus midwifery (often defined as a preoccupation
with the future) is clearly implicated in these reviews. It has been
alleged, mostly although not exclusively, by Nepali academics, that
romanticism is strongly implicated in the very choice of Nepal-and
some specific regions and locations within it, selection of themes as well
as modes of thinking and writing of mostly, although not exclusively, by
international academics. It has been argued by many that this
romanticism detracts from the contribution the discipline could make to
the "dispassionate" understanding, as also to public policy formulation
and implementation and development. The scent of applied science and
immediately socially useful work is strong here, as is the sense of
actively and directly intervening, doing and participating. Contemplation.
analysis and remaining at a distance from the center of activity, that is.
activities which are elaborated through the power of the state,
international agencies, international non-governmental organizations and,
generically, by development, is not prized enough here, (It must be said
that voluntal)' engagement by Nepali academics also remains high within
the domain of the rather politically unglamorolls and financially 110n-
paying civil society initiatives.) This contrast between the Nepali and
international academics, however, must not be overdrawn. Many
academics-both Nepali and international-have drawn attention to the
significance of the large-scale and long run perspective that are
theoretically and historically informed, Fisher (1987) reminds us that
"reverse romanticism" arising out of the faith bestowed on the state, the
international financial institutions and on the agenda of modernization
can become counterproductive as well.
As Fisher notes, it is difficulI to define romanticism (within the
context of sociological inquiry); the allegation of romanticism as applied
to particular inquiry is often vacuous. Romanticism is certainly not a
matter of the physical or cultural location of the "field" or of subject
matter or theme of inquiry. Nor is it a matter of a particular technique of
generating dala and infonnation, It may perhaps be defined as a feature
of an entire mode of inquiry that contributes to mystification rather than
to clarification. Romanticism and mystification is inherent in the modes
of inquiry that are non-problematizing, ahistorical, and non-comparative,
Such attributes are also inherent in the modes of inquiry that do not
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explore the encompassing context within which the concrete is located
and that do not seek to resolve the interface between the whole and the
part as well as the reconfiguration of the interface. Within the academia,
the invocation of "disciplinary boundaries"' often serves to hide the
connectedness and wholeness of social life, particularly in relation to the
larger political and economic conditions and processes. Romanticism and
mystification is inherent in modes of inquiry that do not allow full and
authentic expression of the "local". Romanticism and mystification is
also implicated in attempts that unproblematically seek to slot the local
into a predetermined substantive and theoretical conceptual framework.
The nationalist agenda is very strong in the writings of many Nepali
academics. \\/hile this is evident from the preceding paragraph, the wide
and frequent invocation of the nationalist-and sometimes ethnic,
regional, etc., as also of the notion of "Nepal School of Anthropology"-
is a telling expression of the sentiment. The call for indigeneity within
the discipline and the emphasis on the investigation of the processes of
national identity and integration also bear this out. On the other hand,
John Cameron's (1994) warnings against the ill-consequences of
changing international academic fads on the image of Nepal and the
practice of development there does underpin the problematic nature of
the external and universalistic gaze. (This criticism would, of course,
apply to other countries as welL)
The 1950-1980 period was one of nationalist renaissance in Nepal
(also see Onta 1996). In particular, this was the period when Nepal was
partially unshackled in a number of domains-not least within the
domain of education and school curricula, trom India. Illustratively,
school texts on the history and geography of Nepal were prepared and
used in the school curricula, for the first time, during the late 1950s.
Beginning the early 70s, a new uniform and nationalistic school
curriculum was introduced in the much-expanded school system. This
was also a period when the non-South Asian and non-Chinese world
started to intrude, and impact directly on, the lives of the majority of
Nepalis. (This does not, however, imply that Nepal was "closed" prior to
this period, unlike what many historians and politicians have asserted and
as conventional wisdom incessantly repeats (cf Mishra 1987.) The
current generation of sociologists was nurtured during this period. The
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nationalist agenda within sociology and anthropology, however, should
not be equated with the search for indigeniety within the discipline. This
search, in part, goes beyond the notion of national ism and constitutes a
resistance against the universalistic claims of (primarily Western) social
science and sociology and anthropology. It also constitutes a call for
providing full and authentic respect to the local, for not the privileging
current Western experiences and frames of thought and for an authentic
interfacing between the particular and the general. It is a voice of protest
against the political and economic hierarchization within the world
system. Similar voices have been heard for nearly five decades from
academics in the underdeveloped countries. More recent voices along
this line have been summarized in Moore (1996; in particular see the
introductory essay by Moore and by Norman Long on globalization and
localization).
In consonance with the emphasis on nationalism, modernism and
developmentalism and the resistance against romanticism, ethnography
as the dominant mode of doing sociology and social anthropology has
been strongly questioned both by Nepali and international sociologists.
This mode of practice has been strongly questioned on the grounds of
authenticity (cf Furer-Haimendorf vs. Ortner in Ortner (1973),
Manzardo's (1992) mea culpa on "impression management" among the
Thaklis, Kawakita liro's (1974) retraction of his initial characterization
of Marphali women). It has also been questioned on the grounds of
adequacy of explanation, for example, Ortner's (1989) criticism of
spatially and temporally shackled ethnography and Dahal's (1983)
criticism of Lionel CapJan in relation to Hindu dominance over ethnic
groups (Caplan 1970). It need not be overemphasized that the dominant
mode of doing ethnography was, and to a certain extent remains,
"shackled". One reason for such shackling is/was methodological:
Participant observation, in practice, generally did not allow for historical
and/or an explicitly cross-cultural vision. If historical vision remained
consistently deemphasized in ethnography, cross-cultural perspective
was generally defined as falling within the domain of the Ph. D.
supervisors and other high ranking "theorists", rather than "field level"
and Ph. D.-seeking anthropologists. Such perspectives were often
regarded as negating the definition of a culturally and/or physically
defined field, regardless of the fact that the negation mortally violated
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holism, the time hanored principle of anthropological investigation. The
dominant mode of doing ethnography not only encouraged discrete
studies, but also legitimized the invalid notion that societies and cultures
investigated were unconnected with wider expanses of time, space,
cultures and polities and economies. For this artificial "\vhole" to stand
on its own, it had to be set apart, often invidiously, from macro level and
wider as well as immediately neighboring societies largely by means of
"professional" fiat, rather than by means of historical criteria. It is for
these reasons that ethnographers have been charged not only by the state,
the nationalists and the culturally dominant, but also by trained
sociologists and anthropologists with encouraging divisiveness. Thus
also the emphasis in the preceding revie\vs that "integrative" structures,
conditions and processes should legitimately be regarded as key themes
of anthropological inquiry.
On the other hand, the nationalist and culturally dom inant strain, as
noted, remains strong among Nepali sociologists and anthropologists.
One implication of this character is obvious from the preceding review.
Few Nepali academics have acknowledged that resistance, conflict,
struggle and emancipation-all somewhat divisive themes-ought to
become a key site of sociological inquiry. Indeed, the emphasis on the
developmentalist, nationalist. statist, and modernist agenda has been
quite strong. The preceding review, in consequence, generally fails to
acknowledge that social criticism has a legitimate place within the
discipline. While many international academics have, somewhat
understandably, shied away from these themes, except as applied to the
local context, some others have insightfully explored them (for example,
Caplan 1972, Gaige 1975, Blaikie, Camcron and Seddon 1980, Mikesell
1999). Though some Nepali academics have also highlighted such
themes (for example, Mishra 1987, Bista 1992), most analyses by Nepali
academics have either sought to downplay conflict and resistance or to
find ways to "manage" it. Rather plentiful but discrete inquiries on
''"resource management", for example those related to particular forest
tracts, drinking water systems, are examples. No surprise then that a few
sociologists and anthropologists have provided substantive accounts of
either the 1990 transition or the Maoist insurgency (see Bhattachan 1993,
Karki and Seddon 2003, however). This must be regarded as a serious
failure. The use of anns in the "Maoist struggle" has certainly inhibited
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field-based studies-the staple of many within the discipline. So has the
government's security perception, particularly during periodic bouts of
"national emergency", which views access to, storing and utilization of
Maoist literature as an act of offense against the state. (Access to Maoist
Party literature remains difficult in any case.) And, during this period of
anned struggle bet\veen the Maoists and the state, academics as well as
others, to a large extent justifiably, have remained worried and fearful on
account of the "Marxist" and "Maoist" books on their shelves. Further,
there is a pervading sense of insecurity among academics, journalists and
many others that specific conclusions they reach and publish may invite
reprisal from the government security forces or the Maoists. The ensuing
sense of insecurity is a powerful inhibitor of academic engagement with
the ongoing "Maoist" struggle. Nonetheless, these inhibitors cannot
justifY the paucity of inquiry into the struggle. Part of this failure, which
is both personal and professional----at least as far as Nepali academics are
concerned, must be attributed to old disciplinary emphases on ethno-
graphy, isolated ritual performances, "integrative" features, modernity
and the newer disciplinaI)! as well as local emphases on development,
resource management, and the routine of project-level feasibility and
evaluation studies.
Allied to this is paucity of inquiries on large-scale and long-range
issues (cf Fisher 1987) and the micro-macro interface. Despite the
legitimate criticism of discrete micro studies by several academics cited
in Table I, fe\v of the articles in Contrihutions to Nepalese Studies
(henceforth Contributions), the premier sociological/anthropological
journal published in Nepal and onc that has been in operation for three
decades, explore such themes. The political-economic perspective, which
arguably lends itself much more readily to such themes, has remained
relatively neglected. This neglect, among others, is tied to the academics
and politics of the "field", empiricism, anthropological holism, the
agenda of spatially and sectorally delimited development, the nature of
sponsored research and the nature of the "development project" within
the ambit of which many micro-studies are carried out. I will come to the
wider implications of sponsored research later.
One area, in which resistance, conflict and struggle have been rather
widely studied, particularly in recent years, is the area of ethnicity. While
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ethnicity was often implicated--ta varying extents-in most ethno-
graphic studies, the politics of ethnicity, ethnic conflict and the interface
between ethnicity and nationalism has recently become a substantively
salient area of inquiry. The 1990 restoration of democracy has furnished
a potent site for organized political action on an ethnic basis and for
inquiries into ethnic identity, discrimination and exclusion. The
implications of emerging notions of ethnicity and ethnic political action
on the nature of the Nepali state, Nepali nationalism and social justice
and democracy arc being widely discussed as well.
This ethnic debate has taken two principal forms. The tirst
visualizes ethnicity as historically and socially constructed and contin-
gent. Ethnicity, in this view, is constructed and sharpened and blunted
within the context of specific political, economic and cultural structures
and processes. The second [onn, which is essentialist in nature, in turn,
posits that ethnicity is a primordial attribute of a group of people-an
attribute (or set of attributes) that always was and, by extension, will
always be, in existence.
The non-essentialist position has led to a rich debate on ethnicity,
ethnic connict and nationalism. While Ortner (1989), Holmberg (1989)
and a few others laid the ground, the 1997 volume edited by Gellner,
Pfaff-Czarnecka and Whelpton elaborates this position in great detail and
with respect to the state and its evolution, various caste and ethnic groups
and the emerging cultures and their career. The voices represented in the
volume are diverse and amply demonstrate that ethnicity is historically
constructed through specific political, economic and cultural structures
and processes (see, in particular, the contribution by Pfaff-Czarnecka).
The contributors to the volume also argue that because ethnicity is not an
ahistorical construct, it is necessary to problematize and interrogate it.
As Gellner emphasizes in his introduction, the "true" essentialist
position, which smacks of the days of "headhunters" and barbarians and
races and tribes, has a few adherents now (For an overview and critique
of the notion of tribe, see Dahal 1981, Caplan 1990). The legitimacy of
the essentialist position has also been eroded by expanding intercultural
interaction, movements of population and labor, the modernist, develop-
menttalist and liberal democratic nature of many states, and the galloping
commodity and labor exchange regime under capitalism and imperialism,
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which is sometimes subsumed under the notion of globalization. Further,
the essentialist position often defeats itself as many of those who take
such a position in relation to the past and the present, nonetheless, argue
that future ethnic political consciousness and practice (that is, ethnicity)
will undergo a transition to the extent that certain specific contradictions
find a resolution.
Regardless, "less pure" and softer versions of the essentialist
position remain in vogue among ethnic political activists and politically
committed academics (for example, National Ad hoc Committee for
International Decade for the World's Indigenous Peoples, Nepal, 1994,
Bhattachan 1995). These visions freeze history, create unidimensional
"ethnics", eschew diversity and invidious political interests within and
between ethnic groups, force a disconnect with encompassing political
and economic issues and, in addition, seek to del ink such issues from the
question of ethnic identity. These visions, nonetheless, point out
accumulating contradictions in a politically powerful manner and
underscore the continuing significance of participatory and equity-based
cultural and political negotiations.
Even as ethnography and ethnic studies have been in full bloom for
several decades, the extreme lack of attention on the Dalits by sociolo-
gists remains both curious and sad (see Caplan 1972, however). This
inattention must be regarded as a serious flaw within the sociology of
Nepal. Indeed, the omnipresent and powerful caste system as a whole has
received far less attention than ethnicity and several other themes. The
Gellner, Pfaff- Czarnecka and Whelpton volume is no exception, except
for a relatively peripheral treatment of the caste system among the
Newars by Gellner. The politically and culturally excluded have also
been left out of the intellectual discourse by Nepali academics. As far as
international academics are concerned, could it be that those interested in
the caste system and the Dalits fmd neighboring India more interesting
instead?
The "reverse romanticism" with developmental ism and modernity-
and with state and international development and donor agencies as well
as INGOs and NGOs who remain at the foretTont of these agendas-
within sociology and anthropology in Nepal as noted by Fisher, remains
pronounced. The preoccupation with feasibility and impact studies
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resource (for example. forest, irrigation, drinking water) management,
etc., remains notably intense. The participation of sociologists and
anthropologists. both national and international, takes place within the
frame of a project and by its vcry nature is generally limited to "field"
level information generation, analysis of data and preparation of report.
The reports generally do not contextualize the project and the field within
a larger historical, spatial and theoretical-conceptual ti'ame. Most such
reports are not publicly and intellectua[l~y scrutinized and they thus do not
contribute to public. intellectual and disciplinary debate. Project
literature, not least because they are zealously guarded from public
scrutiny, very often does not even contribute to the practice of national
and international development debate and the larger agenda that cut
across different sectors, different development agencies and different
levels of government.
One key, although not the only, reason for the relatively high level
of participation of sociologists in such "sponsored" research is the high
level of distortion in the structure of wage incentives. The incentives to
engage in sponsored research are several times more than the incentives
to teach at the university ( It is also the case. on the other hand, there is a
sharp and just about impenetrable barrier in incentives for the national
and international researchers). In addition, many international
development agencies contract work out to individuals rather than
institutions. Most academic institutions, on the other hand, are
organizationally, although not academically. unequipped to organize
research programs and to collaborate \vith the government and
international development agencies to that cnd.
The engagement \vith sponsored research, however, has not all been
negative for the evolution of the discipline. It has contributed to the
interfacing of the disciplinary texts-\vhich, to a substantial extent are
repositories of specific Western experiences-with local structures and
lives. This interfacing has helped national academics to engage in a
comparative reading of the texts as against national and local structures
and lives. It has made available a platform for the generation of
comparative infonnation and insight. This platform can serve as a
creativity-promoting site, particularly within a setting within which the
authority of the text has tended to remain unquestioned and sacrosanct.
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In addition, to the extent that the line between applied and basic research
is permeable, sponsored applied research can provide valuable input to
more basic disciplinary research.
Emphases in Sociology in Nepal
The evolution of the discipline in Nepal can also be characterized and
assessed through a review of the outlets for sociological and anthro-
pological writings. Such writings, however, remain scattered in several
academic and semi-academic journals, magazines and newspapers. The
significance of semi-academic writings by sociologists and anthropolo-
gists, while lying along the borders of the discipline, should not be
underrated. It serves not only as an aid to public education but also to the
training of aspiring and "junior" sociologists. These outlets, which are
not the exclusive privilege of the trained academics, provide valuable
space to those who wish to write in the Nepali or other vernacular
languages and have helped several non-sociologists and non-
anthropologists make valuable contributions to the discipline (See Rai
1984, however).
At present, several journals cater to the writings of sociologists and
anthropologists Contributions (1973-), which is published by the Center
for Nepal and Asian Studies, of course, has remained the principal outlet
for the last three decades. The Occasional Papers in Sociology and
Anthropology published by the Department of Sociology and
Anthropology, Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur Campus since 1987, is an
additional outlet. By 2001, seven volumes of the journal have come out.
Studies in Nepali History and Society, published by Center for Social
Research and Development since 1996, Kailash, the publication of which
has recently become irregular, and the journal of Nepal Research Center
are other significant outlets. In addition, there are several other academic
and semi-academic journals and magazines, published in the English and
Nepali language, such as Pragya, Mulyankan, Himal, Himal South Asia,
Asmita, Rolamba. In addition, during the last decade, several semi-
academic and news magazine publications have focused on issues related
to gender ethnicity and ethnic groups, Dalithood and Dalits as well as
specific regions of the country, Such publications have started the
polyvocal genre within social thinking and writing and are beginning to
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make to make their presence fclt within public policy institution. Further,
several weeklies and dailies occasionally publish articles by sociologists
and anthropologists,
This review will focus on the Contributions and provide quantitative
information on some aspects of the nature and "productivity" of Nepali
and international sociologists and anthropologists describe the theme of
the articles and assess decadal trends with respect to productivity and
themes. In addition, the articles will also be categorized in tenns of their
level of "theory consciousness". Further, the themes covered in Occasio-
nal Papers will also be described. It must be emphasized that this
description and assessment is of a preliminary and quantitative nature.
Table 2. Themes Covered by Articles in Contributions
Theme/PeriodlNumber of Articles 1973- 1981- 1991- Total
1980 1990 2001
Ethnography, ethnicity, nationalism, identity 17 13 7 37
Resource management. population, ecosystem 5 4 2 11
State, economy, market. livelihood 4 t I 2 17
Politics, resistance, conflict struggle, inequality 2 0 3 5
Gender, caste, kinship 3 7 2 12
Ideology, knowledge, sociology, anthropology 2 I 1 4
Health, education, environment development I 8 4 13
Social and cultural change 3 2 I 6
Religion, rituals, shamanism 11 0 6 17
Ethnography, livelihood, rituals and shamanism and faith healing
are the most favored genre within Contributions. Many of the
ethnographic articles are also based on very short-tenn and one-shot
visits to particular "field" sites and, partly as a consequence, provide a
simple descriptive account of a specific aspect of an ethnic group's
cultural life, for example, discrete ritual performance, shamanism, trans-
humance, dimensions of livelihood, demographic attributes, Often the
articles implicitly evoke a sense of material poverty, physical and social
isolation and rather stark boundedness among the ethnic group described,
The descriptive focus, generally, is on relatively unusual "ethnic
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attributes" and the descriptive mood is often somber. In turn, there is
little history, little "wholeness", little explicit cross-cultural comparison
and little emphasis on locating the subjects within larger, that is,
regional, national, international or more encompassing political,
economic and cultural patterns and processes. These features indicate
that there is more than a whiff of anthropological romanticism here, even
as such ethnographic efforts have opened our eyes to the diverse nature
of social structure and culture. provided a base for deeper and wider
investigations and furnished perspectives and infomlation, which are
potentially useful for preliminary ethnographic mappings.
On the other hand, sociological and anthropological writings, as
reflected in Contrihutions have seriously deemphasized themes related to
politics, ideology, resistance, inequality, contradiction and change--
themes which have been starkly highlighted and acquired a particular
urgency during the current era of "Maoist conflict". Romanticism,
"salvage anthropology" functionalism, developmental ism, sciemificity,
political neutrality, boundedness and the failure to look at the larger
picture, despite their value, have performed a potent disservice to the
sociological and anthropological enterprise, Studies of these genres, on
the other hand, do serve to highlight the significance of sociological and
anthropological studies which focus on the larger picture and which seek
to interconnect different sections of the larger picture. They also
highlight the significance of the historically infonned studies that do not
fetishize "culture", but locate it alongside and within a specific and
changing political economic structure and which give sufficient space to
political processes and to the genesis and consequences of social
contradiction.
Approximately 30 percent of the articles published in Contributions
substantively locate themselves within, or seek to interrogate, relatively
established conceptual-theoretical frameworks and contribute to the
interpretation, buttressing or refutation, of the relatively established
schools of thought or to the development of a more or less novel frame,
The scope and significance of such articles is also broader than their
immediate empirical engagement One-half of the articles, even as they
do locate themselves within a relatively established conceptual-
theoretical framework, do so in a peripheral manner. Such articles do not
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bring themselves to bear on such frameworks. About one-fifth of the
articles remain at the level of "lay description". The academic
significance of the later two categories of articles, the last category in
particular, necessarily remains low.
Table 3: Level of Theoretical Consciousness" in Articles in Contributions
Articles b.y Articles that Articles that Articles that
sociologists and substantively marginally remain at thePeriod anthropologists implicate a implicate a level of lay
theoretical theoretical description
framework framework
t973-1980 48 15 2t 12
1981-1990 47 14 24 9
1991-200t 33 9 20 4
Total 128 38 65 25
. Trends indicate that the proportion of articles, which substantively
Imphcat,~ SP~CI~,C conceptual-theoretical frameworks while setting up
and/or solvmg a research problem, has remained nearly constant
through three decades of publication of Contributions. On the other hand
there has been a discernible rise in the proportion of articles tha;
peripherally invoke a conceptual- theoretical framework. Whether this
r~pr~sents a step toward a more intense and explicit recognition of the
SignIficance of conceptual-theoretical and comparative analysis in the
future remains to be seen.
Table 4. Productivity of Sociologists and Anthropologists in Contributions
Period Issues Articles Articles by Articles by
published published Articles bysociologists/ Nepali international
anthropologists authors authors
1973-1980 14 96 48 7 41
1981-1990 22 133 47 15 32
199t -2001 23 180 32 1I 21
Total 59 409 127 33 94
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This decadal comparison of Contrihutions shows several notable
features. First, sociologists and anthropologists contributed one-half of
all the articles published during the 70s (columns 3 and 4). During the
80s, the number of articles authored by sociologists and anthropologists
declined substantially in terms of proportion. Ditto in the 90s, both in
terms of number and proportion. Sociologists and anthropologists
contributed only about one-fifth of all articles published during tlie 90s.
This quantitative reduction, however, also has to be viewed against the
"expanding inclusivensss" of editorial policy as well as the overall
growth of social science academic writing in Nepal. The initial domain
of Contributions lay along the disciplines of history, linguistics and
anthropology and sociology. The growth of academia and research
outputs in other field of social sciences for example, economics,
development, political science, human geography, etc., obliged the
editors of Contributions to cater to articles in these fields as well. While
the consequent "expanding inclusiveness" of Contrihutions does in part
explain the proportional reduction in the number of articles authored by
sociologists and anthropologist, it fails to explain the reduction in terms
of absolute number evidenced during the 90s. This reduction is much
more troubling than it appears to be in as much as the number of
sociologists and anthropologists, including those employed at
Tribhuvan-and to a much smaller extent other-universities grew
rapidly during this very period. In addition, Tribhuvan University, which
remains the principal institutional locus of academic sociology and
anthropology, had increased the premium on the publication of articles as
a basis for promotion within the academic hierarchy. While it is not
possible here to exhaustively scan the reasons underlying the reduction in
the number of articles published by sociologists and anthropologists in
the journal, it can be safely said that the opening of other avenues of
publication as mentioned earlier and engagement in the fast growing
sponsored "project" research might have accounted for the reduction.
Second, during all the three periods, Nepali sociologists and
anthropologists published fewer articles in the Contributions compared
to international sociologists and anthropologists. Some progress,
however, has been discernible on this front: While Nepali authors
contributed only one-seventh of all articles-seven in all--published in
the journal during the 70s, the proportion rose to one-third during the
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latter two decades. Once again, however, the "expansion" of the
disciplines of sociology in Nepal during the 80s and, particularly, the 90s
is hardly substantiated by the record of publication in Contrihutions. The
record, on the other hand, does show that the presence of intemational
authors continued to remain strong within sociology and anthropology in
Nepal.
Table 5. Themes Covered by Articles in Occasional Papers (1987-2001)
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on politics, ideology, resistance, struggle, inequality. Unlike Contribu-
tions, on the other hand, it has fewer writings on ethnography, rituals
caste, kinship, gender, shamanism, etc" the traditional core of sociology
and anthropology. During the early years, somewhat expectedly, and as
evidenced by the information provided in Table I, the journal was also
preoccupied with "appropriate sociology and anthropology" and the
preparation of a programmatic agenda for pushing the discipline towards
greater "appropriateness".
As noted, one of the possible reasons for the low presence of Nepali
authors in Contributions is the opening of alternative avenues of
publication in sociology and anthropology. Occasional Papers, which
was first published by the Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur campus, in 1987, is one such avenue. Till
200 I, seven issues of Occasional Papers have been published. Most of
the articles have been in the Occasional Papers have been authored by
members of the faculty in the Kirtipur campus.
The focus of Occasional Papers is much more explicitly
"developmental" compared to Contributions. A large proportion of the
articles on education, environment, resource management, population,
ecosystem, livelihood, etc., in the journal falls within the "development"
genre. On the other hand, and like Contributions, there are few writings
Theme
Ethnography. ethnicity, nationalism, identity
Resource management. popu lation. cwsystem
State. economy. market. livelihood
Politics. resistance, conflict. struggle. inequality
Gender. ca"te. kinship
Ideology, knowledge. sociology. anthropology
Health, education, environment, development
Social and cultural change
Religion, rituals. shamanism
Other
Total
Number of Articles
5
9
6
1
5
7
14
1
2
4
54
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ENDNOTES
1. This paper "as originally publisbed in CONTRIl3LJTIONS TO NEPALESE
STUDIES Volume.32.No.l. January. 2005 and it has been reprinted here in
this volume \\-'ith the kind permission of Centre Cor Nepal and Asian Studies.
Tribhuvan University. Kathmandu. Nepal.
2. Whether sociology is distinct relatively recent and modern European
product or whether the discipline-----()r a recognizable precursor of it--can be
traced to other specific spatial and historical setting(s) has, surprisingly,
remained a nearly unexplored issue \vithin sociology. To the extent that
historical and social thinking and writing is rooted in social struggle and
transformation. one could certainly have expected the sociological genre to
have marked its presence during the formation and dismemberment of the
Greco-Roman empires and civilizations. the opening of the Euro-American
and Eurasian trade routes, the decimation of the American-Indian peoples
and cultures and the rapid ascendance of the European civilization in the
Americas during the 16th to 20th centuries. the stave trade in and across
Africa, the formation of North Africa and Arabic urban regions. the ups and
downs of the Sinic and Japanese civilizations. the initial institutionalization
of the extremely oppressive and deeply divisive caste in India as well as the
ferments created during the rise of all great religions and various larger scale
and long-winded religious, sectarian, ethnic and national wars and their
aftermath. The overall economic, political and cultural significance of these
struggles and transition may very well have been relatively narrower,
shallower and slower and, therefore, more contained than those produced by
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capitalism and imperialism. Nonetheless, sociology has n:mained poorer
because of the virtual absence of explorations, which seek to link these and
other Iargc-sculc struggles and transitions on the onc hand and modes and
substances of social imagination and investigation on the other.
I am grateful to Sur~sh Dhakal for helping me with information provided in
the tables in this section.
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THE DECADE OF VILOENT
DESTABILIZATION IN NEPAL: AN ANALYSIS
OF ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
TRAJECTORY
Tone B1eie
This article
l w~lI discuss how the negotiations over the defining attributes
?f state ~uthonty and of state-society relations at important conjunctures
In N~~al 5 recent political history are related to political and economic
condltlO~s ":,,ith n~tionaL regional and global outreach. The unravelling
of the mtncate 1I1terplay between internal and external st t Id" rueuro
con 1tlO115 and ma~or national political events over nearly five decades
(1950 -] 996) questions any facile characterisation of the Maoist rebellion
(which started in 1996) as an internal conflict only. The exposition
~oreo~er questIOns any characterisation of the Nepalese state as
increasingly "developmentalist" and hence accountable from a rights-
based perspective (see Bleie et. ai, 2000).
!.he main analytical focus of this article is on the structural
conditIOns and agency actions that resulted in 1996 in a Maoist-led
rebellion m this richly endowed Himalayan kingdom 2 Th' C
. . . IS lOCUS
mevltably raises the need for an analytical framework to explain the
causes of the inception of the Maoist uprising in Nepal. To outline the
:vhole net:vork of interacting ultimate and proximate causes and effects
IS exceedmgly demanding, analytically speaking, as well as space
consummg, and thus too tall an order for an article. Instead, this article
seeks to establish a more tentative explanatory framework of the dialectic
betw~en structural conditions and agency actions, which to some degree
explams both some enduring features of the autocratic state and its ability
to adapt - at least for an mtennedlate period over the last 50 years _
under dramatically changing circumstances. Well-known historical
I
Il
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events, including the palace revolt in 1951, the democratic refonns of
1959, the 1980 referendum, the People's Movement in ]990, the
declaration of People's War in 1996 and the April Movement in 2006,
are analysed by combining insights from political science, public
administration and anthropology. A straightforward instrumentalist view
of government that conceptualises policy as technical, rational, action-
oriented instruments for effecting change is supplemented by an
anthropological view of governance (see Shore and Wright, 200 I). This
view conceptualises governance as governed by more complex and
diffuse symbolic processes which establish indigenous institutional rules
and codes of conduct that are internalised. Through these processes,
certain fundamental tenets of the prevailing order of governance are
naturalised and therefore scarcely subjected to reflection. Such a
perspective is applied in order to explain the strikingly widespread and
deeply-felt belief in the sacrosanct Hindu monarchy among supporters
both of the autocratic regime and of liberal democracy.
This view of governance, derived from political anthropology, also
gains analytical strength from drawing on a more comprehensive theory
of the nature of this Hindu state and its underlining cultural models of
divine kingship, sovereignty, body politic and the nature of cultural
diversity] This analytical approach to governance is found to be useful in
explaining how and why the monarch has been unaccountable until the
historical decision in 2006 of the reinstated House of Representatives,
and how the bureaucracy in Nepal has been imbued with an institutional
logic based on patronage and loyalty, a logic unlike the Western notion
of accountability as answerability to human rights concerns' While
Nepal's rulers, for purely pragmatic reasons, in the period between ]950
and ]990 tapped legitimacy through a development discourse, the
internal workings of the government, bureaucracy and public domain
created few incentives for establishing basic accountability mechanisms. 5
In ]990, the People's Movement (Jana Andolan) fought through a
new democratic constitution. This led to the creation of a democratically
elected government, which subsequently ratified a number of human
rights conventions. These unprecedented events promised a new era of
intensified efforts to institutionalise basic accountability mechanisms.
The reasons why such high expectations were dashed will be explored.
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The discussions in this article are confined to analysing most, if not
all, the structural conditions for the violent conflict between the state and
the military and political movement led by the Communist Party of
Nepal (MaOist). Thus, the exposition is not meant to cover all the
necessary and sufficient causes for the rapid escalation of the conflict
which has over the last decade engulfed large parts of the country in civi;
w~r and led to a reduced presence (and in certain areas full withdrawal)
of the "old state's" functions. This does not detract from the fact that a
number of the structural causes outlined here are of considerable
relevance in understanding the escalation of the conflict, including the
otherwise inexplicable positions of the main stakeholders (the r~ling
monarch, the Royal Nepalese Anny, the mainstream political parties and
the Commumst Party of Nepal (Maoist) in a situation that seem nearly
unsolvable, but eventually ended in a Comprehensive Peace Accord in
late 2006.
In order tobe able to cast some light on the degree of continuity and
change m the Hmdu state, the article starts out with a brief analysis of the
state smce the unification of Nepal in the late eighteenth century Th' .
. . ISffi
mtended to claritY and explicate the salient structural features of the state
m 1951., including its underpinning cultural models, when strictly
autocratIc rule ended and a period of early contestation of the Hindu state
began. The article argues for caution against sweeping assertions about
the political history of the last half century as a period of shifts between
aut?~ratic and democratic government. It argues instead that the old
pol~t~cal regime underwent certain restructurings as it reasserted its
pohtlcal dominance through a dramatic expansion of a bureaucracy with
a modem appearance, but governed by institutional rules and practices
grounded m an upper-caste, patronage-oriented court culture. This
massIve ~xpansion of the state apparatus only created the appearance of a
progressIve Nepalese accommodation to international norms of demo-
cracy and a redistributive and accountable state ensuring human rights. In
real tenns, the expansion led to a certain upward mobility predominantly
of men from the hIgher castes, whose co-option into the state apparatus
allowed a revitalisation of the old regime. This restructured and
consolidated regime could now, though bureaucratic expansion and
legItImate development rhetoric, directly penetrate rural society and
pursue a policy of centralisation in spite of its rhetoric to the contrary.
Thus, it is only apparently a paradox that the integration of the
mountain kingdom into the world community (accompanied by a large
influx of development assistance) enabled the regime to tap both Western
and indigenous sources of legitimacy. Donor assistance was used by the
regime to expand a bureaucracy that emulated the old patronage culture,
now flourishing on generous monetary and technical assistance. While
helping to ensure the hegemonic grip of the old autocratic regime in the
shorter run, the development assistance also had other contradictory
effects, reinforcing economic differentiation, restructuring social
disparities and transforming political consciousness of ethnic, caste and
gender-based injustices at both collective and individual levels.
While both international political developments and development
assistance in the four principal development decades (1960s to 1990s)
engendered first the seeds and later the ferment of political dissent -
centred on a Western liberal discourse on the nature of the state and
state-society relations - there was another set of national actors who
represented an alternative chorus of dissenting voices, based on Marxist-
Leninis! and Maoist political ideology. This stream of political thought,
which claimed to be scientific and of universal applicability, contained a
comprehensive set of propositions about the nature of world history, of
global/regional and national interdependencies, and thus also of Nepal's
history. Based on this political ideology, the communists had, from their
establishment of the first communist party, challenged the autocratic
monarchy and called for a constituent assembly in order to create what
they coin "the objective conditions" for a radical rupture in the old
political order and the genesis of "a new state".
This state would effectively combat gender, caste, ethnic and
regional oppression. In recognition of the importance of this growing
political movement and its regional basis, the article briefly describes the
major shifts in the institutionalisation of communism in Nepal, through
bewilderingly numerous fissions and fusions. These were at times the
results of personality-based politics and other more pragmatic postures.
But the fissions and fusions were at times the results of deep ideological
dissent, resulting in the purging of minority views.
The article eventually focuses on the sudden rise in 1990 of a
popular movement, which led to a new constitution that enshrined
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constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy. Three main lines of
argument are developed about the 1990/91 events and the following
period up to the proclamation of the insurgency. Firstly, the article
pinpoints that the cultural hegemony of the notion of Hindu monarchy
and certain international and national political constellations resulted in a
qU~lIed mass movement and an incongruous constitution. Secondly, the
article stresses the importance of 1990/91 and the following years as a
radical juncture for the communist movement in Nepal. Some of these
leftist parties became parliamentary actors. One newly merged
communist party (Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist-Leninist)
turned to social democratic ideology and went into government. Three
other Maoist and outrightly republican parties, though opposed to the
constitution and the multiparty system, created first a political front (the
UnIty Centre) so as to expose tactically the inadequacies of the
parliamentary system, then later withdrew from parliamentary politics
while utilising the expanded liberties of civil society to make a~
unprecedented comeback. Thirdly, the reasons for the failure of both
leftist and rightist democratic parties to build effective coalitions around
national interests and to start institutionalising a democratic transition are
outlined. This blatant failure to embark on a road of democratisation may
be understood as much as an effect of the old regime's political and
mental grip over policy making and administration.
But, this effect led, in turn, to an intolerable disjuncture between on
th~ one hand a fennenting and spreading consciousness of political
gnevances (in a civil society invariably moulded by foreign development
aid and the communist movement) and on the other, the state's failure to
start responding to basic democratic demands, through the establishment
of accountability mechanisms. In fact, the state instead took on a
conflict-inducing and escalating role, resorting to repressive means
through the intact, authoritarian state apparatus. The constellation of
these internal conditions and in addition the ideological victory (within
the Unrty Centre) of the hardliners in favour of armed struggle left the
ground fertIle for the declaration in February 1996 by the Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) of the political and military programme of a so-
called "People's War". This programme aimed at creating a mass-based
movement through first establishing so-called 'base areas' in the remote
rural areas, and then later surrounding urban areas and seizing state
t.
f
power. The Comprehensive Peace Accord of November 2006 can be
characterised as a victory for the Communist Party of Nepal (MaOIst),
though they have for pragmatic reasons conceded to a deal that is based
on liberal democratic values.
THE RISE OF THE HINDU STATE IN NEPAL
Unification and Early Consolidation during Ihe Shahs (1768-1846)
Both in the South-Indian region and Indo-Gangetic region, a number of
expansionist kingdoms rose during the medieval period. They were
organised on religions based on sophisticated textual sources, on the
culture of caste and Hinduism, and on sacred kings considered gods and
great conquerors (lnden, 1990). The rise of Hindu kingdoms in the foot
and mid-hill Himalayan region should be seen as part of these regJOn-
wide trends in state-formation. The unification of Nepal in the middle
and late eighteenth century by Prithivi Narayan Shah was based on a
combination of military force, marriage alliances between immigrants
and ethnic clites, state patronage of earlier local or regional deities,
exterminating some contending chiefly lines while offering others high-
ranking office, and promoting the migration of Hindus to tribal domains.'
As a result of the alliance between Hindu settlers and central ehtes, tnbal
lands were turned into state lands or cleared for cultivation. This resulted
in increased taxation which accrued to the state treasury.
State religion in Nepal was based on the royal lineage's religious
practices, and only this lineage was accorded the power to offer
patronage and confer state status to the state rituals. This basic notio.n ~as
also proved extremely resilient and can be discerned in the contradictIOn
(to be debated in a later subsection) between the 1990 Constitution's
stress on the one side of a sovereign Hindu monarch and descendants
from the Shah lineage's exclusive right to the kingship, and on the other
side, a multi-ethnic and religiously diverse state. This contradiction waS
sought solved at the supra-structural level by the recently (in April 2006)
reinstated House of Representatives, which claimed itself sovereIgn and
abolished Hinduism as state religion and cut deeply most of the
privileges of the kingship.
With the adoption of the Hindu notion of the king as epitomising
society and hence the embodiment of his subjects, it was natural that
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sarkar referred both to the government and the king as the embodiment
of his subjects. While the more subtle interpretation of the founder
warnOr kmg's treatise Divine Teaching (Dibya Upadesh) remains
contested, the fact that the founding statement of Nepal as a Hindu
kmgdom, a garden of four classes (varnas) and of 36 castes (jats) was
even ~ncorporated into the democratic 1990 Constitution is worth
reflect111g t¥Jon (see Shanna, 1997)7 As we will see below, the cultural
model of the monarchy as Hindu has delivered a main state-defining
feature that has proved extremely compelling in Nepalese society. This
model, expressed and legitimised in state rituals, remained virtually
uncontested until the 1920s when as we wI'11 later s II
. . ' ec, some 5ma
SOcieties started to question the legitimate basis for the kingship's divi
rule and the hierarchical caste order. ne
Closely linked to the Shahs' assimilationist and conciliatory
strategies 111 relatIOn to tribal religion, they also opted for a policy of
selective 111tegration of local lords and nobles and chiefly lines from the
heartland mto the state apparatus. The same heartland (the Western and
mId-western hills) was to become the core area of Maoist resistance in
the late twentieth century.
The Consolidated Hindu State: The Rana Era (1846-1951)
lung Bahadur of Kunwar asserted himself as a seminal figure in
Nepalese political history through the Kot massacre in 1846. Bv means
of the famous royal sanad(charter), he managed in 1856 to curt;il the de
}aclo authonty of the Shah patrilineage of Succession and established his
own patnlmeage (adopting the title of Rana) as the heirs' to the
Premlershl~, which were accorded extremely wide powers (see Uprety,
1992.3-4). Rana rule thnved during the next nearly 100 years within the
already well-established institution of divine kingship. The king as the
sovereign was the supreme dispenser of land and offices amongst others.
He was the patron of an extensive pyramid-like ritual exchange
network 10 as well as the head of command structures and of direct!
IndlreC~ polItIcal.control of remote areas, also exercising dominion over a
centralIsed taxatIOn system (based on a particular land tenure re' ).dd' . glme m
a ItlOn to monopoly trade. The centre of judicial, legislative and
executive powers was the Maharaja and his Council, who appointed and If
t
commanded the district officers (badahakims). The Ranas centralIsed the
bureaucracy even more than during the rule of the Shahs. Even minor
appointments needed the Premier's approval. A rule of annual renewal of
offices from lower-ranking offices up to Commander-in-Chief ensured a
strict upward "accountability system" based on loyalty in exchange for
patronage. This principle was matched by a principle of hereditary
succession to all major civil and military positions. The state apparatus
was thus grounded in a bureaucratic culture defined by a patronage
system that mobilised both kinship and caste principles.
The official state realm was devoid of the Western distinction
between the public and the private. At the very top was the Premier, who
after 1856 substituted in persona the erstwhile king as the head of
government (sarkar) and thus as the embodiment of all matters of
collective interest. In other words, the Ranas ruled and the Shahs reigned.
The idea of a harmonious, hierarchical order between ruler and subjects
co-existed uneasily with the ruling family's violent intra-family feuds
over the right of succession to the position of Premier. Of the ten Rana
Premiers, only four died natural deaths while in office. The others were
either assassinated or forced to abdicate (see Uprety 1992:5). The
hierarchical order was also formalised through the promulgation in 1854
of the first civil code, Muluki Ain. The promulgation of a civil code was
inspired by the rulers' exposure to the British Empire's use of
codifications. The content of the code represented an ambitious, yet
pragmatic effort to superimpose an orthodox Hindu caste structure based
on the idea of castes as qualitative species, some slaveable and other
unslaveable. Any notion of the individual was subsumed under the
concept of the collective as an ascribed category of caste. One
outstanding feature of the Code's pragmatic attitude is the middle
position conferred to tribal groups, which the Code ranked as pure castes,
both subdivided into slaveable and unslaveable. 11 This very substantial
reform is an early precursor to political refonns by successive
generations of authoritarian rulers in Nepal. Certain formal features are
borrowed from Western institutions and political language and wedded
with political notions and practices of the Hindu state, regardless of
whether these were truly rooted in Nepali society or simply imposed
through combining force with more subtle fonns of coercion.
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. The pragmatic alliance with the white, impure masters on India
soil allowed the Rana t ' , 0... S 0 pursue a foreign policy of strict isolation. This
pol~cy sUited well the central nation-building objective of reinforcing a
notIOn of Nepal as a uniq t' I' ,, ue na IOn 0 the ritually pure, In addition th
p:hcy --:- whether intentionally or not - practically isolated the elite' an~
t e subjugated multl-ethmc population and lower castes from direct
exposure to 200 years of dramatic political upheavals that led eventually~o political a~d ~ndus~nal revolutions in the Western world. l :! The full
Impact of thiS IsolatIOnist policy is impossible to 11 'satisfactory h b ... spc out In anyf manner ere, ut the Implications for political imaginations
o governance and economic development seem noticeable even until
very recently,
d IThe end of the Rana period has been characterised by contemporary
an atcr commentators as the end of conspiratorial violent politics in
Nepal~ B~t the exceptionally unclear circumstances surroundin the~:assmatlOn of the royal couple and their nearest kin in June 20g1 do
make It unr~a.sonable to question whether this conclusion is
premature, The political culture (institutionalised for more than 150
of Shah a d RI) , , yearsr ~ ,ana ru e with ItS underlying models of the public order of~entra Ise Hmdu state religion, and of loyalty based on patronage ~nd
laVOUrltlsm would also pro 'I'
th I
, fr ve very res] lent against later efforts to refonn
e po Ity om above.
~~~:~~~RUCTUREDHINDU STATE IN THE TWENTIETH
The Early Post-Rana Period
The formal ending of Rana rule in Nepal was due to a a'~~cumstantial constellation of global, regional and domestic c:nd~;~ou~:r
, e recruitment of Gurkhas ' ] into the British Indian Army led to ~
simmering political consciousness about the political e' 'NTh G kh ' , , r glme m epal
, e ur a s participation in the two World Wars and their st t' , 'm IndIa d' h
' a IOnmgunng t e most decisive years of the Indian N t' "Movement f' a Iona 1St
C
. .' :vas 0 particular importance for their earliest political
onSClentlsatlOn. After the . . .of G kh Y were penSIOned, a not mSlgnificant number
dd
' ur as refused, partly on political grounds, to resettle in Nepal In
a ItlOn to the ex-Gurkh II
'
as, a SOla number of elite intellectuals who
,I
I
,
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stayed in India due to family connections and higher studies were also
groomed politically in the Nationalist Movement. They came to form the
core of the small anti-Rana groups, The victory of the Liberation
Movement in 1947, the subsequent withdrawal of the British and the
instalment of the first post-independence government created a new
political situation in Nepal. The Ranas were deprived of their old
colonial ally and found themselves with a neighbouring government
which had every reason to dislike the Ranas, who through the supply of
Gurkha soldiers had directly helped the British to maintain their empire,
Internal dissent over succession in the rapidly expanding Rana family
helped to weaken the Ranas' ability to close the ranks in this new
international situation (see Uprety 1992:5),
While some anti-Rana activities had already taken place in India in
the 1920s and 1930s, J4 the 1940s brought a rapid growth in political
activity, which included one assassination attempt. This was discovered.
Some of those implicated were punished by execution and thereby
became the first martyrs for the democratic cause, In the late 1940s the
Nepali National Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal were
fanned. When Nepal experienced its first incipient civil disobedience
movement, the erstwhile Rana Prime Minister found it necessary to
undertake some limited reforms15 so as to cope in the new international
situation. These steps generated an internal backlash, leading to the
resignation of the Prime Minister (Padma Shamsher) and a ban on the
recently formed Nepali Congress Party, To appease the new Indian
government, the Ranas let the Indians use Nepalese troops during the
Hyderabad and Kashmir crisis and accepted, in 1950, a Treaty on Trade
and Commerce and another on Peace and Friendship (see Shaha,
1990b:195), The latter treaty made Nepal an integrated part of India's
security policy, The Trade Treaty opened Nepal up for Indian economic
interests on very unequal tenns and laid the basis for a growing Indian
domination of the Nepalese economy in the 1960s and 1970s, with
profound long-tenn consequences for Nepal's subsistence economy and
the poverty situation, With the influx of industrial goods like manufac-
tured cloth (augmented later in the 1960s by farm implements and
household utensils), the artisan and service occupations of Nepal'S
numerically large service castes were undermined, Also, the import of
Indian food items, such as a large variety of spices and salt (the salt trade
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with Tibet was made impossible by the Chinese occupation in 1959),
altered the viability of particular occupations and economic institutions
amongst some of the ethnic groups.
Already in 1951, the Communist Party for the first time demanded
the drafting of a new constitution by a constituent assembly. This
demand was voiced during the following 50 years by a number of
communist actors, including the current Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist), which waged a war against the "semi-feudal" state until 2006,16
The actual significance of the Shah royal family in anti-Rana
activities in the 1930s, 1940s and in the Ranas' ultimate downfall in 1950
is disputed (see Shrestha, 1984:121; Brown, 1996:14-22), In November
1950, the king and other royal family members sought asylum at the
Indian embassy in Kathmandu, The royals were later flown to India, The
circumstances surrounding the royal family's flight reveal both India's
direct and indirect roles in the ousting of the Ranas' rule. As we will
repeatedly observe over the next five decades, India was ambivalent in
its strategic postures towards its northern neighbour. The Congress's
armed resistance movement, Mukti Sena,17 received only limited support
from the Indians, who feared the immediate effects of an unstable
northern frontier however much they wanted a more palatable rule in
Nepal (Rose 1971), IS Delhi doubted the Congress's capability as a
prospective ruling party, and feared the Congress's collaboration with the
Nepali Communist Party at the time of the communist takeover in China,
Consequently, they went for a carefully guided transition based on a so-
called power-sharing arrangement through a coalition government of the
Ranas, the kingship and the Congress (see Rose 1971:194),
The Delhi Settlement of 1951 was largely fonned by Delhi's
pragmatic strategic interest. The Settlement, or Delhi Compromise as it
was also called, can only be said to have been a compromise of a
cosmetic kind, since the Congress was mostly excluded from the real
political negotiations, There was certainly a reshuming of the power-
sharing arrangements between the Shah family and the Rana family,
Somewhat more political power was yielded to the kingship and the king
in persona, whilst the Ranas' dominance within the palace administration
and the anny was mostly left intact The consequence of the Delhi
Compromise could be seen as highly influential for the political
development in Nepal until the present. The autocratic state centred on
the institution of kingship was largely left intact The tenn "intact" is
purposely used here to underline the fact that the institution of kingship
as a form of reign could survive a century of Rana political "foot-
binding", The Ranas very cleverly did not interfere with the traditional
and effective modes of publicising and exercising kingly authority
through patronage of a number of national religious festivals and temple
institutions situated both in the capital valley and throughout the rugged
countryside (see Bleie and Bhattarai, 2002),
After the Delhi Settlement, the Congress's room for manoeuvre to
bargain for any real democratisation was severely limited. The regime
was, in other v\lords, intact. Only the partly co-opted and inexperienced
Congress Party gave the new government an aura of democratic
legitimacy, The Delhi Settlement was largely made by Indian actors in
New Delhi, some of whom had multiple economic, kinship-based and
ideological links to the Shah and Rana contenders, The "compromise"
provided new political capital to the king, who could return to
Kathmandu in triumph, declaring his commitment to building democracy
in Nepal,
This Royal Declaration, like later political statements from
Congress politicians, was of a rhetorical nature. The composition of the
old elite was intact The practice of marriage alliances between the Shahs
and the Ranas continued, as did the customary patronage practices of
giving positions within the bureaucracy to clients, kinsmen and other
allies, Though some of the traditional privileges and power bases of the
Ranas and Shahs were undennined or abolished outright, they
successfully expanded into new sectors of the Indian and Nepalese
economies. 19 The India-groomed Congress, superficially victorious,
actually lacked a popular countrywide support base and proved itself
incapable of bringing the Kathmandu-based anti-Rana intellectuals into
the party echelons (see loshi & Rose, 1966:123-124), The Koirala
brothers were in the top leadership, B, P, Koirala wanted a real
dismantling of the Rana state, while M, P, Koirala had strong royalist
leanings, M, P, Koirala is representative of the great majority of the
1950s generation of leadership which was accultured in India and had
internalised the Sanscritic world view of divine kingship and a
58 Occasional Papers, Volt 0
TONE BLEIE : The Decades of Voilent Destabilization in Nepal: 59
hierarchcial social order of rulers and ruled. Neither the palace
administration nor the incipient bureaucracy, or any other central social
or political institutions, nurtured cultural ideas and practices which could
act as catalysts toward a democratic political culture. To be sure, political
statements could be heard that carried a new aura of liberal political
aspirations. But neglecting to initiate anything akin to modern party-
building from grass-roots constituencies, the newly groomed Congress
leaders and aspiring leaders resorted to traditional modes of patronage
and political decision-making which suited the invigorated kingship very
well. The outcome was an empowered king who the Congress hoped
would be a balancing agent against disgruntled Rana elements. The king
and his courtiers had more ambitious intentions than the Congress hoped,
and they succeeded in acquiring considerable power over the indecisive
and disunited party.
This set of developments led to a series of short-lived governments
bent on internal rivalries, unchecked by any popular party-based or
electoral accountability. The king appointed M. P. Koirala to the position
as Prime Minister twice in 1952/53. Both this and other offices were
handed out as gestures of royal benevolence and patronage, not as
appointments based on any popular mandate. Benefiting individuals in
their turn became empowered and capacitated to dispense their own
extended patronage. During this period, the traditional elite fonned their
own pressure groups. The Communist Party was banned in 1955. The
party continued underground to influence some permitted civil rights
organisations and, more importantly, it started to build a cadre base in
some parts of the western and eastern hills. In these western hills
(Pyuthan, Rolpa and Rukum), the Maoist insurgency would start about
five decades later. Already in those early years of party-building, the
communists were ideologically divided over the role of the monarchy in
Nepal (Brown, 1996:27).
As the king expanded his power base and the array of short-lived
governments provoked disillusionment with so-called democracy, the
king abandoned his promise of a constituent assembly and in 1954
proclaimed that supreme power was to be vested with the kingship (see
Shaha, 1990:303-305). These moves between 1951 and 1953 have
certain parallels with the 1991-1999 period (see discussion below). The
1955 successor to the throne, King Mahendra, was bent on consolidating
monarchical absolutism. The elections promoted earlier were postponed
and the administration reorganised to facilitate the ambitious monarch's
direct control and patronage.20
During the post-Rana period, novel avenues for political careers
opened up. The new build-up of bureaucratic institutions, also aided by
the influx of development funds, resulted in an increase in both political
and bureaucratic offices. 21 This led to new opportunistic competition for
offices and influence. Also during this period, Indian influence and to
some degree outright interference in domestic affairs continued and
inevitably provoked growing anti-Indian sentiment. To provide a thin
fal'ade of democratisation, the ban on the Communist Party was lifted in
1956. This lifting paved the way for a joint campaign with the Congress
for elections. After years of internal scrambles, the Congress managed in
1956 to consolidate a socialist platfonn. Despite the parties' successful
pressure for an election, they were not able to stop the king from
promulgating a new constitution directly and dishonouring the demand
for a constituent assembly. The new 1959 Constitution vested all
juridical and executive power in the king. Nevertheless, the appointment
of the experienced B. P. Koirala on the basis of the 1959 elections led to
a brief period of incipient democratisation under Koirala's unifying
leadership.
The Aborted Democratisation under B. P. Koirala
B. P. Koirala's appointment was a pragmatic compromise, but the
palace's cool reception shifted to staunch resistance when the king felt
threatened by the emerging prospect of new, Western (democratic)
accountability structures based on an elected parliament. During this
phase, the communists (who took a strong pro-Chinese stand) led a fairly
effective opposition in the parliament (see Brown, 1996:34). The B. P.
Koirala government, with its recently adopted socialist programme,
started promoting the concept of an interventionist state which should
deliver basic services, run economic enterprises and uphold an
independent judiciary. This new programme led to certain land refonns
and to an early effort to institute an independent judiciary. The Koirala
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government mostly succeeded in the precarious balancing act of
maintaining fairly good Indo-Nepali and Sino-Nepali relations."
The not insignificant gains of the B. P. Koirala government during
its early period gave Koirala a growing popularity and authority. The
government' 5 early effort to institutionalise a more independent
bureaucracy threatened to marginalise the palace-based administration
and the traditional patronage-based politics (See loshi and Rose,
1966:386; Rose and Scholz, 1989:48). In December 1960, the Prime
Minister and his cabinet were arrested. The constitution was suspended
and direct palace-based rule instituted. The conspicuous lack of public
resistance from the smaller parties, the traditional elite and the upper
echelons of the bureaucracy against the royal ousting of an elected
government shows just how profoundly the patronage-based political
culture permeated these public institutions. Also importantly, the
international community did not strongly condemn King Mahendra's
move. The ousting of the government and the ban on the party led
Congress members to start a resistance movement in India. This
movement could not muster enough support for conducting raids on
Nepal's soil that would represent any real military challenge to the
regime. The Indian endorsement of the insurgent activities on their side
of the border was soon withdrawn, on account of the Sino-Indian border
conflict in particular, which altered Himalayan geopolitics.
During the 1950s and the first years of the 1960s, the monarchy
quite effectively managed to manipulate and contain the incipient seeds
of democratic transition. With some level of credibility, the king could
denounce parliamentary democracy as a foreign import. Instead, the
monarch announced the establishment of the four-tiered Panchayat
system (underpinned by a new constitution), which he claimed would be
based on Nepalese political culture. 23 In addition, the regime - inspired
both by Maoist ideology and by the Nepalese notion of unity in the
public order - instituted class organisations (bargiya sangatban) for
fanners, women, youth and fonner servicemen. These organisations were
seen as representing private interest groups which were entitled to
nominate some representatives to the National Assembly.24 Other private
interest organisations needed government approval to enter public space
or were banned altogether (i.e., the communists) from the same space.
As Burghart (1994: 1-14) has pinpointed, the 1962 Constitution
contains a striking contradiction. On the one hand, it was to constitute
political relations between the king and his people in harmony with the
traditional order. On the other hand, the constitution was a modem legal
means by which a remoulded political culture was to be created. The
Panchayat system represented certain novel organisational forms (such as
the class-based organisations"), but tapped into and expanded local and
supra-local traditional forms of political authority favouring men from
the highest castes. Local and central public arenas revolved around
chains of chiefly and royal authority. The Rana-instituted governance
practice of mobile official tours (daudaha) was revived. The monarch
held annual audiences (darshan) in the zonal and district centres and
accepted salami, the ritual offering (similar to the offering of gifts to
deities in temples) of a coin to the royal authority in appreciation for
being appointed to a public offlce.26 The practice of pajani, the annual
renewal of offices, was also given new emphasis by the royal authority.
These public practices were also expressive of the royals' full control
over any legitimate expression of public service.:'.7
All these engagements were guided by a notion of public order
defined through unity, ultimately vested in the institution of kingship.
This notion was different from the Western notion of public order as a
negotiating space for diverse, partly conflicting, partly converging
personal interests. Thus, in Nepal dissent and conflict were by and large
not pennitted.
Nation-building efforts (desa banaune) during the Panchayat years
showed how contested and incomplete the project was. A language
policy issue such as the role of regional languages in education and mass
communication was highly contested already in the 1950s. This and other
language issues reappeared soon in political debate. In 1962, Nepali was
made the sole medium of instruction in all state schools, and broadcasts
in Hindi and Newari were t<nninated on Radio Nepal in 1965." By a
combination of statistical and rhetorical means, Nepali was made the
only official language and the Nepalese, claimed to be "one people".
Similar means were used to construct the common religious identity
the Hindu kingship needed for its legitimate reign. A notion of the Hindu
nation could be forged by manipulating the number of Hindus in the
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1961 Census. As an accommodation to international human rights norms,
the state officially abolished the caste system. The regime thus had to
resort to the vague claim of being the defender of "local tradition".
Undoubtedly, such a stance indirectly lent legitimacy to the still
entrenched caste system, which the same regime had recently officially
abolished.
While some progressive refonns were enshrined in policies and the
1962 Constitution,29 and the somewhat reformed governance system
gave the appearance of separated executive, judicial and legislative
branches, appointments and promotions and dismissals were handled by
the expanded sovereign authority of the king. As Hayes has noted (See
Hayes, 1975:616-628), the monarch skilfully managed to combine
tapping two sources of legitimacy, the traditional Hindu kingly authority
and the Western notions of representative democracy. Direct elections
were only held at the village assembly level. Here the segments of the
population with high ritual status and landed property dominated the
assemblies. If popular accountability at that level was variable it was
minimal at higher levels of the indirectly elective system. At the' centre
the parliament endorsed formally decisions already made by the Central
Secretariat - the apex of royal authority. As comprehensive civil
liberties were forbidden, the regime committed human rights violations.
However, the ruler's alliance-building and patronage of the police, army
a~d rural and urban elites was successful towards preventing excessive
dIrect use of violent oppression. Internal criticism within the system was
contained by intermittently approving certain minor reorganisations. The
expanding middle class was kept politically inactive by providing its
members \vith new economic opportunities that also gave social status.
Of principal importance were job opportunities within the government
and the aid sector, which started to grow in the 1960s and virtuallv
exploded in the following two decades. The disillusioned and exiled
Congress experienced in the 1960s a considerable stream of defections'
many entered the ranks of the Panchayat institutions, indicating thei;
opportunistic power-seeking motivations. JO
Opportunism towards being able to rule and divide also
characterised the royal authority's official and unofficial dealings with
the banned lefbst parties in this period. The communists (divided into
TONE BLEIE : The Decades of Voilent Destabilization in Nepal: . 63
pro-Beijing and pro-Moscow factions) were not considered as real a
contender for power as was the Congress. The Beijing faction was thus
assisted in order to undermine the Congress's support-base. The
Panchayat regime also received considerable aid from the Maoist
Chinese regime. As the communists gained in influence, the palace
shifted sides and started to be more liberal to the Congress. Amongst
others, political prisoners (including the aging and ailing B. P. Koirala)
were released. The 1971 elections to the Panchayat and class
organisations showed popular discontent with the system (Brown,
1996:50). Moreover, Himalayan geopolitics again changed in the 1970s
as communist China's international position became weaker. The king,
who had considered the Chinese regime his closest ally, increasingly had
to recognise that his southern neighbour was a contender for the position
as a regional superpower.
The Middle and Late Panchayat Period
During the late Panchayat period, the hierarchical social structure
underwent certain changes, but without offering opportunities for upward
mobility for individual women or for individuals from the previous
untouchable castes and most of the ethnic groups. The mechanisms for
upward mobility and incipient class formation were based on formal
education, particularly favouring Brahmin men with proper command
over a Sanskritised Nepali. The new employment opportunities in the
government were snatched not only by Brahmins, but also by Chhetri
and Newari men - all /Tom caste groups from the hill region which had
earlier dominated the bureaucracy.
Since the bureaucracy in the 1970s and 1980s also expanded very
rapidly at local levels, it gave ill-informed outsiders the impression of an
increasingly decentralised administration with enhanced capacity to
function as a redistributive state apparatus. The expansion of government
offices at regional, zone and district levels was changing state-society
relations, but not in a manner conducive to democratic constitutional
notions of impartibility, separation of the three cardinal functions of
government and of local self-governance. Instead, donor-dependent
growth let to an unprecedented expansion of the centralised patrimonial
state, within which the extra-constitutional political centre (the Central
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Palace Secretarial) demanded loyalty from the upper echelons of a
satellite-like and steadily growing bureaucracy. High caste patronage
cuhure, consisting of a complex set of behavioural codes and practices
including favouritism and "bribery", was extended down to the lower
grades of civil servants and out\\lards to the newly fonned rural
administrative tiers. In the 1980s, a court dialect used by the Rana
aristocracy in the previous century on social occasions was the routine
fonn of address among civil servants when signalling and negotiating
status and role expectations (see Pandey, 1989:326).
The Palace Secretariat had managed to get a constitutional basis for
their control over all policy decisions.ll This was a fateful structural
incongruity which crippled proactive policy-making and implementation
from the level of ministers down to top bureaucrats and below, as all
were vulnerable to arbitrary dismissal not on grounds of incompetence
but because of either a failure to show sufficient loyalty (chakari) or the
top patrons' shifting alliances and subsequent changes of incumbents.
The rapid in nux of aid money into such a patronage-based usury system
led to a redefinition of the well-established and morally accepted system
of "bribery" and chakari as well as to increased outright embezzlement
offunds.32
The rapid and soon heavy dependence on donor aid (especially
bilateral aid), which in this period covered not only a substantial portion
of development expenditure but also the state's administrative expenses,
created a new category of patrons. These external Western patrons had
their own notions of good governance and accountability structures
which the ruling Nepali politicians and bureaucrats had to please. The
accommodation of two outrightly different political notions and
institutional practices, one inner life based on age-old notions of
dispensing patronage in exchange for loyalty by personalised idioms and
one outer life for the donor community and the intemational community,
necessitated a sophisticated art of impression management and (self)
deception. Administrative refonns, including a number of technical
assistance programmes, were enacted but, to the dismay of the donors,
with limited effects on the efficiency and quality of the administration,
its service delivery and development efforts. Ironically, the Palace
Secretariat, the centre of political power and the chief producer of the
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caste and patronage-based values and go\Cming style. was overlooked in
these refonn efforts.J) The very structure and function of lhe
administrative and political system operated according to very different
"unwritten" institutional rules, which I have brieny described and
analysed above. In order to accommodate the donors' urgings for results,
another strategy for quasi-solution of the administrative impasse was the
establishment of parallel institutions (such as Development Boards),
which had their own rules, regulations and salal)' structure.
In the 19705, it was all too evident that the much-debated and long-
awaited land refonn (enacted in 1964) had done little to change the
inequalities in size of landholdings (see Zaman. 1992; Riedinger, 1993).
In the hills, the growing livelihood crisisl4 was, to some degree,
mitigated by migration to the low· lying fertile Terai. This plain region
had become a malaria-free zone with American aid. The state's biased
land allotment policy and resettlement schemes in the Terai led to a
reproduction of the hills upper-caste social order in the Terni (Shrestha
and Conway, 1985). Temporary migration to India and to the cities also
acted as safety valves in the crisis-ridden hill communities. The donor-
financed constru~ion ofsome roads starting in Ihe 1960s and continuing
in the 1970s facilitated a rapid innux of Indian manufactured goods. This
led in the first place to the rapid expansion of rural markets thriving on
selling manufactured goods and then to urbanisation, mainly in the Terai
and in Pokhara and Kathmandu valley. These developments then affected
the social structure, undemlining the traditional interdependency between
the service castes and high castes. Since no alternative slate-sponsored
social safety net was in place. and caste discrimination still barred these
people from entering the expanding and profitable non-agricultural
sector, their livelihood situation deteriorated further. As smallholders,
these sections (whose composirion in terms ofethnic affiliation and caste
status varied considerably) had marginal access to the material rewards
from the large and moslly bilaterally financed development projects,
such as the USAID Rapti Zone Integrated Development Project. Both the
rhetoric of "a right to development" and "poverty alleviation" espoused
by these development agents, as well as "class-based justice" articulated
by the communists sowed the early seeds of what would fennent in the
19805 and 1990s into a widespread subjective political consciousness of
grievance and relative deprivation. The Maoist rebellion would come to
66 Occasional Papers, Vol10 TONE BLEIE : The Decades of Voilent Destabilization in Nepal: . 67
start from some of the districts under the Rapti Zone (Rolpa, Rukum and
Pyuthan).
The new King Birendra, in spite of his Western elite education,
continued his predecessor's authoritarian political line. The Congress
remained banned and the leaders exiled. The precariously forged unity
was disturbed by a number of violent attacks,35 the most consequential in
retrospect being the Jhapa Uprising in 1971. The uprising showed the
regional link of the outlawed Maoist Communist Party to the Communist
Party of India (Marxist), which started the Naxalite movements in Bihar
and West Bengal. Only the border river Mechi separates Jhapa from the
epicentre of the movement, Naxalbari. The Naxalites' practice of so-
called revolutionary justice was taken up by young Jhapa activists, and
some local landlords were murdered in the way of executions. While the
uprising was brutally quelled by the government, it was politically
mobilising and led to the formation in Jhapa of the All Nepal Communist
Coordination Committee, which started forming local groups. Such class
justice came more than 20 years later, to be taken up on a large scale by
the Maoist Movement.
During the deteriorating political situation under Indira Gandhi, the
exiled B. P. Koirala (then President of the Nepali Congress) returned to
Nepal in a proclaimed effort to contribute to national reconciliation after
India's threatening (with Nepalese eyes) annexation of the Himalayan
kingdom Sikkim in 1975. Koirala's cult-like position was not sufficient
political capital for any revitalisation of the party, though there was some
opposition to the regime. The execution of Pakistan's Prime Minister
Zulfikar AIi Bhutto was an opportune catalyst for public demonstrations,
again shattering the precariously forged unity of public life. The
spreading demonstrations were also indirectly protests against the
execution of the persons convicted for the assassination attempt on
Birendra a few years earlier. This spontaneous unrest led the royal
authority to proclaim a referendum to decide the future of the Panchayat
system. The referendum in May 1980 resulted in a small but significant
majority voting in favour of the Panchayat system. The result may be
interpreted as the outcome of pragmatic support for a reformed
Panchayat system, a lack of trust in the political parties and the panchas'
massive economic expenditure to promote their campaign. In addition,
the Congress and the communists failed to see the importance of building
an inter-party alliance to win the referendum (see Brown, 1996:91).
B. P. Koirala's disastrously poor judgement during his final years,
which nevertheless did not lead to his removal as elected leader, shows
how strong the culture of respect towards elders continued to be in the
political domain. This culture would, as we shall see again, become
conspicuous as we move to consider the Congress leadership of the
1990s.
Between 1983 and 1990, the Nepalese communist movement was
riddled by ideological differences and personality-based conflict. J6 The
movement and its ideological debates and struggles occurred in India,
where many of the activists worked and studied.
As Brown among others has pointed out, there was a confined
political liberalisation after the 1980 referendum. Among the reform
measures were election of the Prime Minister by the National Assembly
and the introduction of the adult franchise. But these measures were
accompanied by an expansion of the royal authority's extra-
constitutional sources of power.37
The inadequate understanding by the powerful donor community in
Nepal of state-society relations and its reductionist perception of good
governance as a matter of refonns and building technical capacity, and
poverty as a result of demographic explosion causing an environmental
crisis, diverted attention away from the two critically interdependent core
issues. These were (I) the elite's centralised control of the state
apparatus, and (2) the distributional aspects of the poverty issue. The
latter issue would have put land reform and the management of water and
other bio-resources centre stage (World Bank, 1988).
While the political pressure increased during the 1980s, the overall
livelihood situation remained poor. According to a conservative World
Bank estimate, about 50 percent of the population faced chronic or
seasonal food deficits (World Bank, 1991), and a very large proportion of
the children were stunted. Regional imbalances in food production and
life expectancy were also considerable (World Bank, 1990). Gender
discrimination remained pervasive, as Nepali women remained among
the most overworked, undervalued and politically excluded of all the
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world's women - despite more than a decade of women-targeted
policies and programmes.
THE DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE TO THE HINDU STATE
People's Rebellion: The Seeds ofa Revolution Betrayed
In latc 1989, the controversy over the lndo-Nepali Trade and Transit
Treaty was unresolved. The urban population in particular felt the
repercussions of the dispute and the ensuing trade boycott. Incorporated
into the global electronic news network, the Nepalese received radio and
television news about how people's power in Eastern Europe could
ovenhrow oppressive dictatorships. People's imaginations were receptive
to these media-sent ideological messages.JI The Nepalese audience could
also observe through the international media how people could
concretely organise for political change. In early 1990, a loose alignment
was established by a bloc named the United Left Front (ULF), composed
of seven leftist parties, and the Congress Party.J9 A number of other
small leftist parties decided al this stage of fight separately, but in
collusion with the Congress and ULF, The anti-regime protests (Jana
Andolan I) ~tarted on a highly symbolic and official day, Nepal's
Democracy Day, J8 February,
The outburst of increasing crowds of agitators in a public domain
based on a model of harmony and consensus was first met by the regime
with a certain degree of repression. The regime also resorted to the well-
known recipe of undermining (the movement's) credibility by playing on
anti-Indian sentiments. Limited concessions were not considered at this
stage. During the build·up and climactic stages of the movement, the
police violated not only human rights but also indigenous moral codes of
conduct, leading to stronger ami-government reactions.4o The protests
initially grew and waned. Then the demonstrations grew in spurts as the
protests spread to all the towns of Kathmandu Valley and later to the
towns in the Terai, culminating in bloody confrontations with the police
in April. Alongside a curfew, the monarch gave some concessions, such
as lifting the ban on political parties.
The nearly exclusive urban and mostly middle-class foundation of
the protest movement, no doubt mirroring the centralised nature of state
power in Nepal, would prove to have major consequences for the
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outcome of the movement. As it grew and the regime's oppressive
apparatus was felt not only by more people but by new types of
demonstrators (including educated professionals not accustomed to face
direct brutal repression), anti-royalist attitudes gained ground.41 As
Brown among others has argued, the widely circulated accounts claiming
that the well-meaning King Birendra was manipulated during those
critical weeks by his courtiers are highly dubious. The king and his inner
circle of advisors must to some extent have underestimated the popular
momentum of the movemenl.4! Following the climax of bloody clashes
caused by indiscriminate firing by the security forces on 6 April, the
palace, for reasons not fully known, did not Opl for a major clampdown
by the well-equipped and royalist army. Instead, the regime opted for a
negotiated "compromise".
The selS of conditions that led the leadership of the Congress-ULF
alliance to opt for a compromise are too complex to be given proper
scrutiny here. Congress and communist activists shared common
experiences of exile, imprisonment, insurgency and unpredictable palace
politics. Nevertheless, the alliance was frail from the start and was
riddled with ideological and personal differences, disparate party cultures
and varying credibility in royal and international circles. The Nepali
Congress had a history beyond that ofa banned opposition party. It had
in certain periods been a partner-in-government (see the above political
history betv.'een 1951-1990). Therefore, the palace saw the Congress as a
more obvious negotiating partner than the more overtly anti-monarchist
leftist parties in the alliance.
At that time, the outrightly anti-monarchist leftist parties which had
not joined ULF started to play an increasingly prominent role in the
rebellion. It showed signs of momentum as a mass movement with a
broadening support base. These developments worried leading Congress
activists who were royalists and had no ambition to let loose a revolution
that would dismantle the entire power structure of Nepalese society.
The popular mass demonstrations gained momentum in a public
domain structured on a model of non·dissent and the unifying unique
person of the king. However, at this moment no full-fledged political
programme for democratic transition from an absolute monarchy to a
responsive. pluralist secular state was worked out. Such basic neglect
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would prove very influential indeed. Without such a political
programme, one on an ad hoc basis instead relied on slogan-like claims
for a constitutional monarchy and electoral democracy. This ad hoc
strategy revealed more fundamental shortcomings of the lead party of the
United Left Front, Nepali Congress, party's organisation and culture. Its
organisational culture was based on principles of patronage, respect for
seniority, caste status and opportunism. Elections to leading offices were
not based on any proper democratic accountability structure and rules,
which were so basic to a cadre-based party culture. With many of the
senior Congress politicians under arrest, the second layer of leaders, who
had not been permitted to gain solid political experience by their detained
patrons, found themselves suddenly in charge of the challenging task of
steering 3n escalating movement in collaboration with the more militant
and experienced communists. This created alann among both the
aspiring leadership as \vell as the senior Congress leaders. Without
consultation with the communist leaders, the Congress leaders brokered
the compromise with the palace.
As noted, the very outburst of and organisational form of the
People's Movement reveals Nepal's recent integration into a globalised
electronic network. The international media's subsequent reporting of the
movement helped create some degree of international support and a
certain pressure on the government. The diplomatic community in Nepal
also exerted pressure on the discredited government and maintained
contact with the ULF. Some diplomatic missions seem to have
specifically engaged themselves. According to Brown, US officials
actively encouraged Congress leaders to reach a compromise with the
palace that included the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in
order to contain the growing leftist influence in Nepal.43 The American
position was again reiterated in strong language when the Congress Party
supremo Ganesh Man Singh visited the Bush administration in December
1990 in order to muster support (see Thapa and Sinjapati, 2003 :36).
The relative importance of other international, albeit regional actors
is more difficult to assess. The Indian coalition government as internally
divided on this issue. One of the coalition partners, Janata Dal, had for
quite some time been supportive of pro-democratic forces in Nepal. The
religious Bharatiya Janata Party was a strong supporter of the Hindu
monarchy. In order to balance these opposing stances, the government
officially stressed a policy of a middle course, but this official posture
may not represent the entire picture.44
The compromise prevented Jana Andolan from becoming a national
movement, supported by the country's oppressed population of small
peasants, low castes, many of the ethnic communities, and rural women.
More conservative political leaders with loyalist inclinations hoped the
deal would give them full access to the state through new political
channels. To them a compromise with the old regime, however
opportunist, patronage-ridden and anti-democratic, appeared to be a
much safer solution than an unpredictable alliance with the more
extremist left groups, which wanted a new social order and a "new state".
The April bloodshed and deal brokered was followed by the
establishment of an interim government and a period of prolonged
negotiations between the newly elected leaders, political parties and
palace. The new government" was to lead the nation through a difficult
transitional period, during which democratic legislation would be
fonnulated, a free press created, general elections held and the volatile
law and order situation controlled. In addition, the ne\v coalition cabinet
promised to curb corruption and to strengthen the judiciary which was
asked to investigate human rights abuses during the Jana Andolan. The
cabinet also promised to start redressing discrimination against women
and ethnic communities. The agenda was, in other words, tall indeed, and
included many of the grievances voiced by the more radical sections of
the Jana Andolan.
During the following months, the interim government showed a
limited ability to follow its own directives, provoking strong criticism
from the more radical sections of the UPF and civil society. This lack of
political ability- perhaps also of will - revealed the highly problematic
tenns of the "compromise" with the regime, a concession which leading
actors within the donor community in Nepal actively supported. The aid
community in Nepal at that time predominantly held a neo-liberal
understanding of a lean(er) Nepalese state in addition to a greater role for
the market and civil society actors, in order to generate growth. They
were, therefore, unreceptive to the left's political programme of
dismantling the elite's parasitic grip on the state by instituting republican
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rule, which could have cleared the ground for an active redistributive
state that could intervene with the market forces. It remains uncertain
whether the donor community fully contemplated the regime-conserving
and conflict-escalating impact of their stance.
The old regime was more or less intact. Yet, some of its supporting
pillars showed signs of fl"3cturing. The political establishment was
divided over the need for political reforms, hardliner pallchas stood
against liberal pancJras (with Congress sympathies). They were
nevertheless still unitcdly opposed 10 any radical legislation that could
threaten the interests of the old elite and the middle class. The Congress
leaders, including the Interim Prime Minister, saw the institution of
monarchy as the very essence of the Nepalese nation and believed that it
was possible to steer a transition from an absolute to a constitutional
monarchy (see Brown 1996:147·149). In order to try 10 save "hate.. er
could be sa\'oo of the legitimacy of King Birendra and to shore up the
institution of monarchy, no legal action was taken against the senior civil
and police officials whom two human rights commissions held ultimately
responsible for the human rights abuses during the Panchayat and the
Jana Andolan.4/l
The culturally unquestioned belief in the Hindu monarchy, resulting
111 a fear of strong influence from the republican left, might largely
explain the Congress's and other leading stakeholders' rejection of the
demand for a constituent assembly to draw up the new constitution. As
shown above, this demand has repeatedly been raised by the communists
since they first formed the party. We will come back below to why this
demand was to become probably the main reason for the Maoists'
withdrawal from the final rounds ofnegolia!ions in both 2001 and 2003.
The Contradictions in tbe 1990 Constitution
Different versions of the new constitution were drafted, showing the
ongoing struggle between the king's unwavering will to remain the
source of sovereignty and the democratic alliance.41 The commission also
invited inputs from the political parties and the general public and sent a
lawyer to study other relevant cases of constitutional monarchy. The
majority of suggestions concerned regional, religious, linguistic. gender
and ethnic issues; in other words, issues of how 10 accommodate
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differences into a state monopolised by the high caste men for centuries.
The commission and the govemment chose largely to overlook these
suggestions. denouncing them as a threat to the nation state's unity. :ne
leader ofthe commission, Justice Bishwanath Upadhayaya, charactensed
mosl of them as "unfonunate" and "peripheral" issues that revealed the
general lack of constitutional knowledge among the citizenry (Hun,
199436).
The 1990 Constitution. as will be discussed below, represents in
some respects a real advance compared to the earlier constitutions, ~n
establishing a democratic order in Nepal. But it was, as we have seen 111
several earlier examples in the post-Rana period, the result of a
"compromise" of a kind that contained some irreconcilable
contradictions. These would prove more disruptive than many
stakeholders foresaw al the lime.
One such contradiction is bet\\-'een the statement in Article 3 that the
sovereignty of Nepal is vested in the Nepali people and the emergency
powers admitted to the king in Article 115. Previous constitut~on~ fro~
1959 and 1962 had given the king the right to revoke the constItutiOns 111
their entirety and to assume all powers of government. Indeed, King
Mahendra used this provision in 1962 to oust the elected government of
B. P. Koirala. The article in the 1990 Constirution says that a
proclamation must be ratified by the House of Representatives within
three months. The constitution does not provide strong safeguards
against the king's suspension of the elected parliament during an
emergency situation. Commentators have held that the constitution's
statement (Article 3) that '"His Majesty is the symbol of the Nepalese
nationality and the unity of the Nepalese people" reinterprets the role of
the king from an autocrat to a constitutional monarch, especially since
Ihe fonnulation is connected to the provision that executive powers lie
with the Prime Minister. This interpretation becomes highly problematic
if we also consider the symbolic attributes of the king's person, as stated
in Article 27(1) and the provision of emergency powers to him.
The much awaited and debated issues of defining the core attributes
of the Nepali nation was "resolved" by the following contradictory
statement in Article 4(1): Nepal is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual,
democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu, constitutional
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ki~gdom.4R The new constitution, in other words, reaffirmed Nepal as a
Hindu state, founded on the institution of monarchy. This fundamental
concept was also affirmed by Article 27(1), wbich stated that the king
had to be a descendant of the Shah King that unified the nation a
maintainer of Aryan culture and a Hindu. The strongly articula;ed
dC~lands from ~thnic groups and the regional party for recognition of
theIr cultur~1 .flghts were thus largely unmct. The constitution gives
somew~at Imllted recognition to mother tongues as national languages
(rashlnya bhasha) and to a right to run schools that can provide
educatIOn In the mother tongue at the primary level. The regional
Sadbhavana Party"s demand for Hindi as a second state language was not
met: only Nepali was given status as the state language.
Another defining feature of the Hindu king \vas his right as Supreme
Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Nepalese Anny. The constitution
allowed the king to retain this right, and to appoint his Commander-in-
Chief .on the Prime .Minister's recommendation. A National Security
Councd led by the Pnme Minister will be in charge of all other military
operatIOns. These fOnTIulations, when seen in connection with the same
constitution's concession of emergency powers to the king (which should
be seen as a serious threat to the democratic elements of the constitution),
would prove (see discussion below) to be significant after the insurgency
started and the question of the Royal Nepalese Army's role in quelling
the Insurgency became a pressing issue.
. Other strongly articulated human rights claims were also only
partIally accommodated: even if discrimination on the basis of sex was to
be abolished, women were not in all respects accorded equal citizenship
rights. 49
Considering the dramatic political events in 1990, the first Jana
Angolan might most appropriately be understood as a rebellion rather
than a. re:olution. However violent and urban-supported it may have
been, It did not fundamentally change the political order. At this point
certain historical parallels between the 1951 and 1990 uprisings can b:
discerned. Both the "palace rebellion" in 1951 and the 1990 "urban
rebellion" lacked mass support in the predominantly rural population.
Both occurred at conjunctures of significant change in the international
order (the fall of the British Empire in South Asia; the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the subsequent democratisation). In 1951 as in 1990, both the
pro-democracy parties and the regime's loyal protagonists had
ideological and social ties with likeminded political parties in
neighbouring India, indicating a number of regional connections. In
addition, the official Indian stance was of great importance, especially so
in 1951. The Indian government and Indian political parties of secular
and staunchly Hindu fundamentalist persuasion were active players
during the 1990 events. New international actors (belonging to the donor
community), however, had also gained considerable political leverage in
Nepalese policies. In 1951, the democratic forces were out-manoeuvred
in the political negotiations and presented with a political fait accompli.
In 1990, the democratic forces gradually asserted a stronger agency
through mass demonstrations. But this agency was considerably
weakened by the ULF's internal ideological differences and by the tacit
consensus on the indispensable role of the Hindu monarchy, which
united the influential moderate Congress~led section of the ULF and the
old regime.
The drafting of a new constitution in the volatile transition period
nurtured great hopes that the constitution would indeed have agency as a
"model" for the real restructuring of the political order. Such hopes were
dashed. The "compromises" in the constitution would turn out to be
irreconcilable, and a testimony to the shared upper~caste and Hindu elite
orientation of the Congress and the old regime, and thus to the
unresolved power contradictions between the authoritarian state and a
rapidly diversiIYing civil society. The 1990 Constitution may thus more
appropriately be analysed as a model of these politically contradictory
and unresolved realities surrounding the negotiated "compromise".
A Halted Democratic Transition and Institutionalisation of Human
Rights
The establishment of a multi-party system, the growth of a vital civil
society, the ratification of a number of human rights conventions and the
establishment of a National Human Rights Commission, all give the
appearance of a democratic transition (between 1991-1995) with consi-
derate efforts to institutionalise human rights. This subsection seeks to
examine briefly how a contradictory development of political and civil
rights and an uneven economic development unable to address basic
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social and economic rights of the great majority or the rural citizen!)!
callle to have dcstabilising consequences.
Prior to the 1991 election. a pkthor::l of Ilew political parties sought
rcgistratinl1, sOllle of them lacking even an elementary political
program III e. The 1ll3jor political rartics also underwent fissions, t'usiolls
and supporter shifts. J\1any fmlllcr Panchayat leaders hecame members of
the Congress Part:'. a sign of the old political elite'", opp0l1unisll1. The
Congress Icadcr-ship \\clcotllcd Ihis intlu'\. as the:' hoped the jJCmcJlOs
would give' tlll'Jll an c\tcnded support hase in the rural areas where their
oLltrcach \\3,'; limited. The old patronage cultufe of c:\changing allegiance
for political of/ices flourisll\.:d. T\\o of the leftist parties ft'om the ULP
merged and estahlished Comlllunist Pariy of Nepal Marxist-Leninist
(CPi\'-Ul\lL) and emerged as th~ Congress's main political rival. 50
Among the other comlllunlst eontcnders was thc UniLcd People's Front
Nepal (the political wing of the Unity Celltre), \\hlch \\ould soon turn
from p<lrliamentary politics and start playing a major role as an extra-
constitutional force. In spite of the e\:odus to the Congress. t\\'o parties of
earlier jhlllchas (politicians tt'om thc Panchayat period) ---- with dubious
democratic credentials - stood fIX the election_ Both paJ1ies were
headed by earlier Prime \1inistcrs It'om the pre-(kmocratic period. 51
The 1991 eh:ction campaign in the rural areas was plagued by Illany
parties' inability' to pursue (j nation-\\ide campaign. Unlike the
controversial roY<llist ponchos and the united cOll1lllunist IXlI1y' (CPN-
UML). many l<lcked the basic party' inll'astructure in rural areas to engage
in the campaign. PolitiGtI repression by illegal and e.\:tra-politicalmeans
\vas also fairly common.
Parts oethe Rapti lone (Rolpa, Rukum, Dang. Pyuthan and Salyan)
of Illid-\vestern J\'epal had long before the People's Movement (dating
back to the 1950s) been an area of underground political agitation by the
then underground communist movement. In fact, onc of the national
leaders, the veteran Mohan Bikram Singh, came from this area. The
eastern part of Rolpa. formerly' pari of Pyuthan district, was already' ruled
by communists in 1957 (see de Sales, 2000), One of the Maoist splinter
parties, CPN (Masa!) called for a boycott of the 1991 elections. 52 This
call received widespread support, Pyuthan had the lowest voter turnout of
all districts (sce Thapa and Sijapati, 2003 :66). The Samyutka Jana
Morcha (SJM) was the political wing of the CPN Unity Centre 5 ; The
CPN Unitv Centre had not joined the United Lcn Front (ULF) alliance,
but opera~ed independently during the Jana Andolan. ]\·1any of the
political cadres within the CPN (Unity' Centre) bad found the ]<)<)0
compromise near to unacceptable. Nevertheless. they' decided to utilise
the multi-party system to engage in open public advocacy in order to
gain immediate parliamentary access, while retaining their longer term
objective of a revolutionary overthrow of what they saw as a regressive
regime. In the first Cieneral Election in May 1991 the Congress \\'l1n
seven of the I] parliamentary seats held by the Rapti Zone
constituentcies. SJrvt \\'on three (two in Rolpa and one in Rukutll) and lhe
CPN-UML one. The support for the S.lM is notable and relevant to our
understanding as to why' the Maoist insurgency later started in Rolpa and
Rukum. Amonu. the nominated Congress candidates, there wen~ a
sizeable numbe; of leaders from the Panchayat era. Reacting against the
placing of panc!w.\" high up on Congress lists, many voters chose to
support SJM,
The ensuine violent means of political competition bet\veen
Congress and SJM cadres can only partly' be explained by both parties'
long history as underground movements, used to violent political
methods. In addition to intact non-democratic institutional practices and
party cultures untainted by even proto-democratic "rules of the game",
t\\'o other factors \vere also of importance. One \vas the grossly' unequal
access of the Congress and the CPN-L'ML to the civil and military
branches of the state apparatus. Another important factor to reckon \-vith
was the new availability of a public space in \vhieh political vendettas
could be undertaken.5~ The general election was conducted relatively'
peacefully and reasonably fairly, indicating that elections were not a
no\/clty in Nepal as such. About 65 percent of the electorate voted, a
rather high rate compared with countries of similar levels of literacy,
poverty and communication systems. But there was evidence of use of
intimidation, vote rigging and votc purchase, suggesting that thc turnout
of genuine voters was somewhat lower than the official voter count. Two
parties stood out as the winners, The Congress gained 54 percent of the
seats (110 of205 seats) and CPN-UML won 34 percent of the scats. The
far leftist party SJM also did well in a number of constituencies and won
nine scats. The two parties of the former panchos did very poorly and
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gained only four seats (HMG(N), 1991: 179-181). The communist
parties' entry into parliamentary politics was unprecedented.
Retrospective studies of the voting behaviour at a national level in
the 1991 election show the core support areas and voter groups of the
communists and the Congress in those critical years before the
insurgency \vas launched. The communist parties did well in the
Kathmandu valley and in central and eastern Nepal. Moreover, they did
relatively well in the mountains and hills of the western and midwestem
regions (such as the Rapti Zone). The Congress did quite well in the
plains areas of the western, midwestem and far western regions.
Congress's electorate drew heavy support from elderly voters in the
traditional castes. The communists. on the other hand, had a younger
electorate, coming from rural small-holder, urban working class and
aspiring middle class backgrounds (See Borrc. et. aI., 1991:356-362;
Kumar, 200 I). The royalist party (RPP) drew mostly support rrom voters
with an ethnic background.
From mid-1991, Nepal had a democratically elected, Congress-
headed government and a promulgated constitution endorsed by most but
not all the leftist political parties. In the following months, G. P.
Koirala's government did not deliver on many of its promised initiatives.
Also, the economic indicators were unimpressive, inter-party rivalry for
spoils was on the increase and Indo-Nepali relations re-fuelled the
political system and public." The parliamentary opposition again
resorted to the streets, demanding Koirala's resignation. Even so, the
Congress government stay'ed in power for another short period through
the 1993 flood disaster and finally resigned in 1994 as a result of serious
intra-party dissent. The parliament was dissolved. The mid-term election
resulted in a hung parliament and the formation of a minority
government headed by the party president of the CPN (UML), which had
won the largest number of seats. SJM (Unity Centre-United People's
Front Nepal), which had recently split, did not win any seats. The UML-
led government was only in office for nine months, and was followed by
a coalition government under Congress leadership, supported by the unti I
then discredited party of the former panchas (Rastriya Prajatantra Party)
and the Terai-based Nepal Sadbhavana Party.
I
I,
I
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I
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This split in 1994 was indicative of the serious ideological
disagreements within the SJM during the years 1990-1994. The party
had found the 1990 compromise more or less unacceptable. Already in
March 1992, SJM had presented the moderate-majority government with
a list of demands. 56 During the following weeks, they launched protest
programmes which were met with police violence and the killings of
demonstrators. Such excessive use of force could not but radicalise SJM
supporters.
During the whole 1990-1994 period, the party engaged in intense
ideological debates. These debates centred on the general applicability of
Maoism as compared to Marxism and Leninism, in addition to the role of
political struggle in relation to armed struggle and, in the case of armed
struggle, the relative merits of rural and urban insurgencies. The ensuring
dissent, also fuelled by personal rivalries, resulted in the purging of the
minority rraction of the Central Committee. The minority rraction stood
for the mid-term election as noted above. Also, the majority rraction
wanted to partake in the election due to tactical reasons, but was not
approved as a party by the Electoral Commission. Facing non-approval,
they called for a boycott of the mid-term election, probably as a tace-
saving measure. This fraction went underground right away and started
its preparations (both on Indian and Nepalese soil) for a new stage of
struggle. These plans were forged in close dialogue with its sister parties
under the auspices of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement
(RIM). Following the promulga-tion of the 1990 Constitution civil
society in Nepal expanded very quickly and also diversified as a result of
an enonnous growth in the number of development-supportive and
human rights-based international non-governmental organisations
(lNGOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Nepal. This
growth was non-evolutionary, and artificially rapid due to mainly two
factors - both structurally related to the neo-Iiberal development
paradigm: (I) a massive influx of development assistance increasingly
geared toward supporting the NGO sector and, (2) massive establishment
of national, regional and local NGOs by both former civil servants (who
had lost their jobs due to structural adjustment measures) and by
bureaucrats and politicians, who saw the creation of own NGO as both a
viable strategy for economic diversification and for gaining a political
voice in civil society. The massive growth coincided with the
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globalisatioll of ne\\' social movements increasingly addressing gender,
religioLls and ethnic differences. C.ircater exposure to advocacy about
gender justice and to formal employment gave increasing numbers of
rural and urban Nepalese women a political consciousness of grievances
and the importance of collective action. The globalisatioll of the new
indigenoLls movement gave political legitimacy and direction to the nevv
fluorescing of ethnicall)! based-associations in Nepal. Considering the
rate of growth and proliferation of civil society acInI'S engaged in ··the
politics of difference", they could be seen as indicators of a considerable
improvement in certain aspects o[ political and civil rights (the right to
take part in the conduct of public an~1irs, the heedolll of association and
of expression, freedom of thought) in Nepal during those tumultuous
;'ears. But these indicators can only he meaningfully interpreted when
they are put in a context of a much more thorough look at the
accountability of the INGOs and NGOs. As the works by Bhattachan,
Dahal and Bkie amongst others have shc)\\11, there \\ere pressing
questions both the N(iO sector's dependency (and top down
accountability) on northern donors: its urban, regional, caste and gender
biases: \\'eak accountability to community-based institutions (and the
ultimate beneficiaries) and dependency on both the Nepalese state and on
markets (see flhattachan ct. aI., 2001~ fllcic et. aI., nd.; Dahal, 2001), As
is evident from both the above exposition and the subsection \,,'hich
follows, other aspects of political and civil rights (the freedom from
arbitrary arrest and detention, equality' before the courts, equal protection
of the law, fi'cedol11 from arbitrary and unla\vful interference into privacy
and home) \vere increasingly violated under the nascent multi-party
democracy. This becomes particularly evident if \vc examine the
deterioration of civil and political rights in the Rapti 70ne of mid-
western Nepal, where the Maoist rebellion \vas initiated in 1996.
Preparations for People's \Var
Reports from human rights observers indicate that in Rolpa District
alone, perhaps as many as 1,000 people \vere arrested between 1992 and
1996 under the Public Otfences Act (See SAHRDEC, 1996), Allegedly,
hundreds of SJM activists were harassed and \vere also faCing false
charges by NC and RPP party memhers, The 1992 local elections form
the direct backdrop for these charges, The district administration,
including the political authorities as well as the police and judiciary, did
not handle these cases in a transparent and fair manner. In tact, evidence
suggests the local elite party cadres acted in collusion witb the police.
In 1994, SJM centrally decided to boycott the mid-tenn poll. CPN-
UML (which, based on the results, came to fonn a minority government)
captured some of the earlier SJM voters, Also, NC obtained a favourable
electoral result in the Rapti Zone. Reports of political and police violence
in Rapti led the newly elected CPN-UML government to commission a
report on the allegations, The report, which spoke of unlawful detention
on false grounds and forced incrimination by police and local political
leaders, was not widely published by the government, allegedly to not
overstrain relations with the Nepali Congress (See SAHRDEC, 1996),
Their local cadres were implicated in a number of the investigated
incidents, As the Nepali Congress again came to power in 1995, the
party's central and local leaders intensified their efforts in order to extend
their voter support even further by undermining and taking over SJM's
support base. Many SJM supporters chose to leave the party as it
otTicially went underground, The party expelled those members who
took part in the mid-tenn election, Many of those who did not partake
went to live in India, where the Maoists had well-established
collaboration with a number of militant leftist Maoist parties, Jointly,
they started ideological and military preparations for an uprising on
Nepal's soil. This uprising was seen as integral to a world revolution of
the proletariat
Observing closely both the developments at the central and local
levels, the underground central leadership of the CPN (Unity Centre), the
Prachanda Fraction, developed its final and consequential ideological
considerations for the next stage of strugg le, Party documents, interviews
and the published writing of the Prachanda Fraction's chief ideologue
Baburam Bhattarai provide us with few clues for judging whether the
leadership devoted time to a last, specific political assessment of whether
they should consider to make a final effort to create a broader popular
movement in pursuit of a non-violent solution to the mounting cultural,
pOlitical and economic contractions of the Nepalese society (see
I3hattarai, 2003a and 2003b),
82 Occasional Papers, Vol10 TONE BLEIE : The Decades of Voilen! Des!abilizalion in Nepal: 83
As the fornlal decision for a protracted war was to be taken, in 1995
the Maoists' and their supporters experienced human rights violations by
a new regime claiming to be democratic and accountable to its
international human rights commitments. Precisely hO\'\I- these
experiences affected the leadership's decision to opt for warfare is
ditlicult to ascertain, but the experiences undoubtedly had a mobilising
effect when they started to prepare ideologically and organizationally for
the uprising in Rolpa and Rukum (two neighbouring districts). A
f()fcrunner of the uprising was the Sisne-Jaljala (the names of two
mountain tops) campaign. This political campaign was started by the
SJM in Rolpa and Rukum hom May 1995.57
In September 1995, a Congress-led coalition government succeeded
the minority government led by CPN-UML. With a hawkish, law and
order-oriented government, local politics in Rolpa and Rukum turned
even more violent in the autumn of 1995 than in the previous years.
Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), national human rights NGO,
reported human rights violations in 1994 and 1995 by police forces in
those areas of Rukum and Rolpa that were strongholds of the United
People's Front (SJM). The same reports also contain accounts of SJM
supporters' attacks on Congress workers (INSEC, 2002; 2003).
One major incident that led to further escalation of violence took
place in Rolpa in October 1995 in connection with the launch of a
cultural programme. A clash broke out between NC, RPP and SJM
activists, leaving a sizeable number of supporters injured and arrested.58
The NC-RPP coalition government's response in November-
December was a large-scale police operation called "Operation
Romeo".59 There are a number of reports documenting excessive use of
violence and a large number of arrests (of both SJM members and of
ordinary non-activists) on false or arbitrary grounds (See SAHRDEC,
1996). Most were arrested under the Public Otfences Act. Reliable
reports suggest that police made extensive use of the rape of women and
girls as a collective punishment, in order to shame and humiliate."
According to reports, party workers hom the ruling party directed police
searches of homes of UPF cadres in 11 villages in Rolpa (See
SAHRDEC, 1996:12). Such acts discredited the forces of law and order,
alienating local activists and ordinary villagers and fostering resistance
among already radicalised political elements.
By late 1995, the fateful decision to engage in armed struggle was
taken. The brutality of "Operation Romeo" thus suited the preparations
of the central Maoist leadership of SJM for protracted warfare, to be
launched in February 1996. On 4 February, the 40-point charter of
demands was presented by the SJM Chaimnan Baburam Bhattarai to
Prime Minister S. B. Deuba. The list contained demands for a new
constitution drafted by a constituent assembly, abolition of the monarchy,
abrogation of all unequal treaties with foreign governments, and several
specific demands related to political, civil rights and economic rights
(improvement of livelihoods) (see Thapa and Sinjapati, 2003: 189-194).
Before the deadline had expired, a number of government installations
were attacked on 13 February. The political nature of these attacks is
evident from the ways in which they were carried out. In the attacks on
two police stations in Rukum and Rolpa, political slogans were shouted
before and after the police were out-manoeuvred. No one was killed in
these incidents. The attackers looted explosive materials and other
valuables. The same day the plant of Pepsi Cola was attacked in
Kathmandu and a liquor factory in Gorkha was blasted. These early
attacks were ideological statements about the main targeted class
enemies: the multinationals, local/national capitalists and the extended
arm of the repressive government.61 The People's War, a military extra-
constitutional means of realising the political aim of first establishing a
"new democratic state" and eventually a communist state, was on. It
would soon spread to other western and mid-western districts and further
to the far west as well as some of the eastern regions.
Considering the 1991~ 1996 period as a whole, the early years of a
multi-party system would have been challenging for even a highly
competent government. With the old axis of palace together with the
amny and police being largely intact, added to an entrenched culture of
patronage in the upper echelons of government and within the
mainstream political parties, the most basic requirements for starting to
establish democratic governance based on answerability to human rights
concerns were neglected. With simmering political discontent and a
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dctemlined under-ground Maoist party with a regional support base, the
situation \vas ripe for confrontational politics by using violent means.
Violent Conflict Between 1996-2006
As stressed in the introduction, this article does not pretend to explain in
full the unprecedented escalation of the conflict between state forces and
Maoist guerrillas and militias during the decade. Instead, I will briefly
illuminate how the above analysis of constitutional wrangles as political
struggles over the attempt to define a principle of sovereignty and the
palace's ability to maintain and recreate extra-constitutional sources of
authority is relevant for understanding (I) why the two efforts at
negotiation apparently failed over the issue calJing a constituent
assemhly, (2) why the issue of whether the king or the Security Council
should control the anny is so sensitive, (3) the repercussions of the royal
massacre in June 2001 and how they interconnect with the current king's
use of emergency powers.
When the nation was still in an early stage of grieving over the
killings of the king. queen and their nearest relatives, the beleaguered
Premier G. P. Koirala stepped down, due to being under investigation for
the abuse of authority'" and a wrangle with the Royal Nepalese Army.
Koirala gave way to one of his party opponents, S. B. Deuba, who had
been arguing for some time that the Maoist insurgency was a conflict in
need of a political solution. Deuba immediately declared a ceasefire (the
announcement was reciprocated by the Maoists' military and political
leaders) and started to prepare in earnest for negotiations. His political
ambitions at that stage for solving the impeding crisis \vere related to his
recent high-level contacts with the rebels, and also to his family
connections to elite Ranas, who are influential within the Royal Nepalese
Anny.6J After the wrangle with the fonner Premier G. P. Koirala, the
Royal Nepalese Anny had an interest in showing a willingness to
collaborate with the elected government. In spite of these enabling
conditions, the negotiations failed in November 200 I after three rounds
of talks.
The main reason for the breakdown was the Maoists' demands for a
constituent assembly and a republican state.'" Nearly two years later, the
government's dismissal of the Maoists' demand for a constituent
assembly was again one major reason for the breakdown of talks after
seven months of ceasefire. King Gyanendra's dismissal of the Deuba
government and his assumption of executive powers in October 2002
formed the backdrop for the second ceasefire in late January 2003. The
new royalist government, which was deemed illegal hy the parliamentary
parties, also contained ministers this time with a conducive mix of
personal, caste/ethnic and royalist connections, mustering the social
capital necessary to act as dialogue partners.('S The protracted
negotiations again found themselves stranded66 in regard to the issue of a
constituent assembly and the amlY's serious violation of the ceasefire-
the so-called Doramba incident. In response to the Maoists' demand for a
constituent assembly, the govern-ment posed its version of constitutional
monarchy, based on the principle of the sovereignty of the people.
Remarkably, this government party was appointed by the king, who had
just violated this principle on grounds of extraordinary circumstances, as
spelled out in Article 115 of the 1990 Constitution. The Maoist
leadership, like so many of their communist predecessors, again failed to
gain acceptance of their demand.
But much more important in the longer run, the Maoists managed to
use the seven-month ceasefire to engage politically with the general
public and mainstream political parties in a manner which lifted the
demand for a constituent assembly to the national level. This widened
sympathy for their basic demand is a step forward. So is, most definitely,
an increased recogni-tion of its democratic rationale as a process leading
to a new constitution that can be "a model for" reconstituting state-
society relations in Nepal. Even with this new openness to the demand
for elections to a constituent assembly, however, there are justified
concerns and fears about the road towards its realisation and about what
kind of constitution would be the outcome. One such worry is how such
elections could be conducted fairly in a far-flung country where, in many
districts, government presence is confined to the district headquarters,
and in a number of areas the Maoists are now the sole governmental and
political actor. The party structures of all the parliamentary parties are
mostly disrupted.
In January 2004, a spokesperson for the Maoists stated that they
would be ready to accept a constitutional monarchy if the king were
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willing to relinquish his command of the army and accept that a sizeable
number of milit31)' officials should be removed from their positions,67
This stance, if fully backed by the political and military leadership, is a
significant signal of the Maoists' fundamental ideological and military
concern with dismantl-ing the kingship-army axis as one founding pillar
of the monarchical state. The demand for the axing of the top and middle
level leadership of the army is also part of this dismantling strategy. It
seeks to address the need to undermine the old axis between the top
echelons of the military and the extra-constitutional centre, the palace.
Thus. their recent move, if serious, could be understood as being related
both to communist ideology in regard to hO\v the conditions for
transforming a semi-feudal state into a transitory democratic (bourgeois)
state and later into a communist state can be established, and to the
Nepalese communist movement's memory of the past 50 years of
political struggle against an autocratic monarchical state. As the above
discussion reveals, the Maoists' political predecessors have over and
over again experienced the monarchy's firm backing from the army and
police in remaining the centre of authority, whether this meant suspend-
ing constitutions or disregarding constitutional proto-democratic reforms.
As shown above, circumstantial convergences of international and
national events both in 1950 and 1990 influenced the course of political
events in Nepal. The II September attacks, which occurred during the
second and third rounds of peace negotiations, came to alter Nepal's role
with respect to the international security agenda. The world's only super-
power and its allies placed the conflict in Nepal on their own mental and
geographical map of Asian "terrorist hot spots", and therefore offered
substantial military aid. The Nepalese government was not able to
withstand the US and UK's mix of courtship and pressure, and opted for
a military solution to the conflict. This was conveniently used by the new
king, who declared a state of emergency on 26 November 200 I, using
the aforemen-tioned Article 115 on emergency powers in the 1990
Constitution. The constitutional rights enshrined in the constitution were
suspended, except the right to file habeas corpus. The Nepal Communist
Party (Maoist) and its supporters were declared terrorists." Thus, the 11
September attacks were used by the executive monarch to alter some of
the rules of the game and the relative strengths of the stakeholders
fighting for control over the state. The Royal Nepalese Army was, for the
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third time in more than 150 years, mobilised against its own citizens.
With the increasingly wel1-equipped and numerous army troops entering
the battlefield, the number of deaths, casualties and human rights
violations increased dramatically. Perhaps less immediately noticeable,
but still very significantly, this deployment fundamentally altered the
way the king (as Supreme Commander) was constructed as a sovereign.
Since Nepal's imperial expansion was stopped by the Sagauli Treaty
with the British in 1816, the king-army axis has built on the notion of
protecting Nepal's stable national border. The employment of the Royal
Nepalese Anny against its own citizens undennines this border
definition, and establishes a much more contentious basis for the notion
of the sovereign warrior king. The deployment of the army was the
culmination of years of dispute between previous elected governments,
the army chiefs and the palace. The dispute reflects another defect in the
1990 Constitution. As a compromise, the king was conceded the position
of Supreme Commander, but had to act on the advice of a National
Defence Council (to be led by the Prime Minister). After 1990, the
political system had neglected to assert their role in the Council."
The murdered King Birendra's reluctance to mobilise the army
against the Maoists guerrillas during the early years of the emergency is
well-known, though this is not the full background for his tacit
understanding with the Maoist leadership. The differences between the
elected government and the palace over who was the commanding
authority actually was given emphasis in 1999, due to the preparation for
an internal security and development plan. This included the employment
of the army in all seriously insurgency affected districts. As already
discussed above, G. P. Koirala resigned partly over these wrangles. The
anny remained immobili-sed until after the Maoists overran a district
headquarters in September 2000. Then it was mobilised for security duty
in 16 districts and remained so until the declaration of emergency about a
year later. This new, militarily engaged, highly visible king-army axis,
oriented towards internal enemies, might in the short run consolidate the
axis, as the army is tethered with new positions and advanced weapons.
However, fighting in hilly terrain cannot be undertaken only by air
strikes alone. As the losses of army personnel increase, resentment and
hatred by the population caught between the combatants will also grow.
In the face of such prospects of increasing de-legitimisation of the army,
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one can foresee the possibility of strategic alliances between elements in
the anny and other parties searching for a non-military solution.
Another key agent implicated in determining the role of monarchy
in the short and longer term is the current King Gyanendra himself. The
circumstances of this king's accession to the otlice arc extremely
contentious. As long as the official version of the bizarre events to the
effect that the crown prince committed regicide because he was
forbidden to marry his long-time girlfriend arc not better substantiated,
the great majority of Nepalese------ with their acute historical memory of
conspiratorial palace politics-- will remain suspicious of the possible
role of the current king and other surviving relatives in the massacre of
his own brother, sister-in-law, their children and some other close
relatives. This tarnished image of the Nepalese monarchy internationally
is a mental burden on the intellectual middle class and elite, who are
paintully aware that even the slightest hints of such serious allegations
would result in full investigations in any state where basic judicial
accountability mechanisms are in force. There might be indications of
another parallel trend of a more distanced, reflexive attitude among the
rural population in insurgency atllicted areas towards the monarchy. If
these tendencies are reinforced in the coming years, the cultural
hegemony of divine kingship shall indeed be under challenge in Nepal.
The king's political performance so far indicates that he might be
ready to and capable of consolidating his power at the expense of any
new deal between the state and civil society. He is, in other words, a
worthy successor to the legacy of his authoritarian and unscrupulous
predecessors, whose central place in the political history of Nepal was
analysed in this article. The Kot Massacre in 1846 brought the Ranas to
rule Nepal for a century. Then internal strife within the Rana family
acted as a factor in the downfall of the Rana autocracy in 1950. Again
internal strife, whatever the actual circumstances were, struck in 2001
when the country was already facing a dramatic destabilisation, These
notable, but less visible and discussed repercussions of the royal
massacre on public support for the Hindu monarchy might very well
accentuate the drift towards a republic in Nepal.
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The years 2005- 2006: a Second People's Movement - ending in a
Comprehensh!c Peace Accord
The last few years have seen political change of a structural kind in
Nepal. The scenario has moved trom a seemingly entrenched triangular
conflict betv•.:een the autocratic and power-seeking royal regime, a fragile
seven party alliance and a still assertive Maoist movement, to a basically
bi-polar conflict that evolved into a second pcople's movcment, which
finally pressured a recalcitrant ruling monarch to reinstate the dissolved
parliament. The reinstated House of Representatives enacted a number of
historical decisions. The state \vas declared as secular and constitutional
control and control over the army was transferred from the kingship to
the parliament. The parliament also accelerated the stale peace talks \vith
the CPN (Maoist), by opening up for real negotiations over the most
disputed issues, including the future role of the monarchy, the
composition of the interim government, modalities and functions of the
Constituent Assembly and of the disanna-ment, demobilisation and
reintegration process.
Let me first describe in some details the trajectory of this rapid-
moving political transformation, which many would say, IS
unprecedented. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) support for the
agitation of the seven-party alliance (SPA) could not but in the longer
run weaken the King's bargaining position. The agreement between the
new partners was mainly limited to the issues of the royal takeover and
constituent assembly, as the CPN (Maoist) opposed the SPA's demand
for revival of the House of Representatives. The alliance's "roadmap" for
peace was no doubt inade-quate, due to its heavy reliance on the political
and constitutional events of the 1990-movement. The roadmap's
inadequacy also refiected the ongoing intra- and inter-party contlicts and
the increasing gap between senior leaders still supportive of the
constitutional monarchy, and second and third-generation leaders who
were increasingly supportive for at least a real debate about a republic.
One might say that the alliance's roadmap was hopelessly outdated, as it
promised a retum to a parliament and a leadership that in fact had
contributed to the conflict escalation in the first place.
The 12-point pact trom November 2005, between SPA and the CPN
(Maoist) to oppose the royal takeover, should nevertheless provide one
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important precondition for the popular movement that unfolded
unprecedented over 19 days (April 6-24). This amorphous movement'''
expanded its support-base day by day and came to include all sections of
the citizcnry; also district towns became the hubs of popular
demonstrations whose force and message of the importance of human
rights, peace and democracy had a self-reinforcing effect. The attention
to the excessive use of force against demonstrators in international and
domestic media, protests from the diplomatic community and
international human rights groups and Nepalese Diasporas, served to
strip the regime for whatever remained of its legitimacy and facilitated
the final outcome. The final days of the movement became a
demonstration of a diversity of popular expressions of women, youths,
children, elders who had never taken to the streets before and the sections
of the citizenry who \vere quite experienced street fighters. The mass-
character of this movement and its democratic and peace-promoting
aspirational values, make it reasonable to argue that the Second People's
Movement of April 2006 was different from the rebellions of 1950,1979
and 1990, whose character I have analysed earlier in this paper,
On April 24, the hard pressured and domestically and internationally
discredited King Gyanendra announced the restoration of the House of
Representatives that he had dissolved in May 2002. Shortly thereafter, on
May 18, the House of Representatives declared itself the sovereign body
in the country, and dissolved the Royal Privy Council, reduced the power
and the privileges of the Kingship (such as the right to decide heirs for
the throne) and the Nepalese state was declared as secular.
This early accelerated phase between April and June 2006 was
followed by a much more contracted and unpredictable phase of tough
negotiations over the most contested issues: the status of monarchy, the
interim constitution, composition of the government, the modalities of
the constituent assembly and arms management. The tireless efforts of a
number of principal negotiators, pressure from the continued people's
movement and the intentional community, eventually resulted in the 10-
point Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) that was signed after the
SPA-Maoist summit meeting by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala
and Chainnan of the CPN (Maoist) Puspa Kamal Dahal (Prashanda) on
November 21, 2006.
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The CPA's preamble is an expression of the agreement as a
compromise between a revolutionary movement, which indirectly state it
ends the early 1 I year long "people's war" and the mainstream political
parties,"1 The CPA contains objectives and directive principles for
restructuring of the Nepalese state, goals for reforms of state-bearing
institutions, decisions to form (interim) institutions and bodies like the
constituent assembly, As has been remarked earlier in this paper,
constituent assembly has been a longstanding demand, dating back to the
early phase of communist party politics in Nepal. The Peace Accord also
spells out the conditions for a pennanent ceasefire, demobilization,
disannament, reintegration and resettlement.
While these political developments have been characterised as
unprecedented, they arc explainable \vithin the framework of analysis of
this paper. The simmering and action-inducing collective consciousness
as citizens among the rural and urban populace, that triggered the
(largely peaceful) mass-character of Second People's Movement, was
based on a convergence between certain distinct political movements and
related consequential events ITom 2001 and onward. The Maoist
movement's decade-long ideological awareness raising about the nature
of the Nepalese state gradually affected large sections of the society, and
the civil society's (and some media houses) steady-fast espousal of
liberal democratic values of social justice and participation (backed by
the international community, though not always united) came to
reinforce one another - opening up a genuine public questioning of the
old hierarchical order centred on divine kingship. The circumstances
around the royal massacre and the questions of trust surrounding the
successor King and the Crown Prince, and the decision to deploy the
Royal Nepalese Army against the country's own citizens, served to
intensifY the de-legitimisation of the century-old state-bearing model of a
sovereign king, protecting his people against foreign invaders.
CONCLUSION
The Nepalese Hindu state was fanned by the combination of brute force
and more benign co-optive and assimilationist political and social
strategies. Consent was built on cultural models of divine kingship, ofthe
bond between rulers and subjects and of a caste-based social order. These
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models gained a hegemonic status through state and state-sponsored
rituals which displayed the king's power in the representative public
domain, through the bureaucratic cOllrt-centred culture, and a civil code
as wel1 as land tenure and taxation system that the [{ana rulers appro-
priated and consolidated, In order to balance Nepal's sovereignty with
continued domestic control of the state apparatus, the Ranas accepted a
certain level of semi-dependency under the British in exchange for their
non~intervcntioll and acceptance of an isolationist policy. During the rule
of the Shahs and Ranas, the Nepalese state developed a historical
trajectory which had certain unique features. This apart. the Nepalese
institution of kingship shared certain basic structural similarities with
Indian princely states, \vhose actual power had been drastically curbed by
the British, who remained tolerant of the pompous state rituals. The Rana
rulers' isolationist policy, in a state based on rule by command and an
honour code that made political dissent a religiously sanctioned sin,
limited even the elite's exposure to \Vestcrn poEtical ideas of democratic
governance and a body politic or elected rulers and citizens.
The earliest e\:posure to any such ideas occurred in the 1920s and
1930s. This c\:posurc grew stronger in the 1940s as a direct result of the
nationalist independence struggle, which eventually led to independence
and a completely new political regional scenario. The events prior to and
during the J951 revolt, kno\\.'n somewhat misleadingly as ending
autocratic Rana rule, \vel'e rather intimately orchestrated by the newly
independent democratic Indian government, whose security interests had
primacy over the more uncertain prospects for genuine democratisation
in Nepal. The course of development in Nepal during the following
decades was predicated by the Indian economy's increasing dominance
and successive Indian governments' somewhat weary tolerance of the
preservation of autocratic rule - including the regime's successful
containment of the seeds of democratisation sown by B. P. Koirala's
brief period in government. The geopolitical location of the mountain
kingdom between t\VO very large countries, communist China and
democratic India, set the terms for the pragmatic foreign policies of
Nepal's rulers, and provided them with sufficient political space to
consolidate their control over the state apparatus, together with a nation-
building project that became more contentious than during the earlier
Shah and Rana periods.
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Aller the 1951 palace rebellion, the ruling monarch quite
successfully managed to accommodate the expectations of the post-war
international community, ne\vly independent India and the traditional
elite by embarking on a modest modernisation of the state. The rapidly
grO\ving influx of foreign technical assistance and financial support
facilitated and accelerated this process of restructuring, \vhich successive
ruling monarchs followed up. By continuing to offer the traditional elite
privileged access to leading positions in the expanding civil and military
state apparatus while also accommodating to some degree the emerging
elites and aspiring middle class (groups whose very existence \vas the
result of new in-country educational opportunities), the monarchs
managed to consolidate their power. The aid-dependent expansion
allowed the flowering of a patronage-based and Ilinduized bureaucratic
culture, which, in the short term, strengthened both centralisation and the
monarchy. The concentration of authority in the hands of officials at the
palace created a classical mismatch bet\veen authority and responsibility,
distorting elemental)! principles of accountability and favouring
personalised ad hoc decisions, informal communication channels and
disregard for basic principles of competence and impartibility.
Pinpointing how a ne\v, complex and potentially destabilising form of
economic semi-dependency developed after 1950, this article has
analysed Nepal's political and administrative development be1\veen 1950
and the latc 1990s. A new critical form of reliance on Western donors
developed, in addition, an increasing economic dependence on India and
a less solid reliance on China.
While the regime \vas fairly successful for the time being in
bargaining expanded economic and educational opportunities against
acceptance of a limited kind of participation in "advisory" political
assemblies during the Panchayat period, the highly discriminatory nature
(to\vards service castes, ethnic groups and women) of this process of
integration, which was not only not effectively redressed but accentuated
by the development programmes of the 1970s and 1980s, created a
simmering process of political conscientiousness with respect to relative
deprivation, injustice and state responsibility. The communist parties
which operated as much on Indian as on Ncpali soil in the 1980s in spite
of their internal ideological struggles consolidated their position as an
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alternative political voice to the Western liberal onc, which was espoused
by the patrons of aid.
The 1990 movement was in certain respects triggered by regional
and international political events. And the form of the movement in
certain respects shmvs national political agents' active use of models for
political action that \vere disseminated by the international media. The
exposition has illuminated how frail the alliance was, fraught by
memories not only of past decades' ideological differences, but of
personality clashes and opportunistic po\ver politics. The political agency
of the movement was not only stifled by this frail foundation for joint
action. The movement \vas also stifled by the partially co-opted position
of certain key political actors (most importantly the Congress's) within
the old regime. This co-optation was helped by! the Congress politicians'
adherence to the hegemonic notion of a Hindu monarchical state. The old
political elite \\'cre also fractured. Hardliner panchas stood against
panchos with democratic leanings. The negotiated compromise and
contradictory constitution \\'erc largely results of these structural
conditions' containing and crippling effects on the 1990 movement. The
uneven alliance between the old palace-centred regime and the moderate
and rightist parties more appropriately characterised as patronage-based
networks created an array of effects bound together in mutually
reinforcing ways that virtually blocked any institutionalisation of
accountability mechanisms. Since a number of the connections and their
cause-effect-cause chain-like nature are still inadequately researched, the
question of the relative responsibility of the main leftist forces ~ the
United Front, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and CPN-UML - and
of the non-partisan democratic middle-class for neglecting to join
political forces to obtain a basically political solution during the 1991-
1995 period remains a sensitive and unresolved issue in the face of
increasing death tolls and the destruction of Nepal's infrastructure.
The analysis has shown how the last 50 years of political contention
and partly failed efforts to restructure the monarchical state in Nepal
have to be in no small measure explained as the result of contradictory
multi-scaled regional (Nepalese-Indian) interdependences. These were
found at the levels of governments (security policies versus a boarder
panacea of political and economic priorities), the parliamentarian party
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systems (the orthodox roJ'alist parties versus the social democratic and
some communist parties), civil societies (also comprising underground
revolutionary communist parties), and lastly at the level of a shared
Gangetic Hindu culture- affording religious and political legitimacy to
the Hindu monarchy. The CPN (Maoist) international connections, also
expressed through proclaiming the "People's War" as the vanguard for a
world revolution, have recently created new global-regional and local
interdependencies.
Political institutions in Nepal after the introduction of multi-party
democracy were not restructured either to respond to or fully to contain
the new pluralist, centrifugal forces fuelled by structural adjustment and
a rapidly expanding civil society. Like a "pressure cooker without a
safety valve", an intolerable pressure built up that resulted in the
declaration of war by a Maoist party bent on dismantling the monarchical
state and perusing a phased strategy for attacking the key functions of
this state and stripping it of what remained of its legitimacy.
The Second People's Movement, and the reinstated House of
Representative's historical constitutional decisions, including to declare
Nepal as a secular state and to open up for a negotiated settlement, lead
after a period of tough negotiations to the Comprehensive Peace Accord,
signed in late 2006. With a restored multi-party democracy, a peace
accord whose implementation requires continued commitments from
several stakeholders, a government authority with weak accountability,
gender, caste and ethnic-based social exclusion, a war-tom economy and
a radicalised citizenry, the consolidation of peace in Nepal depends on a
difficult social transfonnation in the years to come.
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constitutional basis, was the de facto supreme decision-making body,
accountable only to the monarch. See Brovm, 1996:44.
25. According to (Baral, 1977:110-145), some of the class organisations were
also channels for regime critique.
26. The same ritual could be observed as recently as in 2001 and 2002 (also
shO\\/n on Nepali Television), when the new ministers lhanked King
Gyanendra for appointing them.
27. On a daily basis, the official newspapers contained many reports about royal
attendances and initiations of anything from new road links to trade fairs.
28. In order to manipulate the picture of relative predominance of different
languages, the regional languages in the Terai were classilied in the 1971
Census as separate languages and not as Hindi dialects, so as to render the
number ofHindi speakers low. See Burghart, (1994:4).
29. The land reform was implemented and the caste system formally abolished.
These measures created goodwill among educated intellectuals and the
foreign missions. However. these enacted reforms \vere not backed by any
comprehensive sets of measures, which were necessary to redistribute land
effectively and undermine the entrenched caste hierarchy (Cf. Joshi and
Rose, 1966:475).
30. According to another study by Lok Raj Baral (1983:165-166), as many as 60
percent of the then members of the National Assembly were made up of
defectors from the political parties.
31. While according to the line management structure, the civil service is
ansvierable to the Council of Ministers, there was a contravening
constitutional provision that made the Council only responsible for day-to-
day management, leaving the king and his secretariat responsible for all
political decisions (See Pandey, 1989:319).
32. Embezzlement was considered theft under Rana rules and punishable by
13\\/.
33. rhe Service Commission under the first Koirala government prohibited civil
servants from seeking support from the Palace Secretariat. but the
Commission's reforms and the later Civil Service Act have been largely
ignored.
34. There were several interacting factors at play of which the aforementioned
failed and reform was but one. Also, the Nationalisation of Forests Act led
to decreased community access to vital resources: the population in the hills
increased rapidly while the absolute limit for expansion into new arable
agricultural land in this ecological zone had been reached.
35. A Royal Nepal plane was hijacked by Nepal Congress activists, the
residence of the Central Secretariat was burned down and a grenade \\'as
thrown at the newly enthroned king during a visit to the border town of
Biratnagar.
36. See Thapa and Sijapati (2003 :43-50), for a more schematic genealogical
exposition of fllsions and fissions within the communist movement between
1949 and 2002.
37. These inch,lded the establishment of the Social Services National Co-
ordination Council responsible for supervising and approving community
development (including donor-sponsored ones) and the National Sports
Council. a kind of semi-military unit.
38. The fall of the communist regime in East Gennany was of course noted, but
perhaps even more so some of the subsequent falls of dictatorships. The fall
of the Romanian President Ceauseseu, who had come on an official state
visit to Nepal in 1987, made a special impression (see Brown, 1996: 114).
39. Two major communist parties joined the alliance: the NCP (Marxist~
Leninist) and NCP (Marxist), as well as the Varma, Manandhar, Amatya
and Fourth Congress fractions, added by the Workers and Peasants Party.
40. The human rights violations included indiscriminate firing, false allegations
without securing detainees' rights to legal assistance and trial, mass arrests
of demonstrators, detention and imprisonment under torture, unsanitary
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4S. See the ot1icial translated version of the constitution: HMG(l\') (llis
Majesty's Government of Nepal), The Cumtilution ofthe Kingdom oflv'epa/
2047 (/990).
conditions. withollt trial and censorship (see Amnesty' International. 1990a
and 1990h). ["he police violated hasic mora! and religious codes [n not
returning dead bodies l()f funcrul rites. .
41. Injimn::nion about the royal family's economic interests was circulated. and
also comments that amounted to Cl critique of the traditional notion of the
statc's In:asurc as the sovcrcign's o\\n purse,
42. Scc Brown"s (1996:25-127) account hased on intcrvie\vs with the most
promincllt political !caders.
43. Bro\\Il. (1996:137-139) stresses that the Indians' hackstage politics is not
fully kJl(m'l,l. But it seems clear that the Indians were actively engaged in
j()fcing concessions from the king and in trying to promote a dralt treat\'
which would have limited '\Ieplll's sovereignty in certain respects (prrso!l;/
communicalion. Dev Rqj Daha!).
44. Some leading Indian politicians gave full support 10 the movement. Also.
Indian activists gave assistance along the harder. See Brown. (1996: 137).
45. Krishnn P. Bh,ltlnrai (President of the Congress Party') WiIS appointed Prime
Minister. The Council of Ministers \vas composed of {(HII' ministers from the
Congress. three from the ULL two nominees of the kine and t\\'O
independents. ~
46. Onc commission investigated disappearances during the Pancha:yat period
and the other (the Malik Commission) alleged violations during the Jana
Andolan (between 18 Fehruary and 13 April). None of the reports \verc
puhlished. The Malik Commission made suggestions for action against the
ultimately responsible ofTicials within the police, in the Council of Ministers
and in the administration. The Attorney' Gcneral did not take any leeal
action. relying on a series of extremely unconvincing arguments. ~
47. For a detailed account of the whole drafting process. sce MiehaeJ Hun
(1994). Onc of the (in)IJJllous incidents during the drafting \vas the version
released by the palace on 21 November. The draft which gave the kingship
very extensive powers. \vas claimed to have heen \vritten in consultation
with the Prime Minister. J-"or details sce also Brown (1996), and Raeper and
Haftun (1992).
60.
49. Article 9 gives only children of male citizens the right 10 be acknowledged
as Nepalese by descent.
1
50. The Nepal Communist Party (Marxist) und the Nepal Communist Party
(\tlarxist-Lcninist) merged into the Communist Party of" Nepal (tinitied
1\,1 arx ist-I,en inist).
51. The National Democratic Party (Rashtriya Prajatantra Party) \\as headed by
Surya Bahadur Thapa. Thapu held the of!iee of Prime Minister during the
dramatic days of April 1990 and thus was discredited in the eyes of the
political left. The other party was headed hy Lokendra Bahadur Chand. Both
would return as Premiers atter the people's war had started.
52. (PN (l'v1asal) \\as one of the splinter parties of the part) also having the
mime CP'\" (\1asa1). which \\as furmed by I\ilohan Bikram ~ingh in 19X3. In
1984. this party was OIH: of the f(llmding membcrs of the Rl'\olutiollary
Internationulist J\..1ll\Cl1lent (R [1v-1) (sce llwpa and Sijapati. 2003 :27).
53. The (PN Unity Centre wnsisted ofCP:'-J (Mashed). CPN Iclth Congress) and
a splinter group of CPN (\1asal). which had gut registered by the Electoral
Commission in early 1991.
54. Sce SAHRDECs (1996:8-9). \\hich argues that many instance ofperson<.ll
animosities sUPP(lrl~d under the Panchayat systcm \vere translnted into
political conllicts in the new public space created by the multi-party system.
55. The Tanakpur Agreement between India and '\lepal hecallle a matter of
serious political contention, as the constitution was ambiguous on the terms
for ratification. The Supreme Court ruled in December 1992 that the treaty
should have been ratified by the parliamcnt.
56. The full list is published in Thapa and Sijapati. (2003).
57. Sce the referencc in SAHRDEC (1996). to an intervie\\ in 1996 with the
, erstwhile Deputy Superintendent (OSfP) uf Police in Rolpa. The DSIP Sa\\
thc Sisne-Jaljala Movcmel1l i..lS the real start of the People's \\iar.
58. Of the 24 people arrested. sevcn of them wcrc charged under the Puhlic
Offences Act of 1970 and 13 for attempted murder. SAl IROEC (1996).
59. According to Thapa and Sijapati (2003:71). the operation was headed by a
Congress Home Minister known to be a ruthless politician. He was already
sued in a criminal case. accused of being implicated in a fatal shooting
incident \vhieh killed UML activists during the 1994 mid-term election.
Aller he beeame Home Minister. 'It seems he managed to stop the case from
being pursued in Ihe court system.
I3aburam Bhattarai's view of what happened during Operation Romeo was
referred to in The Independent, 13-19 December 1995.
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61. See the ML Party's own article on these incidents in Yew Worker. No. 2
( 1996).
68. The basis was a Terrorist and Destructive Activities Control and Punishment
Ordinance, \vhich \vas tollo\','ed in 2002 by the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities Act (TADA).
69. Former Chief Justice 13ishwanath Upadhyaya, who drafted the constitution
in 1990 and also the Civil Code in 1964 under King Mahendras autocratic
regime, is unusually blunt about this omission in a recent interview in The
Kathmandu Post (available at: http://\vww.nepalnews.com/Kathmandupost,
12 January 2004). He says: "Even in the case of the army, the constitution
fo:med a Defence Council with the majority of parliamentarians to operate
thIS body. But the ~~Iitieal parties never asserted their role and let the king
operate such a sensItive organ."
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
G. P. Koirala was under formal investigation by the Commission for the
Investigation of Abuse of Authority (scc Thapa and Si.japati. 2003: 115).
K. P. Bhattarai's short-lived government in 1999 appointed Deuba as the
leader or a high-level committee to suggest solutions to the Maoist prohlem.
After promising initial contacts. the hitter intra-party' dissent over the
initiative resulted in Uhattarai's JaiL and his critic G. P. Koirala. who
advocated a law and order approach to the Maoists. again became Prime
Minister.
Evidence about how the Maoists used the ceasefire to reorganise politicallv
and rnilitarily suggests that they had little faith in the negotiation;.
Immediately after the hreakdmvn. the Maoists proclaimed the establishment
of their parallel National People's Government and a number of large-scale
o.tTensives were launched in various parts of the country. Sudhir Sharma.
"Ihe Ethnic Dimension of the Maoist Insurgency (draft), (Kathmandu, 2002).
Minister Naryan Singh Pun, strongly royalist Magar and succcssful
businessman. is a good exam plc of such a pro-regime actor.
Both parties showed no commitment to follow the agreed Code of Conduct
and preparations \\i'ere poor. Both parties' official statements were
in~~nsistcnt. Both sides werc influenced by hardliners who pushed for
mJ1l~ary so~utions. There was no proactive support from the parliamentary
partIes, \vhlch were not a formal party to the nt:gotiations and whose main
agenda was the reinstatement of the parliament.
See http://www.kantipur.onlinc.com/php/kolncvl...s.phs&nid. 22 January
2004.
70. For a valid vie\vpoint questioning the role of civil sodety in the second
people's movement see CD. Bhatta's article in The Rising Nepal on 27 July
2006: Role of Civil Society in Conflict Resolution. also available at
http://nepal cl emocracy.org!contl ict.
71. The CPA states in its preamble "Pledging for progressive restructuring of
the state by' resolving prevailing problems related to class. ethnicity. regio-
nal and gender differences." The prt:amblc continues by stating: "Reiterating
commitments to competitive multiparty democratic system, civil liberties.
fundamental rights, human rights, complete press freedom. rule of law and
other norms and values of the democratic system". A vailahle at
http://'''iww .nepalnews .eom/archive/2006/nov/nov08/F ul I. ,text_summ it_mee
ting.php
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BORDER TOWN IN THE TARAI:
SITES OF MIGRATION I
Sondra L. Hausner
This paper relates the dynamics of three border towns, focusing on
Nepal's southern Tarai as a belt of migration. This paper focuses on the
contemporary geopolitical reality of the Tarai as a place in which both
hill migrants congregate and through which migrants leave Nepal and
travel to the Indian plains, in search of work, safety, and opportunity.
The theoretical aspects of the paper touch on the questions of voluntary
versus forced migration, and also, analogously or not, voluntary versus
forced prostitution (De La Costa and Alexander 1993, Doezma 1998). It
is grounded in a critique of the rhetoric of trafficking as the sole measure
through which the development industry - both international and national
_ views the movement of women across the Nepal-India border (Fujikura
200 I, O'Neill 200 I), and opts rather to focus on the labor conditions of
voluntary sex workers in Tarai migrant towns. Prostitution in border
towns is a global reality - border crossings in the Tarai are no exception
_ and our reflections on this region of Nepal must include ways to ensure
the proper treatment of sex workers.
Each Tarai border crossing poses a particular set of geographic,
cultural, and political realities, with various histories ~ certain routes are
more plied than others at different moments in time, which reflect
variable labor and market economies in India (Rankin 2004) and, in more
recent history, the Gulf, where an estimated half a million Nepali migrant
wage laborers live and work (Seddon et. al 1998, Seddon 2005), almost
all men.' Women who migrate are by no means ail victims of trafficking
rings (Frederick 1998, Hausner 2005), but those who are trafficked are
nonetheless among those who migrate. As far as we know, trafficking
destinations are not usually large towns on the border. But active sending
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routes change over time (Lieehty 2001), and will determine \vhether a
particular border area is a place where high numbers of traffickers cross
into India. Junctures with direct lines to railway stations to Mumbai, for
example, are long-standing routes of established trafficking networks;
others pose fairly' llC\V markets.
In the years at the height of conflict in Nepal, at the beginning orthe
millennium, violence bct\vecn Maoist cadres and the Royal Nepal Army
was worst in the Mid- and Far-Western Development Regions of Nepal,
and this too affected the changing rates of migrant outflow at different
border points. Many more young men were choosing to become Jahor
migrants to India as an explicit alternative to joining the Maoists in
\vestern Nepal than in eastern Nepal..! When my team conducted our
field\vork, in 2004, the number of migrants leaving Nepal through each
border town that \VC looked at increased as \ve moved farther west, where
the roots of conflict were coming to fruition (de Sales 2000, Friedman
2005) and where, at that time, the intensity of conflict between Maoist
insurgents and Royal Nepal Army security forces was strongest (Lama-
Tamang et. al 2003).
Nepal's Tarai: 3 Sites of Migration
The paper is not about the Tarai as a singular location but as a border
area and place of active migration to India, as \\'ell as a destination itself,
for III igrants from other parts of Nepal. Understanding the Tarai in
contemporary geopolitical terms means acknowledging its role, among
others, as a series of points of exit and entrance, and therefore as a region
of transience (Adhikari 2006). What I want to do is bring to light thc
realities of people's migratory choices at a pivotal moment in their lives,
through the lens of the locations in which they occur I am particularly
interested in the question of women's experiences of migration; my
research team elicited this information through ethnographic research in
three Tarai bordertowns: Kakarvitta, Jhapa district, on Nepal's eastern
border; Bhairawa, Rupandehi district, on Nepal's southern border, and
Nepalganj, Banke district, also on Nepal's southern border, about 300
kiJometcrs further west."
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memhcrs, \\'ho likely observed many comings and goings of women and
their companions, and \vere \vell aware of the realities of migration and
prostitution. Our methods \\'ere open-ended, informant-guided,
ethnographic conversations. The research \vas not based on pre-
formulated questionnaires or conducted in focus groups, but rather took
the form of informal exchanges with migrants as they passed through the
national border.
The border bet\\'een Nepal and India is a porous one: many' more
crossing points exist than are formally policed or patrolled, and these
movcments are legal. The Tarai region is a place of old migration: most
border town settlers are themselves people \vho migrated from the hills
three to four decades ago, in the 1960, and 1970, (Thapa 1989. von dcr
'Icide and Hoffinan 200 I). Vole must not thinK of III igration through the
rarai as a recent phenomenon (although it has cel1ainly increased in
recent years), nor of migrants as a new Kind of population. These are
questions that must rather be fitted into a longer histo!)' of regional labor
migration, and a larger view of state relations bet\veen Nepal and [ndia,
and also of COl11l11unal identity (Hutt 1997).
In what fo]]cw,..s, I discuss the three sites of border research, in turn,
giving snapshots of each, focusing on the dynamics of migration, and
particularly on the realities of border town prostitution. I end with a
number of policy recommendations, emphasizing (i) the importance of
educating women on processes of ·'safe migration" so that they may
more productively and securely' move to and through border towns: (ii)
the need to establish refiJges or rest homes for \vomen who have been
abused, tratlicked, or thrown out of their communities, and the potential
usefulness of existing border patrol facilities for this purpose; and (iii)
the need to ensure that border town sex workers arc protected, not
demeaned, b)/ armed forces. The easy equation that prostitutes need not
be treated well - they sell sex, after all -- means that the greatest
difficulties for sex workers may come from members of those institutions
that are paid to protect women and communities more broadly: the police
force, the anny, the insurgents.
i. Kakarbhitta-Siliguri
The research was predominantly conducted with women crossing
the border, but \ve also interviewed border guards and local community
The Kakarbhitta-Siliguri harder
Darjeeling, Sikkim, Shillong, and
falls on an old trade
Calcutta. Migration
route to
bet\veen
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Kathmandu and these parts of eastem India - and the kind of town such
movements give rise to - is a well-known story here. One hotcl owner
told us, "You see, Kakarbhitta is a place of migrants. Fifteen years ago,
people from Meghalaya and Assam started coming and settling down
here. Here you find all castes and kinds of people.'" This is a common
talc in Tarai border lawns, and we see how it has become part of
residents' identity as \vell.
Most of the women traveling from Kakarbhitta through the border to
India were not migrating but shopping, because goods are cheaper in
India, Although border tratTic is steady, migration did not appear heavy
across this border at the time we did research there, in November 2004.
Most women who were travcling through the border and not returning
with goods were returning to their cross-border marital homes after the
Dashain and Tihar festivals, usually with children, sisters, sisters-in-law,
husbands, or brothers in tow. Very few Kakarbhitta informants were
leaving Nepal for India for good, or for the first time. Migration through
this border did not seem to have been particularly affected by conflict; at
the time the research was conducted, Nepal's eastern areas were less
affected by violence and forced recruitment than western regions, and
this likely accounts for less out-migration through Kakarbhitta. Migrant
flow was much heavier through the southern border 'points that lead to
the vast plains of India.
Many commercial workers cross the Kakarbhitta - Siliguri border
daily in pursuit of work that comes when a large, mobile population
needs to be catered to: people shopping for cosmetics and trinkets to sell
in small shops and market places; merchants shopping for vegetables and
foodstuffs that could be cooked and sold in transitory chai-shops; and
women crossing the border - in both directions - to do household chores
in hotels and restaurants, and to sell sex to migrant workers, truck and
bus drivers, local residents, and travelers temporarily freed from small-
town scrutiny. Bengali women come to Nepal, and Nepali women go to
Siliguri. Local hotel owners told us that women would cross the border
for the day, servicing clients, and return home in the evenings.
What came out very clearly over the course of this research is the
vast difference between trafficking across a border - the assessment of
which was the original inspiration for the study we conducted - and
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street-based or brothel-based prostitution in a border town. Kakarbhitta is
a Maiti Nepal border post because of it falls on the route to Calcutta,
where the brothel industry relies on powerful networks that traffic Nepali
women (Frederick and Tamang 2005). The prostitution that takes place
in Kakarbhitta town itself, however, appears not to rely on trat1lcking
networks at all, but rather on women choosing to participate in a
voluntary market for sex. This is a critical difference - that of consent -
and succinctly demonstrates how viewing women's migration
exclusively through the lens of trat1lcking both inhibits women's
freedom of movement across an open border, and fails to ensure that
public health provisions and social protections arc provided to border
town sex workers in their proper context.
Because it is an old, well-plied border crossing between two poor
regions (eastern Nepal and the plains of West Bengal), Kakarbhitta has
something of a reputation as a brothel town. The hotel owner where we
stayed told us, "There is a lot of prostitution in this town although people
are slightly cautious these days. It is not as open as it used to be. But
what I have heard is that a recent trend is developing: village children -
school children 14 or 15 years of age - also engage in sex work. See, the
hotels have to pay rent. Look at my hotel - it has been mentioned in the
Lonely Planet; it is more expensive than the other hotels and most
foreigners come and stay here but still I find it difficult to pay the rent
sometimes. How do the other hotels manage? They have to have some
side business".
Another informant told us, "According to police station data, there
are 300 hotels in Kakarbhitta. Let's say 50 are clean: all the rest are
involved in prostitution. There are hotels that do not cook any food; the
hotel is just a fal'ade for canrying on sex work." When asked about
migrants who come to work in the hotels, she replied, "What help do
they need in the kitchen when no food is being cooked" What to do,
sister; it has reached a point where we sometimes feel ashamed to say we
are from Kakarbhitta."
Following a series of raids, the local Hotel Association had recently
circulated a petition condemning prostitution as a practice in their
establish-ments. A cabin restaurant visited by our research team was
completely empty, possibly as a result of the recent raids. Prostitution is
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a cOTl\/cnicnt issue all \\'hich both police and Maobadi want to "crack
dO\vl1," citing sex \vork as a social ill: while five women caught \vith men
in hotels were being held as prostitutes at the border police station at the
time \ve were there, the Maoists had recently' cut the hair off a prominent
local madam.
h. Bhmra!lult'u-,)'unauh
At the Bhairah,l\va border, as in Kakarbhitta, many local residents
travel back and forth to India daily for purchasing goods. The number of
people especially men-migrating to India for \"'ork through the
Bhairahaw'-l borckr is extremely high, however: border patrols estimated
that as Illany as 1000 people cross the border to India Jailv morc than
hal f of \vhum are labar III igrants. Moving \\i'estward thrOL;g'h our three
border points, the difference in labor migration between Kakarbhitta and
Bhairahawa was remarkable.
Our I3hairahmva rescarchcr estimated that most migrants were mcn
bct\vcctl the ages of 18 to 30, migrating in a group of 5 to 15. Many had
come to visit relatives over the holiday' and \v'ere returning to India to
work. About half of the men (but many' fewer \vomen) identified conflict
- particularly' the demands or the Maoists - as the primary reason thev
had moved or were mov'ing to India, The other half identifIed economi~
reasons as their primary motivation: they told us that "no matter hO\v
hard they \vorked in the fIelds, it was not enough for their families to eat
t\\/O meals a day." \\/h3t is clear is that the political and economic sides
of the coin are not far removed from one another: political instability
causes economic devolution, and economic devolution causes politic~l
instability. People experience the combination of events; how they report
them depends on how palpably they feel the effect of each, and on how
much they trust us, the questioners.
The girls and women migrating through the Bhairahawa border,
mostly from the surrounding districts Gulmi, Palpa, and Arghakanchi,
were vel)' uneducated. Few had been to school or could read or write'
those who had gone to school had dropped out at class five, A Jew girl;
knew how to use the telephone. Our researcher found that they did not
knO\v anything about their destinations. Five girls did not know the
names of their o\\'n villages. or the name of the places they were headed
in India. None had the contact addresses of their destinations, nor did
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they have any money on them. Women who \vere going to visit their
husbands did not knO\v \vhat kind of jobs their husbands were doing in
India. These women \vere entirely reliant on male family and village
members, with no resources, address contacts, or information. They had
no idea how to go about making contact with prospective employers,
relatives at home, or institutions that could help or protect them if things
go wrong, like the police, the Nepali Embassy, or a transit home, Many
said that \vhether they worked or not how long they stayed in India,
whether they would be able to study, and whether and when they would
return to their home villages were decisions their husbands alone would
make.
Almost all the girls and women we spoke to said they trusted their
hlmilies, and although a fev\' first-time travelcrs said they' were scared,
most told us that they felt no fear as long as they \"'ere with their
companions, "When I'm traveling with my O\vn brother-in-law, why
should I be nervous?" one young woman who did not know the name of
her home district asked. A woman from Gulmi said she did not feel
scared to migrate as her "husband had not left her for a second." Others
confessed their fears~ one \voman moving to Lucknow to be with a new
husband said she was scared to move to a big city, but as her husband
lived in Lucknow, she had to live with him whether she liked it or not.
Many women we spoke to stated their confidence in husbands they
had not met in years. This reflects a deep cultural value in Nepal - not
limited to the Tarai - that women should look up to and place faith in
men, ard shows how encouraging women's independence may be a
critical part of preventing trafficking and assuring safe migration. The
essence of successful anti-trafficking programming lies in teaching girls
to believe they have some role to play in their travels, in learning their
geographies, and in questioning the circumstances of their movements,
even if this means taking on responsibilities that men nonnally bear.
A number of women said they were enjoying their trips, and were
excited to cross the border, viewing their migration as an opportunity to
be in a new setting. "Safe migration" means that women should be
encouraged to watch what their companions are doing, and how they
handle the exigencies of travel, rather than stand passively by. In this
way, women might gain experience and independence, rather than
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remain reliant. This is a matter of gaining confidence, in part, as well as
experience, so that travel, short- or long-tenn migration, and labor can all
fall more easily under women's O\vn purview.
iii. l'v'cpalganj - Rupedzva
The most heavily-plied border town of our research period was
undeniably Nepalganj. Upon arriving in Nepalganj, one member of my
research team reported, "It looks like all of Nepal is emptying out of
Nepalganj I" Bus station officials told us that they had added extra buses
to accommodate the extra flow: 60 30-person buses - around 1800
people - were leaving from the government bus station daily. (Recall that
our research period was just after the Tihar holidays, when numbers of
migrants were particularly high.) Even with post-holiday traffic,
however, this figure indicates an extremely high level of migration to
India through Nepalganj. As in Bhairahawa, a relatively small percentage
of migrants (our researcher estimated 5~lO%) were \vomen and girls,
almost all of whom were traveling with male family members to meet
their husbands or brothers. Conflict had clearly impacted many
infonnants" lives, but in most cases they did not identify violence as the
main reason for migration, although many said the situation \vas
complicated and uncertain 6 As in Kakarbhitta and Bhairahawa, labor
migration through this Tarai border point is a long-standing
phenomenon; too few employment opportunities and too little land are
problems that preceded the conflict, and indeed gave rise to it. Almost
everybody hoped they would be able to return to Nepal at some point in
the future, and even appeared mournful at the thought of not being able
to.
The population of Nepalganj itself has certainly increased in recent
years, because of conflict. If migrants to India more often cited economic
reasons as their primary motivation for moving, migrants newly resettled
in Nepalganj more often cited the conflict itself (although these two
motivations should not be viewed as entirely separable entities). Women
migrants to Nepalganj told us quite explicitly that they had had to leave
home because Maoists had demanded too much food and money.
Families migrating to the city ofNepalganj are likely more wealthy, and
from higher castes, than those crossing the border from Nepalganj into
India for work, who largely come from very poor families (Hausner
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2006); most told us they did not have enough cultivable land to feed the
family for the year. More wealth means that a family is first, more
heavily targeted by Maoists, but also more able to reestablish itself in a
new city, with the upfront economic investment that requires.
Nepalganj has also been concentrated somewhat, as people from
outlying areas have moved in~ surrounding districts were no longer
considered safe. A woman who had moved from Bardiya, a half-hour
away, said that Maoists had not allowed her and her husband (who had
since migrated to Saudi Arabia, \vhich had increased Maoist demands for
money) to run their small Mallt, or liquor shop.' In Nepalganj, she said,
opportunities were higher. She herself had become a sex worker: "After
all," she told us, "a bazaar is a bazaar. We can eam money here
somehow." Quite a number of recent women migrants to Nepalganj were
family members of men who had migrated to the Arab States; some had
found work as prostitutes.
As in other border cities, prostitution in Nepalganj is quite high - it
is a border town, an army base, and an increasingly populated urban
center of refuge from the conflict-ridden western and far western regions
of the country. About half of the roughly ISO sex workers in the local
prostitutes' support organization were recent migrants. One sex worker
complained to us, actually, that the increasing number of sex workers
meant that local rates of services were going down - what used to cost
Rs. 500-1000 now cost a tenth of that sum, or Rs. 50-lOO. Nepalganj sex
workers work out of small tea and liquor shops, as well as little paan
stalls, where they meet and solicit customers: many of whom are Indian
men crossing the border expressly to find Nepali women. Indeed, Indian
men seem to be willing to pay more for a Nepali woman, and were
therefore the preferred clients of the Nepalganj prostitutes we spoke to.
A number of sex workers we spoke with had been abandoned by
husbands or had been widowed; others were married to men who didn't
earn enough (rickshaw drivers, for example, who earned Rs. 80- J00 per
day), and who might turn a blind eye to their wives' source of
supplemental income. Many came from abusive family backgrounds. A
small number of more educated women said they were sex workers
because it was fun, a kind of entertainment. Most said they would never
encourage women to work in the profession; one woman said that when
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she met new sex \vorkers, she suggested they leave as quickly as
possible. All the sex \\'orkcrs ""'jth \vhom w'e spoke were looking tor
alternative sources of income generation: most wanted to open a shop or
start a small business.
Although there is a long history of prostitution in the area (including
Badi women), police and other public offices have clamped down on
prostitution in the last few years. Police had raided the major hotels and
restaurants a few months hcforc our research, and most hotels in the area
had since refused to hire nc\v \vomen employees. Sex workers told us
that the RNA and police \vcrc their main clients, however. as well as
their main adversaries.8 Even though hotels \\"ould not publicly hire
women employees in November 2004, a client could still bring a
prostitute to his room, Not hiring \vomen is a policy that clearly
discriminates against \vomcn laborcrs because of t~1lse assumptions that
all women migrants are prostitutes: such a policy means, of course. that
more \vomen \vill become prostitutes, because there are fev..'er labor
options. Ultimately, the refusal to hire women so as to avoid public
scrutiny most severely affects women migrants, the very people such
public scrutiny intends to protect.
Policy and Programming: A Fe"" Recommendations
In the rhetoric of the development industry, \vomen's experiences are
largely cast in terms of the need for protection from sexual predators:9
protect girls from trafficking (even if it means prohibiting migration);
save \vomen from prostitution (even if it is engaged in voluntarily as a
viable means of income), In this article, I too call for ways to ensure the
safety of· or to protect - migrating women and girls, but without, I
hope, the patriarchal or patronizing mechanisms that assume that women
are not in control of their own movement, or their own sexuality, Rather,
I wish to insert these realities ofwomen's lives -- moving with or without
family members to find work; opting to migrate to a town where new
economic opportunities might open up; choosing to become a sex worker
in order to make enough money to live - into our view of Tarai border
towns. Acknowledging these arenas of women's agency ~ and these
aspects of life in the Tarai - is onc \vay programmers and policy makers
can help ensure women are socially protected, not in the sense of being
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til!htlv restricted in their movements or behav'iors, but rather i~ thc,sens,c
l11- b~ing free from harassment and judgment on the baSIS ot theIr
SC:\ll~llity.
I, Establish education ccnters at borders: retrain border
auards as safe migration educators, not interceptors.
M
Women we spoke in regions all over Nepal -- migrants and
prostitutes, educated and uneducated -- hoped m.ost fervently for
L'ducation for their daughters, arguing that the 1I1dependellce and
KlH1\\'lcdge brought about with higher levels of education is the best
social protection possible. The poor le\'t~ls of education among women
and !2irls crossing the border mean that they arc entirely' dependent on
thcir~malc cOlllra~lions,and often unable to muster resources of any' kind
should trouble arise. Improving national levels of education for girls -
and cducati!l!! women and girls on the means and modes of migration
specifically ~ \vould mean that they' \vould be morc prepared for their
journeys. and their destinations.
A llumber of organizations. most prominently Maiti Nepal, have
trained \VOll1cn border guards to be on the lookout for cases of potential
trafficking. This training and placement can be very' useful to preventing
tr3ffickin~, but not quite in thL \,,'ay' it is now operating. Fig~ting
trafficking \.... ill not happen effectively at borders, because there is no \vay
to know whether, in anv onc case, a patroller is effectively stopping a
IrafTicker or inhibiting aWmigrant womi.lIl's mobility. Stories of policemen
and "..'omen taking bribes so as not to raid certain border town hotels (or
not to stop cel1ain people going through the border) are rampant. in
Bhairahawa. onc policewoman \vas accused of sending girls to India for
money herself. And in large part because Maiti Nepal's advocacy efforts
have been so successful, traffickers knov,' they must go through "chor
halO" _ thief roads - \vhen they are actually smuggling girls to India, As
a Kakarbhitta custOlllS officer told us. "Frankly speaking, there is a great
deal of smuggling going on - both goods and people - but not through
this route. They go through "chor-batos" - through the jungle or border
villages. NO\v that the river is dry', they cross the border by walking
through the riverbed."
Rather than act as investigators and police, border guards from
women's organizations likL Maiti Nepal. Saathi, and ABC Nepal should
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act as educators and information brokers. Girls need to know how to
check offers of potential employment or marriage, and become
accustomed to the idea of acting independently. Education about how to
migrate satCly, such as how to keep records of contact addresses which
can be shown to someone for help; the importance of having onc's own
money; and learning about borders, travel routes, and names of places,
could be very helpful. A Bardiya woman \\lorking in a Nepalganj hotel
did not know how much her salary was, as her brother collected it for
her. The importance of teaching girls how to control their own money _
and indeed that this might be a value at all- cannot be overstated.
Education materials forming the basis of a safe migration
curriculum should be incorporated into girls' and \vomen's
empowerment efforts in both home villages and urban centers (SCN and
S.A. 1996), as well as in border areas. As one long-tenn advocate of the
issue told us, the best results come from programs that encourage girls to
"check it out. An offer of marriage? Check it out. An offer of
employment" Check it out. Who are these people? Where do they want
to take you?" l1y encouraging scrutiny, critical thinking, and
independence, girls will feel more resourceful and empowered, and be
better able to protect themselves.
2. Establish safe havens for migrating women and girls:
support transit homes in border towns and resource centers
in destination cities.
A. Support transit homes
Currently, transit homes havc been established to accommodate
those girls intercepted at the border, who must wait for parents or
guardians to pick them up and escort them home or to a legitimate
destination. But large, well-run, and well-funded transit homes can
accommodate many morc girls than are stopped at the border. In some
cases - certainly the Kakarbhitta transit homes - local communities have
taken over the homes for a much better purpose: places of refuge for
runaway girls, usually from domestic violence from either husbands or
parents-in-law. None of the three girls at the Kakarbhitta transit home,
for example, had been fonnally intercepted, and none had been engaged
in prostitution.
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These transit homes are clearly useful. but they would he more
useful still if they publicly acknowledged that their primary purpose was
to serve as a refuge for women who need or want to leave their domestlc
situations. A\\'areness about the broad uses of a transit .h?me would also
help the girls who live there, who said no one came to VISit them: perhaps
out of a stigma that all the girls and women affiliated with Maltl Nepal
were prostitutes or had H[V or AIDS. The communal support available
in transit homes, especially with a well-trained and dedicated statf, IS an
important way to ensure productive counseling, rehabilitation, a~d remte-
gration efforts of all kinds; these are successes that should be built upon.
E. Estahlish migrant resource centers
A number of informants told us that we[l-established and well-
blicized "contact points" in Indian cities could be very useful for~ .,~
migrating women, and a transit home H'rit large 1I1 al~ urban center mlg
\vell serve this purpose. One programming suggestion that has not yet
been acted upon but which holds great promise is the establishment of
Migrant Resource Centers, which could provide legal, educational, and
refuge facilities for migrants from all areas in major urban Cities. These
nters with phones and message boards, could serve as the "contact::int"~ for both families wanting assurance of a dau~hter's s~fe
migration and possible employers - desired by so many migrants wIth
10
whom we spoke.
From a donor perspective, a migrant resource center is very
efficient, as migrants from all countries and in all circumstan~cs can be
catered to under a single administrative structure. Women from many
different areas of the subcontinent working in neighboring brothel areas
would also be able to convey infol111ation to one another about how to
get assistance that is not limited to women fro~.a part!~ular country. An
ideal model might be transit homes in subSidiary cities and resource
centers in large cities, although they would in the end perhaps serve very
similar roles.
3. Ensure protective mechanisms for p.rostitut~s,.. ~nd
encourage viable alternative income generation pOSSibilities.
Mechanisms to protect prostitutes rather than penalize them would
be quickly felt. Those NGOs that provide vocational training and
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rehabilitation arc greatly <lpprcciatcd: (he local support organization fix
sex workers in Nepalganj, for example. supported in part by' Ci \VP
(General \Vclfare Prathisthan) appeared to be a model nct\vork,
providing condoms, a drop-in center. and a phone center. ;\ cc-nter that
provides such services is a prototype that might be built upon for women
migrants more generally. In Bhairahmva, too, local sex workers were
vcI)' supportive of onc another.
Although there is much debate on this point legalizing prostitution
would probably he the 1110St protective mechanism for prostitutes: abovc-
ground unions might be the best way to make sure labor conditions are
sound, for example: women who arc abused by clients could take proper
legal redress: and se\: \\orkers might be relatively fi'ce 11'om the
harassment of police. Police can be a big problem for prostitutes. Some
donors havc insisted that male policcmen undergo a course in gender-
sensitivity training: whether or not this is acted upon, police should be
roundly' penalized for harassing sex workers. Police policies and
procedures should be explicit about the penalties of mistreating
prostitutes, and all policemen should be held strictly' accountable to
these.
In areas \vhere they' did not already exist. a number or women
suggested establishing collective welfare funds as a critical part of
building solid community support among sex \vorkers. NGOs prov'iding
alternative jobs - beyond sc\ving or knitting, which are not viable means
of income and \\'hich perpetuate rather than challenge gender stereotypes
should he supported, as many girls ;md \vomen said they yearned for
economic options. Idt:ally, loans could be provided as seed money' in
order that \VOmen could start small businesses. ;\ long-time advocate in
this area said \vomen could easily' be encouraged to \\Cork in business, as
they already have advanced skills as negotiators and in managing
transactions. They can hold their own, and even talk back to clients if
need be; with years of experience, they can negotiate with customers as
equals. Women themselves suggested opening [Jaan pasa!s or small
grocery shops; small-scale factories for chocolate, candles, or soap; or
communication centers.
Finally, the women we spoke with explicitly requested that NGOs
offer training or avvareness programs for civil society - the police, the
1
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rcss, and perhaps bar owners too - in order to mitigate the negative
r . . I d
reputation and reduce the exploitation and harassment of glr s an
\vomen working in the sector. Many women hoped that the impressions
of women who worked as dancers, waitresses, and/or sex workers could
be changed in part so that they might marry or remarry, In order to
counter negative social experiences, women also requested rehabilitation
centers, for those that have become reliant on alcohol, and perhaps most
importantly, counseling facilities, especially for those \vomen who have
suffered exploitation and abuse,
In a region of transience, \ve see how those who might othervv'ise
slip through the cracks can sometimes find unexpected stability, in
domains not usually considered socially acceptable. As \ve advocate for
equal consideration of the disparate regions of Nepal, let us not allow
gender disparities to go unnoticed, or impose puritanical social
;ssumptions on women who have defied them, Indeed, only by changing
predominant views about women's roles in society can we hope for ajust
and equitable Nepal,
ENDNOTES
I. This puper \Vas presented at the Social Seience Balm Conference "Tarai:
Contexts and Possibilities" in Kathmandu in March 2005. It is printed here
\vith their kind permission. A Nepali language volume of the conference
presentations, including this paper, was published by SOl.:ial Science Baha in
2006 (V.S. 2(63),
2. Men migrating to the Gulf alien lly directly from Kathmandu. rather than
crossing hy land to India first. Because of strict laws regulating \',lumen's
migration 10 the Gulf (now finally being contested in 2006), \,,"omen who
intend to move to the Gulf states almost always migrate to India first. often
through land borders,
3. Sce Vlatchlist on Children and Armed Conflict (2005) for an account of
forced recruitment by Maoist cadres.
4. The research for this paper was conducted under the auspices of the Save the
Children-USA Himalayan Field Office, Kathmandu, by a team of eight for a
project on the Safe Migration of Women and Girls, in partnership \\'ith Maiti
Nepal,
5. We were also told that a sizeable wave of settlers came into Kakarbhitta
from Burma in the 60s, under King Mahendra's rule.
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6. Those from Dailekh and Jumla (followed by Salyan) most often cited
conJlict as the reason for migration. Many families from these districts had
migrated to resettle in Nepalganj proper, rather than cross the border to
India; this usually implies more capital with \....hich to start a business and
reestablish a home (scc below).
7. A Surkhct man and his sister-in-law had also moved to Ncpalganj because
the Maoists had increased their 5% donation requests upon learning that the
man's brother had migrated to the Gulf.
8. Some Nepa!ganj residents told us that they had to fight the police \vhen they
\vantcd to close down Badi institutions of prostitution. Police action against
prostitutes. then. seems very arbitrary. and more closely related to individual
desire or inclination - in more ways than one - than to an execution of duty.
9. My thanks to Carolc Joffc for demonstrating this link.
10. This programming suggestion was first recommended by advocates of the
issue in Bangladesh. The heauty of the model is that it bypasses questions of
which country bears responsibility for which migrant: the Centers could be
internationally funded, and would henefit migrants to a particular city from
any country.
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OUTCASTES IN AN "EGALITARIAN"
SOCIETY: TAMANG/BLACKSMITH
RELATIONS FROM TAMANG PERSPECTIVE I
David Holmberg
Camell University
It is now common to critique the social anthropology' of South Asia as
caught up in the essentialization (Appadurai 1988) of a "hierarchical"
caste India and an "egalitarian" West, however, the terms of comparison
are more complex. Critics orthe Orientalist traditions of ethnological and
historical scholarship on South Asia (cf Appadurai 1988; Guha 1983;
Dirks 200 I) erase the place of"tribals" in colonial fonnulations of South
Asia.2 The contrast between "tribes and castes," hO\vever, finds its way
into innumerable gazetteers, ethnographic accounts, missionary
ethnography, travelogues, and colonial reports well before the peak of
the colonial ethnographic project of the late 19'" century. The
comparison is not, as both the Orientalists and their postcolonial critics
would have it simply dialogical; they are at a minimum triangular. 3 An
opposition between hierarchical "caste" groups and egalitarian "tribes"
has particularly structured the study of Nepal since the inception of
ethnography there. Hodgson's first paper on "military tribes" in Nepal,
for instance, was delivered in 1833 (Hodgson 1971 [1874]) to the Bengal
Asiatic Society. Nepal emerged in anthropological imagination
beginning in the early part of the 19'h century as a domain oftrihals who
by definition were understood in contrast to caste Hindus as more
fundamentally "egalitarian.'4 Brian Hodgson - the earliest systematic
ethnologist of the Himalayan region describes the "tribes" of Nepal in
these tenns: "The whole population is tribal. .. But the barrier of caste, in
the true sense, is unknown" (1874:32). This initial characterization had a
substantial affect on subsequent anthropological work as the early
professional anthropologist to enter Nepal in the 1950s focused almost
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c'.:clusively· on non-caste populations (Sherpa, Gurung, Magar) to the
ncg.lcct of other cultural ethnic groups."'
My concern in this paper is \vith an understanding of hmv
"c!2alitarian" Tamang have intimate and explil:itly unequal relations ",,'ith
Au7ni or Blacksmiths, the highest of the pani noco/ne choi chito
fj({/r/ufJornejot or castes from whom, in dominant Ilindu perspective, one
call not accept water and whose touch requires purification (Hofer 1979:
5::;-67). If one of the sacrosanct boundaries In the anthropologizing of
\:cpal is that between caste Hindus and noncastc Tibeto-Burman
speaking hill groups, hov..' can the latter have caste? Moreover, if they do
have "cask" hO\v can they be egalitarian') My intent here is not to resolve
these questions but to propose that our opposition betv..·een "hierarchical"
iltld "egalitarian" mav need to be re framed in different terms particularly
those ~'hich look at' systems of exchange and everyday' interactions as
they' \vork in the production of cultural value. I am concerned less with
qu~stions of rank than \...·ith exchange relations especially those of
symmetry and as)'mmetry and hO\v they related to relations of
domination and subordination (cr Cameron 1998). I propose that
ramang govern their relations with Kami according to a different set of
",lues or habitus (Bourdieu 1977) than Hindu caste villagers do theirs.
Ilefore turning to the specifics of Tamang/Kami relations in the area
\vhere I worked in Nepal, let me briefly reiterate the basis on which the
egalitarian image of groups like the Tamang emanates.
Tamang Egalitarianism
It is largely in domains of marriage and commensality that concepts of
hierarchy and equality take anthropological form in Nepal and South
Asia. Western Tamang on the local level divide themselves into local
patrician segments('. Until recently these patricians consistently practiced
bilateral cross-cousin marriage with an announced preference for men to
marry patrilateral cross-cousins or father's sister's daughters. The
structural effect of these rules was to generate a regime that through time
emerges as one of restricted symmetrical exchange among equal social
segments. Although strict adherence to cross-cousin marriage is
becoming modified in contemporary Nepal (Aheam 200 I), the logic of
exchange in both practice and ideology - albeit of more generalized fonn
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~ remains intact in Tamang kinship and social life. These practices
produced social divisions in the western Tamang region that were not - in
contrast to neighboring Hindu societies - ranked endogamous castes then
but unranked exogamous clans and de facto moieties (Holmberg 1989a).
Even where status asymmetries in Tamang communities have been
documented (Fricke 1995), these status distinctions do not perpetuate as
clear hierarchical divisions like those found in Hindu communities in
Nepal or village North India where marriages have typically reproduced
3. ranked .endogamous divisions among castes. Tarnang commensality,
lIke marnage, is markedly open and reciprocal in contrast to closed
c~mmensal practices found among caste oriented village populations in
hill Nepal." As Toffin concludes: "Tamang society is fundamentally
egalitarian. [my translation] (1986:42). Thus, the presence of lowly
Blacksmiths In Tamang villages poses a contradiction to conventional
representations.
Kami in Tamang Villages
In the western Tamang hamlets and villages to the Northwest of Trisuli
Bazaar in Nuwakot, Rasuwa, and Dhading districts, households or
clusters of households of Kami or untouchable Blacksmiths are found in
villages otherwise dominated by Tamang. Kami along with sarki and
damai are the three main d-lit or Untouchable groups (pani nacalne choi
chito halnllparne jat) found in this hill region and many other areas of
Nepal. There were no Sarki or Damai in the immediate area where I
worked and they tended only to be attached to villages with high-caste
Hmdus. One can usually recognize these Kami households readily by
their separateness and by their coating of black charcoal dust
~ccumulated from activities associated with the working of iron in their
forges. The documented sizes of Blacksmith settlements attached to
Tamang villages varies from none or a few to upwards to one hundred.
Ethnographers have generally neglected Kami and other outcaste
communities (Sarki and Damai) in their concentration on dominant hill
Tibeto-Burman speaking populations (cf. Gellner 1995). This neglect
certamly characterizes my own research and r want to emphasize that my
mterpretatlOn here is directed almost entirely toward the formal
interactions of TamanglKami and toward Tamang views of Kami and not
I
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the inverse. 1 Thus, it is primarily about Tamang constructions of socio-
economic relations. It is about Kami to the extent that Tamang are the
dominant group in the area where I worked and their perception of Kami
constrains Kami life in significant ways. My material is drawn primarily
from the village where I resided supplemented by the Andras Hafer's
(1976) preliminary accounting of Kami social, ritual, economic, and
technical life. Tamdungsa2 - the village of my research - had five
households of Kami and 67 households of Tamang in the mid-1970s, a
number that has not changed significantly in 30 years even though the
number ofTamang households has increased dramatically.
Kami were and remain effectively landless and gained their
livelihood through iron work for Tamang patrons or field labor for
wealthier Tamang. Relations were structured on models similar to those
we associate with the jajmani system of North India or what is
commonly referred to the kamallne system of in hill villages of Nepal.
Kami provided iron working service to Tamang patrons - whom Kami
refer to as bisla - for contractual amounts of millet, maize, and unhusked
rice at the time of harvest. Relations betv.'een particular Kami and
Tamang households tend to continue hereditarily and contracts are
formally renewed annually. In addition to these agreed upon payments,
Kami were entitled to meals at major ritual occasions (weddings, death
feasts, sacrificial days, Dasain and the like) and receive special payments
for major new tools. Most Kami find it hard to subsist on what they
receive in return for metal work and most must work in the fields of
wealthier Tamang households in return for payments in grain. For
instance, at the occasion of planting rice, one of the dominant Tamang
households of the village in the late 1970s employed 14 Kami (along
with Gurung and other Tamang) who received meals plus either grain or
money. Some Kami in the region but not the village where I lived
produce, in addition to iron tools, beaten copper vessels and aluminum
wares on a cash basis. Some were also proficient as carpenters and were
regularly employed in that capacity by Tamang households.
Although aspects of TamanglKami relations approximate those of
the jajmani or kamaune system, there are notable differences. The most
significant one is the absence of ritual service accompanying
occupational contracts, a characteristic jajmani practices in Hindu
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villages. Tamang and Kami in f~lct live separate ritual lives despite their
close economic relations. Kallli replicate general Hindu practices with
their own spccialists- sometimes referred to, according to HareI' as~ ,
·'Bahull." (1976:351). They do not participate in any major Tamang
rituals or take blessings from Tamang Buddhist lamas. Kami jhankhri or
shamanic specialists, hovvcvcr, often train \vith their Tamang
counterparts - knO\vn as homho - \\'ho are the undisputed masters of the
spirit powers inhabiting the regional cosmos. Morc generally, the ritual
life and obligations of Kami link them to other Kami communities in the
region. The mother tongue of Kami is Nepali but they speak Tamang
fluently. They also occ<lsionally employ <I "pig Latin" that Tarnang are
not supposed to understand. In their separateness, Kami remain, though,
a ubiquitous presence in Tamang villages. They arc always there at the
margins of Tamang social rites getting their share of feasting foods or, on
a morc regular basis, begging, pleading, demanding, and cajoling food,
tobacco, or raksi. It is in fact this characterization \vhich play's
elementally in Tamang constructions of them - an issue I will return to
shortly,',
Pure/Impure in Tamang/Kami Interactions
If asked Tarnang \vill tell you that Kami are defiling and that if they are
touched by a Karni that they must observe purificatory ritual. Toffin
(1976:45) reports lllrther that vessels touched by Kami must he ritually
cleansed. Tamang refuse Kami entrance to their houses and will not
accept cooked food or water from Kami hands. Kami and Tamang can
not share the hookah and when men smoke together Kami receive the
chilam part of the water pipe when all others are finishedJ . Marriage is
formally prohibited and sexual relations are not supposed to occur
bet\veen Kami and Tamang. Kami squat on the verandas of Tamang
houses and are not allowed to sit on raised benches. Inequality clearly
structures interaction. I remember distinctly the return to the village of a
Kami who had resided in Darjeeling for some time. Immediately upon
his arrival to his home village in Nepal, he attempted to interact on an
equal footing with Tamallg. He sat on the benches reserved for Tamang
and his demeanor was not subservient. The power of communal
sentiment soon transformed this social hubris and in the matter of a few
days, he "vas back to proper fonn, squatting on the floor cajoling in
Ij
I
DAVID HOLMBERG : Outcastes in an "Engalitarian" Society: Tamang" 129
distinctively Kami style. Likewise, I had announced quite publically that
I would not adhere to these sorts of strictures and that Kami were
welcome in my living quarters, however, not one Kami ever attempted to
enter my house the entire time I was resident in the village: they always
sat outside even when explicitly invited inside. I, no doubt, was
perceived as a temporary resident who was unable to mitigate or
supercede pressure of local Tamang, especially my local patron in whose
compound I lived. These strictures are familiar to anyone who has lived
in hill Nepal and these practices appear to reflect an ideology of
pure/im pure and of necessary separation and hierarchy that we have
come to associate with social practices of Hindu caste villagers.
Observers commonly explain the unequal relations between Tibeto-
Burman speaking hill groups like Tamang and pani nacalne)-I as a
function of the historical contact with and subsequent acculturation to
greater Hindu Nepalese society, what has been commonly referred to as
the process of sanskritization. Tibeto-Burman speaking hill groups as
FGrer-Haimendorf suggests for the Sherpa "imitate" (1972: 14) high caste
Hindus in their treatment of low castes. In other words, the contradiction
of "outcastes" in otherwise ideologically egalitarian societies becomes a
function of immigration of Blacksmiths into new areas and the
dominance in Nepal of caste Hindus. There is, 1 believe, a modicum of
truth in this assertion but I propose that there is more going on than
simply acculturation to caste ideology, Although Tamang observe what
appear to be rules similar to those we associate with caste relations in
Hindu society, the nature of relations and their conceptualization are
distinct.
Tarnang do not have an elaborate set of restrictions surrounding
purity and impurity (Dumont 1970) or inauspiciousness (Raheja 1988),
values isolated by anthropologists in the analysis of transactions in Hindu
society. Tamang do not elevate common pollutants to the socially
charged significance they seem to carry for Hindus or for that matter
even recognize them as pollutants (for instance, menstrual blood),
Significant named pollutions (dip) are associated with birth and death
and they are ritually cleansed almost immediately without lasting
implication' In Dumont's (l970b) tenns, all Tamang pollutions are
"temporary." Tamang furthennore tend to handle the pollutions of death
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reciprocally and symmetrically. To the extent that people handle
pollutions they do so in a direct give and take. For instance, the impurity
acquired through contact with corpses and the personal effects of the
deceased passes back and forth in Tamang society among affinal kin in a
pattern whereby groups reciprocally defile each other. Although Tamang
adhere to Hindu-like restrictions on commensality with 000-Tamang,
within Tamang society the emphasis is on exchanging food - including in
some ritual instances food from a common receptacle - and not on
restricting food. Kami may formally be said to defile one if touched,
Tamang and Kami in fact touch with great regularity and in my
experience, almost never perfonn purificatory rites even though most
individuals can describe those rituals. I have watched young Tamang
women and Kami women parade around in festivals with their anns
around each other. I witnessed a senior and influential Tamang man have
his torso massaged by a Kami without ill effect or ritual cleansing.
Tamang, thus, gloss relations with Kami in a rhetoric of pure and impure
but their relations are, I would argue, constructed on very different
principles of exchange and meaning.
Kami and Evil in Tamang Social Imagination
Outcasting of one fonn or another is not, in fact, confined to Hindu
society in Nepal or elsewhere. Hutton (1973( 1946]: 133-148) and Passin
(1955) provide comparative evidence on caste practices elsewhere. In
Nepal, Tibetans, Sherpa, Gurung, Thakali and others outcaste groups like
Blacksmiths and Butchers. Tamang have close historical links to Tibet
and we may be able to gain some comparative insights by examining
their practices which appear to be structured differently in these societies.
Aziz (1978: 58), for instance, makes the following observations:
. . . . outcaste individuals in both Sherpa and Tibetan society
have a chance (albeit a limited one) for upward mobtlity that
will lift them into the mainstream of their society. Interaction is
facilitated through commensality among all Tibetans including
ya-wa [outcastes], who join public gatherings and are served
food and liquor along with other guests. In addition to secular
foods, ya-wa can also take ritual foods, votive offerings (tsog)
distributed throughout the community.
J
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Although both Sherpa and Tibetans view outcastes as defiling, this'
pollution is constructed very differently and gets linked with notions of
the demonic and of evil. Grtner observes that in Sherpa symbology, "The
lower castes as polluting seem best explained in terms of the demonic
principle - violence and aggression - though sheer physicality also plays
some role." (1973:55). Aziz reports a conversation with her cook about
an outcaste man, "She [her cook] claimed he was evil, and when I
retorted that in my dealings with him I had not found his so, she
conceded with the remark, 'He's not too bad, but his kind of people are
evil. All ya-wa are dangerous.'" (1978:58).
Likewise Tamang imagine Kami to be not so much polluting but
perpetually wanting, begging, and, by implication, inherently evil.
Connotations of evil culturally supersede impurity or defilement in
Tamang representations. Tamang are likely to accuse Karni of being
hoksi or witches, of keeping hir or familiars for the appropriation of
wealth and vitality from others, or in female form, to capture the shadcw-
souls of young children. Tamang exorcists and sacrificers chant out the
evils of "Sarkini, Damini, Kamini" - female representatives of hill
outcastes - when curing or protecting children. Kami are not the only
ones who are accused of being hoksi or of keeping familiars (hir) or of
being evil. Tamang accuse each other of such predilections as well as of
being mengko or poisoners. Tamang, however, figure Karni as being
inherently predisposed toward evil whereas Tamang are not; they must
prove it through their accumulative and greedy actions, actions which
defY the reciprocal ethos. To understand this formulation of Kami and
ultimately how Tamang frame their interactions with Kami, we must see
Kami in light of Tarnang village social ideology and practice. Kami as
social evils are constructed like spirit evils according to a logic which
stresses inclusive reciprocity. Evil is for Tamang linked to those who are
left out of symmetrical exchanges, those who do not receive their fair
shares.
Much has now been written on the ethos of reciprocity among
Tamang and related Tibeto-Bunnan speaking groups in Nepal and I will
not elaborate on it here at great length. Tamang are well known for the
hospitality accorded to their fellows as well as visitors. There is a sense
embedded in lore and social practice that if you horde and do not share,
132 Occasional Papers, Vol10
your possessions will diminish and that if you share, they will expand. In
the most ordinaI)' circumstances and often with paltry resources, Tamang
feel obliged to treat guests with food, drink, tobacco, and whatever they
have at hand be their guests a local kinsman or a visitor from outside.
More eventful social and ritual circumstances are marked by elaborate
formal prestations and commensality proffered with elaborate etiquette
(March 1987). This symmetrically reciprocal order takes highest
structural foum, as I have noted already, in the local social system of de
facto exogamous moieties made up of patricians who exchange spouses
in a system which can be accurately described as one of restricted
exchange.
I want to emphasize, however, that at the same time that onc can
characterize Tamang social ethos as one of reciprocity among structural
equals this does not constitute a total description of social relations. This
ethos forms - as it were - in a field of social relations and practices which
are in violation of this ethos. Accumulation, cheating, bickering, bitter
factional ism are also a significant aspect of Tamang viIlage life right
along with harmonious interchange. In fact, the system itself entails
structural asymmetries at any point in time between giver and receiver.
My point here is simply that reciprocity is valued at times to the
obfuscation of relations marked by inequality and asymmetry.
Reciprocity must be seen as a value that emerges in a wider field of
social relations and possibilities. The primacy of this value, however, is
seen in Tamang predilections to moralize around issues of wealth and
poverty. Those who accumulate or horde without a nod to redistribution
or patronage are thought to be evil.
Social giving, though, is more than a fetish disguising real relations
of accumulation and exploitation in a rhetoric of reciprocity. For
Tamang, giving is a powerful act in that it establishes social relations in a
specific foum. It has the practical effect - as is weIl known - of
engendering obligation and establishing control. In a quite real way,
Tamang attempt to order the world by establishing obligatory exchange
relations. Tamang ritually attempt to enclose social and cosmic forces
into a rounds of reciprocity. Specialists are fastidious in being as
inclusive as possible in their ritual offerings. They chant long lists of
spirit beings that extend to the bounds of Tamang consciousness of the
j
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world. Likewise, at the simplest meals Tamang offer symbolic portions
up to the gods and down to the evils with every being getting their share.
When they sacrifice, Tamang distribute portions for all. In the grand
scheme of things, Tamang draw a circle around a moral society of
reciprocity either direct or redistributive. Those who lie outside the circle
of a moral community are generally those whom Tamang conceive to be
not only "other" but to have denied a fair share.
If Tamang struggle on one level to distribute shares in a
reciprocating universe, the also imagine some human and extrahuman
beings are left out. There is an antithetical backside to the social closure
of reciprocal distribution peopled by a society of witches, poisoners, and
evil spirits. Among the most prominent evils in the Tamang cosmos are
the four mhiga whose prinCipal definition is those who are left out. The
haunting refrain of the exorcism of this metaevil of Tamang social
imagination is, "In death, you did not get a share/In life, the portions
were insufficient." Tamang recognize not only the logical potential but
the reality of incompleteness to their reciprocal efforts. Lurking in those
social margins is danger. To deny is to incur malevolent aggression in
return. In Tamang logic, those left out crave the good fortune of those
with possessions. Evils like unwanted guests keep returning, demanding
fair shares but providing nothing in return. Kami for Tamang viIlagers
embody the social counterpart to spirit evils. Blacksmiths approach their
Tamang patrons pleading, begging, demanding but not tied into the
reciprocal relations that mark interchange with other Tamang. They are
exploited and poor. In their relative want, Tamang imagine them to be
perpetuaIly covetous of Tamang good fortune and wealth. Their craving
jealousy enters and ruins prosperity. An envious glance at a milking cow,
a baby, a stocked granary can ruin, either sickening or poisoning. Kami
women in particular are thought to amict in this manner.
Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Exchange
From this outline of Tamang perspectives on outcaste Kami and their
relations, I wish to raise in conclusion a comparative question. To what
extent can Tamang outcasting of Kami and Hindu outcasting of
untoucha-bles be understood as the same or different phenomena? I
would argue that they are fundamentaIly different and that an
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examination of patterns of exchange allow; us to compare these systems.
The most obvious quality of transactions in Hindu South Asia is that they
are inherently asymmetrical. This asymmetry holds true whether one
works from a Dumontian perspective (1970b) which sees the opposition
of pure/impure as encoded in Hindu village exchanges or ITom critiques
of this vantage (Marriot and Inden 1977). Most work on high caste
communities in Nepal see the relations among castes as consistent with
greater South Asian practice.
In Hindu caste communities, symmetrical exchanges across caste
lines are rare but asymmetrical transactions abound. Asymmetry marks
transactions in the so-called jajmani system. Transactions appear
charged with ritual meanings, marking separation, difference, power,
inequality, and rank whether: one works from a Dumontian scheme
(1970) of castes forming a "religious society" or in Raheja's (1988)
stress on the "ritual centrality" ofland holding castes. In Raheja's village
of Pahansu in Uttar Pradesh, for instance, Bangi or sweepers receive dan
or gifts and thus "inauspiciousness" from their patrons in an array of
ritual contexts; they "remove the 'affliction'" of sick children during
cures, and have ritual obligations at weddings and other social rites
(1988). For Dumont (1970), Brahman and untouchable are linked
through their mutual ritual dependence whereby the untouchable keeps
the Brahman pure and thus ascendent and the Brahman communicates
with the divine. Dumont bases his argument on the idea of wholeness
whereby high and low are kept in systemic complementarity. My intent
here is not to resolve debates in social anthropology of Indian villages
but to make a comparison which is sustained no matter the interpretation
of Hindu caste society to which one adheress
As I noted at the outset, Tamang and Kami do not articulate their
interactions in a common cultural code. Tamang/Kami exchanges are
antithetical to Tamang exchanges. Hafer captures the quality of Tamangl
Kami demeanor that suggests something quite different from reciprocal
exchange:
The slightly plaintive intonation, feigning misery - a token of
servility and thus an attribute of many untouchable castes _and
the stereotyped allusions to his poverty appear only when Kami
bargains [with] or visits his clients on holidays and begs for
J
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some alcohol. In the smithy, however, an impatient client IS
rebuked harshly and a Tamang asking a Kami for a cash credit
is frequently compelled to flatter and beg for some time before
getting the ten rupees asked for.
The Tamang call Kami a caste of beggars and liars and point
out that the Kami are never satisfied with what they get, even
in cases of over-payment. The Kami openly admit that begging
is a habit of theirs, fulfilling thus the role expectation people
have of them. (1976:353).
Relations are not mediated by either the ethos of reciprocity or of
relative purity and inauspiciousness at work in the generation of Hindu
caste asymmetry. Tamang exploit Kami to the highest degree but remain
constrained in their dependence on iron work and field Jabor. Tamang
have more power but Kami have some too. There is a social anonymity
to the exchanges which allow Tamang to act in a purely exploitative
manner toward Kami, extracting in a way that is thought to be unseemly
within Tamang society.
Tamang villagers situate Kami at the margins of a closed society
and according to a different cultural logic from that reported for high-
caste Hindus. Kami do not carry pollut ions in order that Tamang retain a
purer position nor do they receive dan and it's concomitant
"inauspiciousness.',6 Tamang, moreover, do not respect the Brahman in
any ritual sense. Ritual connections with either Iow or high are
unelaborated and at best circumstantial. The lowness of Kami and their
danger are best interpreted as an inverted refraction of symmetrical
reciprocity.
Sahlins (1972) in his comparative work on exchange systems
distinguishes between balanced, general, and negative reciprocity.
Negative reciprocity is characterized by Sahlins as follows:
Negative reciprocity is the most impersonal sort of exchange.
In guises such as 'barter' it is from our point of view the 'most
economic' The participants confront each other as opposed
interests, each looking to maximize utility at the other's
expense." (195)
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Selt~interest of this "most economic" type overtakes TamanglKami
relations in direct contrast to a fonnal ethos of self-denial that is enforced
in Tarnang internal exchanges whether generalized or balanced. Kami
ultimately end up with the short end of the stick because selt~interest is
limited by relative power and Tamang have the upper hand. In Tamang
perspective, Kami occupy the position of outside insider and in this
capacity can only be incorporated with the debility of being evil. The tag
of defiling seems to be a secondary development through which Tamang
relate to the historic rise of dominant Hindus Brahman and Thakuri.
Counler Cullures
Although Sahlins' scheme has some utility in understanding Tamangl
Kami relations as they are constructed in Tamang terms, it does not
really provide for an understanding of exchanges in caste society. Sahlins
like his predecessors, Mauss, Malinowski, and Levi-Strauss, has a two
poled comparison of "primitive/modem." His typology does not fully
encompass the kinds of valued transactions that govern Hindu village
life. Transactions in village India, as have been demonstrated
consistently (Tyler 1988), are inherently asymmetrical and of ritually
valued materials7 among humans and between humans and the divine in
a way that is markedly different from Tamang no matter what the
interpretive stance one takes toward the issue of hierarchy. These
asymmetrical exchanges constitute a moral economy but not one of
balanced reciprocity, generalized reciprocity, or negative reciprocity.
Tamang outcastes and Hindu pani nam/ne choi chila ha/nuparne jat
are different even though the effects of their relations appear identical.
These cultural boundaries are, I believe, significant but to discover their
significance requires looking beyond Tamang/Kami interactions to the
wider field of socio-political relations of Tamang in Nepal. In their
historical resistence to domination by the state Tamang sustained a
culture of symmetrical exchange, I would argue, as a fonn of counter
culture, In other words, they reproduced an ethos of symmetrical
exchange in the production of social solidarity that empowered them in
resistance to state domination. It is not by chance that much of Tamang
practice looks like the inverse of Hindu practice. (See Holmberg 2000;
and Holmberg et. al. 1999). Ultimately Tamang culture as we witness it
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today fanned in an integral way in a dialogic process with encompassing
Hindu culture.
In conclusion, South Asia gains prominence in anthropological
studies primarily because it was one of the few domains where an active
comparative social anthropology unfolded, led in large measure by
Dumont's contrast of an ideologically egalitarian West and a hierarchical
Hindu South Asia. The emphasis ofrecent work on South Asia especially
in American anthropology has been to undermine Dumont. On the one
hand, there has been an empirical effort pursued from many directions to
prove Dumont wrong and an attempt to uncover the true and essential
nature of Indian culture and social practice. On the other hand, there has
been an effort to deconstruct Dumont's fonnulation as an artifact of an
Orientalist project to "'essentialize" which in turn leads to "exoticizing,"
and "totalizing" as the hallmarks of the production of anthropological
knowledge (Appadurai 1988) in Hindu South Asia. Most of these
critiques are well-taken, yet, we should not abandon a comparative
perspective that allows for difference outside of this narrow dichotomy.
Moreover, the frame of the comparison in South Asia must move beyond
the confines of the insular discourse of a Western/Hindu to include
systems like that of the Tamang. Embedded in cultures like that of the
Tamang is a sociologic and a culturologic that counters both poles in this
dichotomy and colonizer and colonized get refigured in intriguing ways
where for groups like the Tamang their overlords were the Shah and later
Rana royalties along with their administrative operatives. The language
of exchange and attention to everyday interaction may well lead us in the
right direction to translate acrOSS different systems. It is precisely in the
encounters of different cultures in Nepal outside of direct colonial rule by
the West that we will be able to displace the opposition which has
dominated the thought of postcolonial critics of the anthropological
project, critics who fail to take seriously the differences in societies like
Tamang and their caste neighbors and the role of localized colonizations
embedded within the larger scheme of relations between the West and
South Asia.
ENDNOTES
1. Much of the recent work on India's dalit or untouchables has concentrated
on either acceptance of or resistance to fonnal caste ideology concerning
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their position (see MatTat 1979; Freeman 1979; Khare 1984). My concern is
with social relations and the dominant Tamang construction of them.
Pseudonym.
H5fer (1979: 216) reports that Kami \vhere he worked are not allowed to
touch any part of the pipe.
!arnang. specialists innumerate the following kinds of pollution in ritual
mc~tatl?ns: mouth pollution, pollution of black bear meat, pollution of
cannIbalism, pollution of eating orphaned animals.
Raheja's critique of Dumant works from the logic that gift transactions do
r~produce values but that those values are not those of encompassment or
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ALL IN THE FAMILY:
MONEY, KINSHIP, AND THERAVADA
MONASTICISM IN NEPAL
David N. Gellner
(University of Oxford) and
Sarah LeVine (Harvard University)
Historical Background
The figure of the monk-shaven-headed, ochre-robed, intent on
enlightenment- is a key symbol in all Buddhism, but it is far more
central in some fonns or traditions than in others. In the traditional fonn
of Buddhism of the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal, known as Newar
Buddhism, the contrast between monasticism as a symbol and
monasticism in practice is perhaps greater than anywhere. The stoI)' of
the Buddha's renunciation was well known, in the Mahayanist version
given in the Lalitavistara. The main shrines of Newar Buddhism nearly
all contain statues of Shakyamuni Buddha himself and main Buddha
shrine is usually flanked by the Buddha's two main monastic disciples,
Shariputra and Maudgalyayana.' These shrines are found in temple
complexes, usually small courtyards given over to Buddhist monuments,
known colloquially in Nepal Bhasha (Newari), the local language of the
Kathmandu Valley, as bahah or bahi, and honorifically by the Sanskrit
and Pali term, vihara. In other words, from the point of view of the
tradition, these sacred Buddhist courtyards are monasteries and the ritual
specialists who inhabited and owned them are monks. And yet there are
no full-time monastics in Newar Buddhism. Instead there is a sacerdotal
caste of married domestic and temple priests, the Vajracharyas and
Shakyas, the male Vajracharyas being the only ones entitled to be
domestic priests, the menfolk of the two groups together providing the
temple priests of the Newar Buddhist viharas. Thus Vajracharyas and
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Shakyas are in practice part-time monks. They are householders
(grhasthi, gristi) and pass on their sacred statuses patrilineally.
Vajracharyas and Shakyas may and do intennarry, but there is a slight
preference for endogamy; thus, effectively, they fonn a single caste with
two ranked sub-sections with different socio-religious identities (Gellner
1995). While carrying out their religious roles they adopt the position of
monks: thus Vajracharyas fast and maintain strict purity rules while
carrying out domestic rituals for Buddhist Newars; both Vajracharyas
and Shakyas, while carrying out the role of temple priests in a vihara
adopt the dress and rules of monks, with a monastic robe and eating only
one full meal a day.2 In the past, most members of the caste earned their
living as artisans, especially as goldsmiths, silversmiths, coppersmiths,
carpenters, god-casters, and so on. A few became rich traders while in
Tibet.
The tenn for monk in this traditional fonn of Buddhism was bare,
derived ultimately from the Sanskrit vandya or 'venerable'. In Nepal
Bhasha the word refers primarily to the Shakyas as a caste, though it is
also used by many to refer to Vajracharyas and Shakyas together
(Gellner 1992: 67). Shakyas and Vajracharyas do not themselves like the
tenn, because it is used in a non-honorific and, they believe, insulting
way by the high-caste Hindu Shresthas, and therefore they avoid its use
as much as possible. It is, however, an unavoidable part of certain set
expressions, and in particular of bare chuyegu, the primary name for the
ritual of initiation by which a Shakya or a Vajracharya boy becomes a
member of his father's monastery. Bare chuyegu means, literally,
'becoming a monk'. Euphemistically the ritual is often called cudakarma
or 'tonsure'. The texts call the ritual bhiksu-pravrajya or 'renunciation as
a monk'. During this ritual the boy spends four days as a monk and on
the last day he goes through a rite called 'laying down the robe' (civar
kwakayegu) in which the boy's domestic priest reads out a recitation, on
the boy's behalf, in which he is supposed to say, 'The [monastic] path of
the Shravakayana is too hard for me to follow pennanentiy. Please show
me an alternative.' To this priest responds by initiating the boy into the
Mahayana and Vajrayana paths of Buddhism,] The ten or five most
senior members of a Newar Buddhist vihara are known as 'elders'
(slhavira) and they carry out the most important regular rituals.
Colloquially they are called aju, i.e. 'grandfathers'.
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Although Vajracharyas and Shakyas carry out these rituals of
monasticism in a number of contexts, they only fonn a small part of their
overall religious practice. The highest salvific practice is to take Tantric
Initiation, a secret ritual that lasts many days and is ideally taken with
one's sexual partner. It involves following practices that are in direct
contravene-tion of monastic codes: the ritualized and sacramental
consumption of meat and alcohol, sacred dance perfonned by the
initiators, and possession (Gellner 1992: 266ff.). The divine
representations of the highest Buddhist path show Tantric Buddhas in
full sexual intercourse. But, and this is a key point, these divinities were
displayed traditionally only inside shrines to which access was restricted
to the initiated. The way in which they can now be seen on sale to
tourists and in shop windows throughout the city is a flagrant breach of
traditional conventions. No one who had not taken the requisite
initiations was supposed to see or know about them. Consequently, the
more ascetic and monastic values of the religion - though not the actual
practice of monasticism - were a large part of the public face of
traditional Newar Buddhism (though the Vajracharya priests'
predilection for alcohol was also a stereotype of popular culture).
In short, monasticism within Newar Buddhism was restricted to
certain public contexts, it was primarily symbolic, and the high status of
those allowed to enact it was passed on patrilineally. Monkhood was
indeed all in the family (and caste). Monasticism was a key legitimating
symbol, but even the most learned and ascetic of Newar Buddhist
practitioners were not, at least not primarily, monks. They inherited their
position as Buddhist priests and - one or two very rare exceptions apart-
they did not withdraw from family life, but rather depended on it for their
religious privileges. Vajracharyas' position was legitimated by their
status as guardians of the Tantric Buddhist (Vajrayana) path; Shakyas
were traditionally mostly known either as Shakyabhikshu (' Buddhist
monk') or as Shakyavamsha ('of the Buddha's lineage'), and, apart from
the fact that they filled the local role of Buddhist monks, it was indeed as
kinsmen of the Buddha that they found their deepest legitimation'
Newar Buddhism has always existed in contact with Tibetan
Buddhism (Lewis 1989). Centuries ago Tibetans came to the Kathmandu
Valley in search of Buddhist teachings. They continued to come on
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pilgrimage to the Buddhist holy sites of Nepal, principally Swayambhu,
Bauddha, Namobuddha, Lumbini, and the Buddhist shrines of the Valley
cities of Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur. Some followers of Tibetan
Buddhism, usually Tamangs by ethnicity, have always lived inside and
around the rim of the Kathmandu Valley. Occasionally, even before the
twentieth century, Newars took ordination as a Tibetan monk. Newar
Buddhists recognized Tibetan Buddhism as a form of their own Tantric
Buddhism, with the same divinities and practices, even if the institution
of incarnate lamas was unique to Tibet. Theravada Buddhism, on the
other hand, was unknown to them and it was only in the 1930s that they
became acquainted with it for the first time.
Among Newars of the Kathmandu Valley today there are still some
households where there is a preference for Tibetan Buddhism, in which
the pious members of the family (usually the elders) say their prayers in
Tibetan. There arc many more where they have gone over to Theravada
Buddhism and where devotions are carried out in Pali, the language of
the Theravada scriptures, and these include many more young people.
Such households - whether pro-Tibetan Buddhism or pro-Theravada -
do not usually cut themselves off from their Newar Buddhist heritage.
They still continue to call their Vajracharya priest for necessary life-
cycle rituals. But their optional religious observances will be carried out
in another idiom and using other specialists.
There is then a co-existence in contemporary Newar society of (a)
Vajracharya priests; (b) the Vajracharya and Shakya caste, who
traditionally claim to be 'married monks' but are now almost entirely
secularized and embarrassed by the claim to sacerdotal status (and even
practising Vajracharya priests nowadays dress like laymen most of the
time), (c) Theravada monks and nuns who practise celibacy, and (d), on
the fringes, Tibetan lamas, some of whom are members of celibate
orders, while others are married. The Theravada monks and nuns
disparage traditional Newar Buddhism, saying that it is not real
Buddhism, and criticizing its ritualism, its connections to animal
sacrifice, and the Vajracharyas' use of alcohol. The Vajracharya priests,
for their part, regard monks as selfish, receiving the alms of the laity and
giving nothing in return. Some Theravada monastics inhabit what used to
be Newar Buddhist religious sites, having been given small, decrepit or
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abandoned baha to occupy. None the less, architecturally and
iconographically, the various Buddhist traditions are as easy to
distinguish from each other as they are sartorially or liturgically.
Theravada viharas are usually modem, functional cement buildings
painted yellow. In a few cases, munificent (usually foreign) donations
have transformed them into marble-paved halls, or, as in Kirtipur, into a
gigantic and highly visible simulacrum of a Thai temple. The baha of
traditional Newar Buddhism, on the other hand, are usually situated
around a courtyard set back from the road, with characteristic carved
\vooden tympani over the doors of the shrines, carved wooden struts
supporting a tiled roof, and at least one, and often numerous, caizvas
adorning the courtyard in fron1.5
The introduction oflhe Theravada movement has opened up leading
Buddhist religious roles to men and women of all castes and
backgrounds, where previously they were restricted to Vajracharya, and
to a lesser extent Shakya, men. The emergence of new roles for women is
a remarkable innovation, for which the women have had to struggle for
fifty years. Since the Theravada monastics (unlike Vajracharya priests)
may not work (except at teaching), they almost never have salaried
employment and rely on the laity to support them. This means that a
series of overlapping lay communities supporting the monastics and
focused on specific viharas has grown up, which re-creates - in a more
modem, less caste-bound, and more open and fluid way - the communal
focus that existed, and still to some extent does exist for their members,
in the traditional Newar Buddhist hahas. Traditional bahas belong to,
and have as members, the male members of one, several, or (in the case
of a few large ones) a large number of Vajracharya and Shakya
patrilines. The Theravada viharas belong to (are donated to) the Sangha
or monastic association, of Nepal, and are run by self-chosen committees
of lay people. These lay people may be related to each other but there is
no requirement for them to be so.
The Beginnings of Theravada Buddhism in Nepal
Given this background, it is perhaps understandable that Shakyas and
Vajracharyas should be predisposed to be impressed by the Buddhism
they encountered in Tibet; it also made good commercial sense as well to
146 Occasional Papers, VollO
seek the protection of powerful Buddhist institutions in Lhasa and
elsewhere. Then, in the 1920s, there was an upsurge of Buddhist
revivalism in the Kathmandu Valley itself. A number of factors seem to
have come together to produce this revival. Pandit Nisthananda
Vajracharya of Kathmandu went to Calcutta in 1914 in order to have his
Nepal Bhasha (Newari) version of the Buddha's life-story, the
Lali/avis/ara, printed. Both before and after the printing he held
numerous public readings of it. A group from Uku Baha, Lalitpur, were
inspired by this to put on a play of the Buddha's life, which was widely
influential. Dharma Aditya Dharmacharya, born Jagat Man Vaidya, went
to Calcutta to study commerce, came under the influence of Anagarika
Dharmapala and his Maha Bodhi Society, and was attempting to revive
Newar Buddhism by various modernist activities, such as publishing
Buddhist magazines, founding new organizations, and holding
conferences. In 1925 a charismatic Tibetan celibate, Kyantse Lama,
came to Kathmandu and gave teachings to which hundreds of Newar
Buddhist devotees flocked. Under the influence of all this five young
Newar men became monks in the Tibetan tradition. By caste they were
three Shakyas, a Manandhar, and a Shrestha. The last was Mahapragya,
destined to become one of the most influential Nepali monks. Because
Mahapragya was a Shrestha, and therefore presumed to be born a Hindu,
the Rana authorities took umbrage and expelled all five plus the lama
who had initiated them 10 India. There they made contact with the Maha
Bodhi Society and Theravada Buddhism, though they did not convert
immediately. Mahapragya continued to Tibet, and in Lhasa he recruited a
young Newar trader, an Uday, who became Karmasil (later
Pragyananda). Together they performed austerities, but unconvinced,
they returned to India. In successive years, 1929 and 1930, they went to
Kushinagara, where the Buddha died and attained ultimate
enlightenment, and took ordination as Theravada novices ITom the Ven.
Chandramani, a Burmese monk who had been sent to Kushinagara at the
instigation of the Maha Bodhi Society.
It is an important and interesting question why they chose to give up
being monks in the Tibetan tradition. The evidence, at least for these
early founders of the Theravada movement, is that they did not see any
fundamental difference between Theravada Buddhism and Tibetan
Buddhism. What was important was to be a monk and thus to reintroduce
,
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permanent monastic practice to the Buddhism of the Kathmandu Valley.
They became persuaded that Pali was easier to learn for Nepalis than
Tibetan and that Theravada Buddhism was easier to study and teach than
fibetan Buddhism.6 The position of female converts was different,
because the Theravada nuns' ordination lineage had disappeared from
South Asia in the eleventh century and had never been revived. Thus, the
nuns, unlike the monks, were stepping into a hitherto almost unknown
role. As the tradition had died out, and because it takes a minimum of
five nuns to ordain a new nun, they could not have the status of a fully
ordained nun or bhikkhuni. Thus they were merely ten-precept laywomen
or anagarika (homeless ones).
The young religious reformers of the 1920s-1940s sought to rejilrm
Newar Buddhism, rather than to replace it, and to do so by reintroducing
to Nepal the genuine monasticism which had metamorphosed into a caste
of householder priests in the Middle Ages. They also sought to rid Newar
Buddhist traditions of what they saw as un-Buddhist practices, especially
animal sacrifice, adopted ITom the dominant Hindu culture, and they
sought to educate the laity about the dharma and provide them with
vernacular translations of canonical texts. They encouraged devotions
focused on Sakyamuni Buddha rather than on the traditional elaborate
Hindu-Buddhist pantheon of gods and bodhisattvas.
Several of the new Theravada monks had once been married but had
left their families 'to go into homelessness'. All the nuns were formerly-
married women seeking to escape the social marginality of widowhood
or divorce. For many years their only recourse was to share quarters with
the monks who repeatedly obstructed their relationships with the laity
and expected them to fill the role of monastery servants.
From perilous beginnings in which they were harassed, imprisoned,
and even exiled by the brahmanically orthodox Rana government, the
Theravadins saw their revival movement slowly gain momentum,
particularly after the Rana regime was ousted in 1950/51. By the mid
1970s, forty years after the first Theravadin monks preached the dharma
in Nepal, there were 44 monks and 37 nuns; by the end of the 1980s there
were 59 monks, 72 novices, and 70 nuns, and in 2001, 78 monks, 94
novices, and 118 nuns. Where there had been no Theravada monasteries in
Nepal in 1930, today there are 98, induding 17 nunneries.7
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Although almost all Newar Buddhist still call Mahayana priests to
perfoffil domestic life-cycle rituals, they often do so in the most minimal
way compatible with their social status. The Theravada Buddhists have
succeeded in almost wiping out one traditional ritual and replacing it
with one of their own devising. This is the traditional harha tayegu
puberty ritual for Newar girls, for which now the vast majority of
Buddhists substitute rishini pabbajja ('the renunciation of a sage-ess'),
sending their daughter to a Theravada vihara for between three and
twelve days of instruction in Pali and Buddhist precepts. What the
Theravadins have succeeded in doing in the case of this one ritual they
may eventually succeed in doing in others as well. Even if they do not,
ideologically many prefer Theravada Buddhism which, being more
comprehensible, egalitarian. and inclusive of women, they see as better
suited to modern life.
The Theravada monks are called hhi/<shu, and their presence in the
Kathmandu Valley has more or less efhced the Shakyas' and
Vajracharyas' claims to be the monks of Newar Buddhism. No Shakya
today uses 'Shakyabhikshu' ('Buddhist monk') as his surname. Lay
people address Theravada monks using the newly introduced tenu bhante
(Pali 'venerable') and this word is often used colloquially in reference to
mean 'monk' and in the plural to mean 'monks'. Very senior Theravada
monks are called sthavira, 'elder', just like the elders of a traditional
Newar Buddhist monastery; but no one would use the colloquial qju
(grandfather) for a Theravada monk. Between themselves monks do use
kinship tenus for address; thus a very old monk will be addressed as
'Bhante grandfather (bhante bajyal'. This use of kin tenus as a respectful
way to address unrelated seniors is carried over directly from Nepali and
Nepal Bhasha. A slightly older monk may be addressed as 'Bhante older
brother (hhante Jail'. Younger monks are nonually addressed by name.
More fonually the Pali word avuso or ayusman ('ITiend'), either on its
Own or with their name, may be used.
For female monastics the situation is more complicated. The nuns'
Order had died out in Theravada Buddhism, so technically renunciate
women could not lay claim to the status offull nuns (bhikshuni) and were
only 'ten precept laywomen', for whom the new word anagarika or
'homeless one' was adopted ITom the 1930s. In the 1980s a movement,
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led by Western feminist Buddhist, started for the re-establishment of the
nuns Order where it had died out and its establishment where it had never
existed (e.g. in Tibet). The older Theravada monks in Nepal follow the
monastic establishments in Bunna, Thailand, and Sri Lanka, in rejecting
the possibility of re-founding the nuns' Order and therefore refuse to
refer to contemporary nuns as hhikkhuni (Pali) or bhikshuni (Sanskrit), or
to their nunneries as vihara. Instead they continue to call them
anagarika. Colloquially the problem is avoided, because the most
common way to address nuns, and to speak about them in reference, is as
guruma ('guru mother'), the tenu that was and is used for the wife of a
Vajracharya priest, who accompanies her husband to domestic rituals as
a kind of assistant.S
Caste in Newar Buddhism
Sakyamuni Buddha established a monastic order based on a hierarchy of
ordination rather than of caste and accepted recruits from many
backgrounds, including untouchables. In this regard the egalitarianism of
the early Sangha contrasted sharply with the hierarchical structure of
South Asian society in which it was embedded and in which the Buddhist
laity, like Hindus, was ordered by caste. Although we can only speculate
about the structure of society in the Kathmandu Valley before the
common era, inscriptional evidence from the Licchavi period (fifth to
tenth century CE) indicates that a caste society similar to that of the
Indian plains had developed. By the fourteenth century, when the Sangha
is thought to have completed its long process of laicization, it came to
occupy the summit of a baroque and complex caste system. At its apex
stood two householder priestly castes: on the one side the Vajracharyas
and Shakyas, on the other side Hindu Brahmans. Although far more
numerous than the Brahmans, the Vajracharyas, in particular, were, and
were seen as, the Buddhist equivalent of Brahmans. Below them in the
hierarchy of purity/impurity came five more 'blocs' of castes: (i) traders
and landowners (Shresthas, mostly Hindu, and Uday, Buddhist); (ii)
fanners (Maharjan-Jyapu, in the west of the Valley Buddhist, in the east
mainly Hindu); (iii) many small 'clean' occupational (artisan) castes
(mostly Buddhist); (iv) the Butcher/Milkseller caste, theoretically not
untouchable though water was not supposed to be taken ITom them; (v)
Untouchables, mainly Sweepers.9 Shresthas and Udays as well as
'I
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Figure 1: A Shakya Lineage and its Theravada Attachments
The Udays meanwhile had recently become embroiled with their
Vajracharya priests in a long-running and bitter dispute over relative
Vajracharyas and Shakyas \vere eligible to take Tantric initiations which
enabled them to participate in salvific rituals from which members of
lower castes were excluded. Although upper-caste wives took such
initiations along with their husbands and the wives of Vajracharvas took
supportive parts in ritual practice, the great majority of Buddhist ~women,
excluded from religiOlls instruction, were confIned to a devotional role.
The first small group of Ncvvars who took Theravada ordination
came almost exclusively from upper-caste and Buddhist backgrounds.
With the exception of Mahapragya, who was a Shrestha, all male as well
as female monastics were either Shakyas, Udays, or Manandhars. 10 As
occasional temple priests but not domestic priests, Shakvas were barred
from making a livelihood by performing rituals for the laity; instead they
\vorked as goldsmiths and icon makers. The traditional identity of
Shakyas as 'sons of the Buddha', 'descendants of the Buddha'
(Shakyavamsha), and Buddhist monks (Shakya-bhikshu) in a ritual
s.ense, if not in actual life conduct, meant that Shakyas were particularly
likely to teel the call of monasticism. For an example of the way in
whIch Theravada adherence tends to cluster in related households see
Figure I. '
With the exception of two who, before they renounced the world,
had been involved in the Lhasa trade, monks in the first cohort of Newar
Theravadins had no personal resources to speak of when they joined the
Order and thereafter were dependent on donations from their lay
followers. A few monks lived long enough to accumulate wealth and
property through donations; but although, under the Nepal Law Code,
they were also entitled to inherit a share of their father's property equal
to that of their brothers, since most were from poor families, in practice
they renounced their rights to paternal property. The same is true today.
A monk in his late twenties named Suman ordained as a novice at age 14,
shortly after the death of his father, was intending - albeit unofficially-
to renounce his patrimony. More recently, he thought seriously about
leaving the Order but in the end, as he told us, decided to remain a monk
caste status, which meant that they were very open to criticisms of the
Vajracharya's version of Buddhism (Rosser 1966). In the movement's
early years the small group of donors on whom the Sangha depended for
financial support was composed of rich merchants and businessmen from
the same upper-caste background as the monks and nuns.
At ordination monastics shave their heads, exchange lay dress for
monastic robes, take up their begging bowls, and go 'into homelessness'.
HO\vevcr, as Gregol)' Schopen's studies of the AlulasanYJstivada Vinaya
have shown, monks in medieval north India v\'ere not required to
renounce private wealth at ordination; rather, they were expected to
retain it, to use it wisely, and to bequeath it to the Sangha at their death
(Schopen 2004: 3-4,13-14). Indeed, monastic status and reputation were
closely related to wealth. While the source of funds is never indicated,
Bames' study of donative inscriptions dating from the second century
before to the third century after the beginning of the common era shows
that nuns and well as monks were making substantial gifts to stupas
(Barnes 2000: 21). Although donations from devotees may have been a
more ample source of their wealth, inheritances received from parents
and other members of the family of origin both prior to and following
ordination were viewed as legitimate and not uncommon (Schopen 2004:
102).
Monastics and inheritance
I
I
i
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
4 I
N ::: Nun
D = Donor (Layman)
LB "'" Lama Bhiksu
Tibetan :
Mahayana I
Preference ~i~;::r-'--c:..--...,
,
,
rfq' __ J
Do.Cl. «...J\ ro;
~ Thera~·ada Preference
I
152 Occasional Papers, Voll0
because he realized that, at this late date, to ask his brother to give him
half their father's property, a small piece of agricultural land in an
outlying village, would be "the most painful thing I can imagine".
Prior to a change in the inheritance law in 1975, only daughters who
had no brothers could inherit parental property, and even then it helped to
remain unmarried. A daughter with brothers had no further claim on
parental property after she got married and received a dowry (stridan) of
gold jewelry, clothing, and household requisites. As childless widows
and divorcees, most nuns in the first cohort were at least as impoverished
as the monks. An exception was Vasaka, a divorcee who, because she
had no brothers, had inherited her father's property, drew on personal
resources to help her co-religionists and to travel abroad, in addition to
supporting herself in the substantial house she had inherited (S.M.
Tuladhar 1993). There is no evidence that the childless widow
Dharmachari, who from the 1930s until the mid 1960s was the leading
nun in Nepal, inherited money or property from her own or her
husband's family; never the less, because she attracted many devotees
from the well-to-do merchant community to which she belonged, in the
late 1940s she was able, with their donations, to build the first nunnery in
Nepal, in which, once they were living independently, the nuns largely
evaded the monks' control.
The 1975 law gave daughters who reached the age of 35 without
getting married an equal share of their father's property. In theory it
should have had a major impact on the nuns, especially those who came
from wealthy families; in practice, however, the only nuns who actually
claimed their inheritance were those who had no brothers. As a nun
named Dhammasevi, an only daughter who had two brothers, told us in
1997, "I'm not going to ask for anything." If she did, she explained, she
would antagonize her sisters-in-law. "Ifmy brothers decide to give me a
share, I'll accept it, but it's up to them." In 2001, the law was changed to
allow all adult unmarried daughters (aged 18 and over) equal property
rights to those of their brothers. However, if, after receiving her
inheritance (either following a property division while her father was still
alive or after his death), a daughter married she was required to return to
her brothers whatever remained. To date we have not heard that any nuns
have tried to take advantage of the new law. As a senior nun from a
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wealthy family told us in 2004, customs are more important than laws.
She would continue to depend on the generosity of her three businessman
brothers. "If they give to me voluntarily, that's fine," she explained, "but
if I pushed them, that would cause problems with my sisters-in-law, and I
might end up with nothing." This seems to be the consensus.
Motivations for entering the Order
The first generation of monks and nuns shared a reforming zeal and a
desire to study the dharma and to teach it to others. All saw ordination as
an escape from normative adult roles. The monks, whether married or
single, were looking for a haven from householder life while the nuns, all
of whom had once been married, were in flight from the social
marginality of widowhood and divorce. Life in Kimdo Baha, the ancient
Newar Buddhist monastery that a rich merchant had restored and where
the majority lived throughout the 1930s and most of the 1940s, was not
easy, especially for the nuns, who, since the laity viewed them as lesser
'fields of merit', received many fewer donations than the monks; but at
least there was time for religious devotions and teaching the
fundamentals of Buddhist belief and practice to lay people who sought
them out. Most of the monks, with the help of the Mahabodhi Society,
were able to travel abroad to study in Burmese or Sri Lankan
monasteries, opportunities which were denied the nuns until many years
later (Kloppenborg 1977).
In the 1950s, after a century of isolation, Nepal started to open up.
Western schooling, until now confined to a small elite in the Kathmandu
Valley, began to spread throughout the country. A trickle of development
aid became a flood, communications improved, tourists arrived in ever
increasing numbers, the towns began to grow and develop rapidly, so that
the gap between town and countryside became ever wider and harder to
bridge, and a new middle class emerged defined by new consumption
patterns (Liechty 2003). Since in pre-modem Nepal the higher castes
were by definition more advantaged, when society started to modernize
they were best-placed to seize on new opportunities and to win the lion's
share of political and professional positions. The stroc1UIal inequalities
that were revealed by census figures in the I990s became a serious
political issue and have been frequently invoked to explain the success of
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the Maoist movement in attracting the poor, the female, the low caste,
and the Janajati"
The consequence of these social changes for Theravada Buddhism
was that young men from upper-caste families, faced with a variety of
education and career options, found the idea of studying Buddhism for a
decade in a monastery in Mandalay much less attractive than securing a
well-paid position with an INGO after studying on a scholarship in
Gennany, China, or the US, exporting curios to East Asia, or opening up
a tourist hotel. Celibacy, in itself an alien if not bizarre concept in a
community that had had no monks for hundreds of years, was the main
drawback to monasticism, Even though an adolescent boy might be too
shy to articulate his objections, his parents most definitely could
articulate theirs: they believed that a man should marry and have
children, care for his parents in their old age and perfenn their funerary
rites at thcir deaths and trom then on until he himself passed away. As
religious virtuosi, monks were to be admired, venerated, and supported
fir.ancially, but they should by preference be o'her people's sons,
Thus, by the 1970s, unless his family was too poor to educate him
past rrimary school, monasticism had ceased to be a desirable or even
acceptable career for boys from upper-caste Buddhist families, Although
the mosi: senior monks, all of whom had entered the Ordcr in Rana times
were from upper-caste backgrounds, Hartmann (1993) showed that b;
the 1980s novices (samanera) were being drawn almost exclusively from
impoverished rural families belonging to fanning or lower (but clean)
castes. Their parents, in contrast with Shakya and Uday parents,
encouraged ordination because, in the short run, by 'giving a son to t~e
vihara' they stood to earn prestige in their community as well as,spiritual
merit. In the long run, since the culture of aphno manche ('one's own
person', i,e, person who is either kin or an old contact) prevailed in the
monastery as well as in lay life, as he proceeded up the monastic ladde. a
monk was expected to help his kin and those with whom he had Icng-
tenn tIes whenever possible. In Nepal, as in Sri Lanka, ordination is
preferably a life-long commitment, but it does not have to be.
!.1croasingly the Bunnese and Thai ritual of temporary ordination ~as
gained currency, and with it the South-East Asian presumption that there
is nothing wrong with a man leaving off bci(lg a IIlonk. This notion has
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been taken advantage of by young Nepalis and their families, When a
young monk reaches adulthood - provided he is willing to face the
disappointment of his community who had invested in his training - he
can disrobe, take the conventional path of marriage and fatherhood and -
with the credentials and language skills acquired abroad - get a good job
and contribute to the economy of the joint family.
Although, as before, widows and divorcees continued 'to come to
the vihara', in the 1940s the nuns' Order began recruiting young single
women, some of whom, like the novice monks, were village girls from
Jyapu families. Meanwhile upper-caste girls were continuing to ordain.
The most prominent nun in Nepal today is Dhammawati, daughter of a
Shakya goldsmith ITom Lalitpur, who aged fifteen ran away ITom home
to become a nun; after studying for thirteen years in Burma, she returned
to Nepal in 1963 resolved to teach Buddhism to people of all ages and
most especially to women. Although she inherited nothing ITom her
father (who had bitterly opposed her becoming a nun), two of her
brothers gave her part of their inheritance to buy land in old Kathmandu
on which, with donations from her devotees (who included her mother),
she built Dhannakirti Vihara, to which flocked many prominent
merchants as well as Buddhist women of all ages, In 1988 she and two
companions took full bhikshuni ordination according to Chinese rites at
Hsi Lai monastery in California. Since then, defying the interdiction of
the senior monks, onc third ofNepali nuns have followed their lead,
Over four decades Dhammawati's intelligcnce, courage, and energy
have attracted many young women who, like herselt~ are from upper-
caste, even privileged, backgrounds, By the 1960s, when very few girls
were as yet in school, several recruits had attended secondary school; by
the 1980s a few were university graduates; and in the 1990s two devotees
with Master's degrees abandoned successful careers in government
service to ordain as Buddhist nuns while two others, with family support,
went on to receive PhDs, Of 75 nuns resident in the Valley in 1999, 45
(60%) were upper-caste (Vajracharya, Shakya, Uday, and Shrestha), 22
(29,5%) were Jyapus, 4 (5,3%) were ITom non-Newar Janajati ethnic
groups, and 4 (5.3%) were Manandhars, members of the Newar Oil-
Presser caste. While a few Shakya nuns were ITom impoverished
backgrounds, the majority were well-ta-do, Again, although some Jyapu
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nuns were also from poor families the majority were comfortably off.
Coming from families who believed that educating daughters was as
important as educating sons, most of these nuns - unlike the monks -
came to the vihara with credentials in hand.
As with Bartholomeusz's Sri Lankan dasa si! mala infonnants
(Bartholomeusz 1994), the primary objective that all recruits to the nuns'
Order shared was to avoid marriage. For Newar women, marriage
normally requires 'going to live in the house of a stranger' followed by
many years of subordination to mothers-in·law and husband's elder
brothers' wives while, provided they bore sons, their status in the
household hierarchy slowly improved. Far from being a harsh
deprivation, these young women viewed the celibacy that their ordination
vows imposed as an incomparable blessing. Instead of a 'renunciation',
they saw ordination as an 'emancipa-tion' from the restraints of
householder life: they could study and teach the dhanna, m.editate, travel,
pursue religious studies in nunneries abroad, translate and edit texts, and,
through their work as ritualists and counselors, earn the affection,
admiration, and respect of the laity. Not all Newar women get married
but even today a single professional woman of good family would not
consider living alone. Those who remain single, whether by choice or
because a suitable match has not been found for them, have to stay in
their natal homes, where there is almost inevitably tension with their
brothers' wives. Thus one important long-tenn advantage that the Order
has to offer is that, instead of being dependent on resentful in-laws,
elderly nuns can live in the nunnery, where they will be cared for by
younger nuns, their cheli, whom they themselves have trained.
Although over the seventy-odd years since Theravada Buddhism
came to Nepal many more men than women have taken ordination, a
large proportion ~ possibly half - of the monks have eventually disrobed.
Latterly, many have chosen to settle down in the Buddhist countries
where they have received their education since their credentials and their
status as fonner monks have more purchase there. By contrast, having
'shaved their heads', few nuns have left the Sangha. In their decision to
ordain, many met with intense opposition from their families which,
since parental consent is required, often took months if not years to
overcome. Parents view arranging good marriages for their children of
both sexes as their most important spiritual, as well as social,
responsibility and frustration in this regard as a personal tragedy. But
once having consented to her ordination, most give their wh~lehearted
support to their daughter's monastic career. Rather ~han losmg her to
another family as they would if she were to have mamed, they keep her,
as it were, and at the same time they, as weIl as she, earn prestige and
merit to which, as they support her projects in the nunnery, they add over
the years. In such a case, just as in traditional Newar Buddhism, though
even more narrowly, merit and wealth are circulated wlthm the famIly.
HELPING THE FAMILY
I. Opening doors
Monks and nuns are expected to help their family members in various
ways, in particular by arranging for the admission of y~ung relatives to
the Order. This requires finding a senior monk or nun with the resources
to provide for the daily needs and education of the novice or young nun.
In the early years the Theravadins made up a small disparate group of
individuals each of whom was taking a leap into the unknown. Even so,
several were related to each other, as were the devotees who supported
them. At least some kin could always be relied on if all else failed.
Although the lay community is now much larger, it remains tightly kmt
through kinship and friendship, and so does the Sangha. Of seventeen
nuns living in Dhannakirti in 1999, the majority had grown up m
Theravada families; eight had sisters or first cousins who were nuns and
four had brothers who were monks,
Most recruits today come from Theravada families. Aside from a
few who belong to Janajati groups and grew up in remote areas which
monastics rarely visit, most have known and even been close t~ mon~s
and nunS from an early age. As small children, they accompamed theIf
mothers to the vihara; they saw monks and nuns come to chant, teach,
counsel and receive the midday meal (bhojana dana) in their homes;
when t~ey reached primary school age they started to receive religious
instruction in the vihara and many took temporary (ten-day) ordmatlOn
there as well. Once they have made the decision to take the precepts (or
their parents have made the decision for them), if they have relatives in
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the Sangha, the parents' next step is to ask them to intervene with a
senior monk or nun on their child's behalf.
A monk named Dipaka, the eldest of four sons of poor parents,
ordained as a novice soon after the death of his father and was sent by his
preceptor to study abroad. Within a few years he \vas able to place two of
his younger brothers in a Kathrnandu monastery, leaving only one
brother to take care of their widowed mother. But his responsibilities for
his siblings did not cnd there: last year he arranged for one of his
brothers, a recent secondary school graduate, to enter an Australian
monastery; no\\' he is looking around for a foreign Buddhist institution
willing to take his other brother.
A nun named Padmawati recalled that \vhen a cousin's husband died
leaving several young children, her cousin begged her to take thl: eldest.
a girl named Ratna, who at the time was nine years old. Padmawati, who
was only about twenty, was in no position to do so because she did not
have the resources to care for the child. As a young nun, the lay people
viewed her as a poor field of merit; thus she received little dana, barely
enough to cover her personal expenses. But through her good offices, her
abbess, Dhammawati, accepted the child and for the last twenty years has
provided for her education, just as she has for several other fatherless
girls whom family members, as a last resort, have 'brought to the vihara'.
Today Ratna has a university degree, and after spending extended
periods of time in Fa Kuang Shan monasteries in Taiwan and California
where Dhammawati had contacts, speaks good Chinese and English.
Meanwhile Padmawati has herself become an abbess, Thus when her
brother-in-law died a few years ago and her widowed sister asked her to
take in one of her daughters, she was able to do so. Soon after giving the
girl the precepts in an elaborate ceremony which she paid for, Padmawati
found a place for her in a Burmese nunnery whose abbess was a close
friend. When, after some time, her niece became dissatisfied with the
education she was receiving - she wanted to learn English - Padmawati
again lIsed her foreign contacts to secure a place for the girl in a Sri
Lankan nunnery school which featured English ill its curriculum.
Nuns sometimes make arrdngements for young male relatives and
vice versa. A monk named Kos 11a tells how, as a young boy growing up
in a village in the Kathmandu Valley, he would visit his aunt, who was
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one of the first Jyapu women to ordain, in the Lalitpur nunnery were she
was living. When, some time later, he began to show an interest in the
dhanna, she arranged for him to live in the next door monastery, where
he became the abbot's servant; he eventually took novice ordination
there and, thirty years later. is now its abbot himself. About ten years ago
he ordained his father who, he says, "had been waiting to come" for a
very long time; the old man now lives in the next room. His mother
would like to ordain as well, says Kosala, "and my father and I would be
happy to give our consent. But my brothers won't give theirs," he adds
sadly, "and without it, she can't leave home."
Another Jyapu monk who had grown up in Bhaktapnr but has been
studying in Thailand for many years, learned that his sister, whom he
scarcely knew, since she was born after he left home to become a monk,
was deeply unhappy living with a relative after both their parents died.
He was able to secure a place for the girl in a nunnery outside Bangkok,
find sponsors willing to support her stay, and raise the money for her
airfare as well. When, after a few months 'trial' in the nunnery, she asked
to take the precepts, he paid for her pahbajja (ordination ceremony)
himself.
2. Arranging for medical care in foreign hospitals
Given the poor state of medical care in Nepal, anyone who can afford to
do so prefers to be treated abroad. Vellore (in south India), Delhi,
Singapore, and Bangkok are the favoured destinations. In fact, Nepali
monks stationed in Bangkok can find a very large amount of their time
being taken up with accompanying visitors from Nepal to hospitals,
shopping malls, and Thai holy sites. Almost all the monks and some of
the nuns have spent long periods studying abroad and since many speak
local languages as well as English and are familiar with foreign medical
systems, they are called upon to arrange treatment for sick relatives as
well as members of the lay community generally. Whereas nuns, whose
families are often rather well off, are 'only' required to organize the
treatment process and stay in hospital with the patient, monks, whose
families are of much more modest means, must also raise the funds to
cover the considerable expenses involved. Provided they are senior
enough, they do this trom donations that in the usual course of events
they receive trom the laity.
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3. Caring for elderly parents
Zangskari nuns are required by their families to perform many domestic
tasks ITom caring for young children to working the family fields in
return for the life-long economic support without which they and their
nunneries could not survive (Gutschow 2004). By contrast Nepali nuns'
hands-on responsibilities to their natal families are generally confined to
caring for parents. (No Nepali monastic would ever labour, in the fields
or anywhere else.) Monks, too, are expected to contribute to their
parents' support, but whereas it is enough if they simply give money to
the old people themselves, or if they are infirm, to a brother living in the
same house, nuns are expected to play a central role, especially in the
care of their mothers. Even if there are several daughters-in· law in the
household a mother still feels closer to and trusts her daughter more, and,
if she is unmarried, she is seen as 'available', regardless of her
responsibilities in the nunnery. Thus nuns are frequently called home for
indefinite periods not only from local nunneries but ITom abroad. In
Dharmakirti in 1997 three of the seventeen nuns had been called back
ITom their studies in Thailand to care for ailing mothers. Padmawati, who
as abbess of Mayadevi Vihara runs a complex operation, dreads the days
when her mother falls sick; she knows that, despite having three
daughters-in-law, her mother will want her to be at her bedside. The best
solution, one that Thai abbesses commonly resort to also (Falk 2000: 44),
would be to bring her mother to live in the nunnery. ("But will she be
willing to leave her home?" Padmawati wonders. "Probably not. .. ")
4. Bnilding contracts
Senior monks and nuns are frequently engaged in construction projects
and need to hire contractors to carry out the work. Although in recent
years Dhammawati, a Shakya, and Padmawati, a Manandhar, have
carried out ambitious projects, neither has given contracts to relatives. It
so happens that neither has relatives in the construction business. By
contrast, Kosala, a Jyapu, hired his contractor brother to rebuild the
vihara in Lalitpur of which he is abbot, a project which took several
years and cost many hundreds of thousands of rupees.
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5. Private property
According to the rules promulgated by the Mahnsangha. the umbrella
organization of the Theravada Monks' Order in Nepal \vhich was
established in 1944, a monk is required to register any property, however
he may have obtained it, in the name of the Sangha: similarly, he must
bequeath all the money he may have accumulated to the Sangha; and
after his death his personal possessions are to be distributed among his
fellow monks. The nuns, as ten-precept lay vvomen, are excluded from
the Mahasangha (thus far the senior monks have refused to acknmvledge
their fully ordained status) but have adopted similar rules. Each nunnery
is supposed to be registered in the name of its management committee,
which includes lay people as well as monastics, and bank accounts
should be registered in the same way. The basic rule is that all monastic
property belongs to the committee, which. at the death of the abbess, will
be charged with finding a replacement.
A professional \voman \vho sat on a management committee
observed that even their treasurer, a man \vith a great deal of experience
in business, knew little about the monastery fInances. This \vas because,
when making donations, donors distinguished bet\vecn those that \vere
for the institution, for which they were supposed to receive receipts. and
those which were for the personal use of the abbot or abbess.
Furthermore, even though monastel)! accounts underwent an annual
government audit, many cash donations were never recorded let alone
deposited in a bank account; money came in and was spent and, as our
informant told us, "Only the abbot knows where that money went." In
short, a situation open to abuse.
Although thus far the nuns have escaped financial scandal, the
monks, some of whom have received large sums of money from foreign
sources, have not. An early case in point occurred when Amritananda,
founding Secretary of the Mahasangha, abbot of Anandakuti Vihar, and
for forty years the chief spokesperson for Theravada Buddhism in Nepal,
raised funds (including 200,000 rupees ITom Chou Enlai, whom he
visited in Beijing) for a Buddhist school to which he appointed his son-
in-law headmaster. With the massive expansion of private schools from
the 1980s, its originally Buddhist character has become increasingly
irrelevant and it is now a private-for-profit school like any other and the
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personal property of Amritananda's daughter (the only child of his early
marriage) and son-in-law. Amritananda, hO\vcver, was never publicly
challenged in this regard. Another notorious case occurred more recently
when, after his death, it was revealed that a prominent monk \vith
lucrative foreign contacts had registered in his own name a house which
a member of the lay community had donated to the institution that he
headed; he had also registered in his own name a bank account in which
he had deposited substantial amounts of money from foreign donors. By
Nepalese law all these assets would pass to the next of kin, in other
words, his brother, who also happened to have been his business
manager. Delicate negotiations had to be held between the Sangha and
the family members in order to avoid costly and embarrassing court
action. By contrast, Sudarshan, abbot of Sri Kirti Vihara, was fully aware
of these issues of inheritance and \vas punctilious in making proper
arrangements so that \vhen he died his monastery, as well as the money
in the various bank accounts set up for different purposes related to its
running, passed without incident to the Sangha.
6. Earning merit through endowments and ritual sponsorship
When monks and nuns 'go to the vihara' their families stand to earn
prestige by association; but while a monk's family members hope that,
through education and contacts with influential people, he will lead the
rest of them into the middle class, a nun's family members are more
likely to look to her to provide opportunities to cam merit and raise their
status in the community. Devout Buddhist parents who \vOtild be
horrified if their son told them he wanted to ordain may be enchanted at
the prospect of a daughter 'shaving her head' and generously support her
thereafter. The monasteries are either traditional Newar baha which were
given by their owners to Theravada monks who renovated them, or, if
newly constructed, were built on land donated by devotees. By contrast,
Nepali nuns, like Buddhist nuns elsewhere in Asia (Kawanami 2000;
Falk 2000; Salgado 2000a, 2000b) and Catholic nuns in medieval Europe
and nineteenth-century America (McNamara 1996), are much less likely
to receive endowments from the laity. Although a small number of nuns
who become widely known for their piety and good works may be able
to raise funds to build a nunnery, most are built by wealthy families for
their daughters, who then take in other poorer nuns to live with them.
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Thus several nunneries in Kathmandu and Lalitpur and one in Pokhara
were either constructed by families for their daughters or built by the
nuns themselves with inherited funds. Some famil ies may intend, at the
death of the abbess, to take back the nunneries they paid for; but
meanwhile thcy sponsor festive meals and ritual events and provide their
daughter. sister, or cousin with funds to support recruits from mostly
rural backgrounds.
Kamala, the eldest of ten daughters, trained for many years in a
Moulmein nunnery in Burma berore returning to Kathmandu, where she
earned a university degree. After living for some time in Dharmakirti,
shc developed rheumatoid arthritis. Wanting her at home where it would
be easier to care for her, her rich parents built a vihara on their own
property. where she lives with five younger nuns whose routine
maintenance her family underwrites. Although, as a daughter,
lJppalavanna received no inheritance when her father died in the 1960s,
after she returned from training in Bumla her businessman brothers built
her an impressive house in Lalitpur on land they had purchased expressly
for that purpose; they topped the attached dharma hall with a replica of
the great stupa at Swayambhu. Uppalavanna has brought a succession of
young women to live in her vihara while she arranges for places for them
to study in nunneries abroad. Meanwhile her whole extended family
regularly turns up with beaming faces for ritual events in the vihara,
which they also pay for.
The fourth of eight university-educated daughters, Viryawati is the
pride of her family. Having ordained after two years in the university,
she spent 12 years in Bunna, where she earned the Dhammachariya, the
highest qualification in the government-sponsored Bunnese Buddhist
education system, followed by a year's training as a vipassana meditation
teacher. On her return to Kathmandu, her family donated a substantial
sum for a women's centre which, when it is completed, Viryawati will
head; in the meantime she translates for the Bunnese monk in residence
in the meditation centre where she currently lives, and teaches meditation
to adults and elementary Buddhism to children in the Saturday school.
Dhammasangha is a strikingly handsome woman who, when she
took the precepts at age 21, already spoke several languages and had
completed an MA in Mathematics. She says she's too busy to live in a
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vihara; monastic routine \vould cut into the time she needs for her work
in the community. Instead, she lives in her own quarters at the back of
the parental mansion in Lalitpur from \vhich, with her brothers' support,
she pursues half a dozen educational and scholarly projects.
Unlike these nuns, all of whom are from wealthy upper-caste urban
Thcravada families, Padmawati, abbess of Mayadevi Vihar, a nunnery on
the outskirts of Kathmandu, is a Manandhar from a town outside the
Valley who aged eleven ran away from home to become a nun when she
discovered that her father was intending to marry her off She recalls that
it took her at least a decade to persuade her parents, who though welt-to-
do were traditionalist. that. as she puts it. "Theravada is better than
Vajrayana". Blit ever since she won them over, her family, including
several COUSins, have been generous with their time as well as their
money. She explains that because she doesn't belong to the wealthy
ShakyalUday community of Kathmandu, building a circle of donors
among the Jyapus living near her nunnery is a slow business and she is
much more dependent on her family than she would like. Her parents
have contributed a large part of the construction costs of her vihara, an
ever-expanding project \\'hose end is not yet in sight. One cousin
provided plumbing fixtures for six bathrooms; another cousin gave her a
car and taught her hmv to drive it; two brothers sit on the vihara
management committee; another brother helps with the vihara magazine;
her sisters-in-la\v are kind to the adolescent nuns in her care and
efficiently' supervise the kitchen where meals for several hundred people
are produced on festival days; and at least one relative almost always
stays overnight to provide adult company in what might othef\vise be a
lonely, albeit increasingly high-profile, life. In short, Padmawati's family
has embraced her institution-building project as their own; in this life
they bask in her reflected glory while earning merit for a good rebirth in
the next.
Conclusions
For Newar women from Buddhist backgrounds, renunciation as a nun
today is not such a great challenge to kinship norms: (a) because it is not
so unusual to be unmarried; (b) because, despite the rise in female
employment, there is still little expectation trom a daughter's future
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earning power (it is assumed that it will accrue to her husband's family if
to anyone). whereas sons are looked on as one's security in old age; (c)
because, in the \\'ays described, women who become nuns are not really
lost to the family. but come to be seen as a valuable source of merit, a
way to keep religious activity all in the family. Even in those much rarer
cases of women from Hindu backgrounds becoming Theravada nuns, the
families do not seem to find the adjustment as stressful as they certainly
would in the case of a son.
By contrast, men who renounce are a loss to the family. Where there
are many sons it may be a loss that can be borne and which may
eventually turn out to have been a valuable investment. But where (as is
increasingly the case) there are only one or two sons, the break With
family norms and expectations is often very painful. And when it is also
the case that the young man in question comes from a Hindu background,
so that there is no feeling of merit gained and, on the contrary, the
possible negative spiritual consequence of a son lost, in addition to the
economic aspect, the parents sometimes cannot reconcile themselves to
what has happened and continually urge their child to abandon being a
monk and return home. The fact that this is known to be possible and to
attract no blame in Thailand and Burma does not make It any easier for
the monk.
At the start, the first monks had to be brave and willing to fight
against the conventions and expectations of their society (and before
1951 against the very political powers as well). They seized upon the
symbols of Buddhist renunciation within the traditional Buddhism of the
Kathmandu Valley and infused them with new life and new meaning. In
the process they broke the link between monasticism and patrilineal
inheritance, a radical act made possible only with the support of their
families and extended kin group who were willing to play the role of
devoted Buddhist laity.
The women, for whom there was not even the sanctioning role of a
symbol within the indigenous tradition, had to innovate even more
radically and had to face considerable obloquy and vicious rumours for
their pains. At this period the support of family, for those Buddhist
monastics who coutd rely on it, was particularly crucial (when the eight
Theravada monks were expelled by the Ranas in 1944, some of the nuns
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- whose renunciation was a large part of v/hat had angered the authorities
- took refuge outside the Valley with relatives in Trishuli Bazaar).
By the time that Theravada was well established, a different set of
considerations came into play. Monasticism became a career that some
youths could embark upon. But it was not an easy one, as we have
discussed, and, especially as society itself became freer, and career
options and international links expanded, the rules of the monk's life
became increasingly to be experienced as a series of restrictions. By
contrast, because of the still greater expectations and restrictions on
women's behaviour, becoming a nUll was and is experienced as the
winning of great freedom, despite the rules that surround being a nun.
Seventy years after the first Theravadins began teaching the dharma
in the Nepal, almost all members of that early cohort are dead. But while
the charismatic monks of that era have not been replaced and the monks'
Order languishes, or at the very least is not as successful as the early
founders and activists believed it would be, the nuns' Order flourishes
under the leadership of a few dynamic women. True, the monks have
built impressive monasteries in Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Kirtipur in
recent decades. The nuns, too, have major projects to their credit in
Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Lumbini. But whereas the abbots built their
monasteries largely with foreign funding, the nunneries' construction
costs were paid for by local donations. Although some of the senior
monks are much admired as scholars and teachers, rumours about their
sexual behaviour have long circulated. Donors want to give their money
to the purest field of merit and, in that respect, the leading nuns are
impeccable. The nuns raised some of the money for their projects by
going house to house, but most came through their wide networks: well-
to-do family members led the way and fTiends of the family followed.
And the names of the donors whose money helped build those fine
dhanna halls and donnitories are embedded in the walls where anyone
who passes by may read them.
Nevertheless, though successful in its own tenns - in building up its
support base within the Kathmandu, in reaching out to other ethnic
groups and other parts of the country, in recruiting the next generation,
and in building international links - the Theravada movement is still
much smaller and much less well funded than the various Tibetan
, I
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Buddhist sects. The latter, dra\ving on Tibetan refugees, recruits from
enclaves of Tibetan culture throughout the Himalayas. With extensive
global links, numerous Western followers and donors (Moran 2004), and
a large and rich support base in Taiwan and South-East Asia, Tibetan
Buddhists have managed to turn every available hilltop, as well as many
other sites, in the Kathmandu Valley into sacred centres of Tibetan
Buddhism. One consequence is that in teOlls of international visibility,
Tibetan Buddhism, even within Nepal, overshadows the Theravadins
\vho have been discussed in this paper.
Appendix:
Extracts from Bhikshu Ashwaghosh's
The Life of a Monk (tr. H.L. Singh)
Taking the present situation into consideration, it appears that even
monks must please householders and fulfill their wishes. They must
extend helping hands to them. They must give loan to those who come to
beg. They are obliged to do other works not at all concerned with
Buddhist activities. They have to meet officials and campus chiefs for
getting jobs to job seekers or to call the District Judge for settling
criminal cases. Besides this, some people do not hesitate to beg money
from the monks. They also have to arrange pilgrimages for pleasing the
householders. They have to do works not connected with their religious
activities. Therefore, it is true that nowadays it is not enough that the
monks give seOllons and give discourses. They have to do the works of
priests (purohit). They have to visit the press for printing books, edit
magazines and run organizations. They have to handle money matters in
the monastery construction works.
To be involved in construction works shouldering the financial
responsibility is not suitable for a monk. Because if for some reason he
becomes involved in misappropriated a sum larger than Rs 75, he has
committed a parajika, he is defeated, or fallen. It is not only by becoming
attached to womankind, getting involved in inappropriate behaviour, and
giving birth to offspring that a monk is defeated (parajika).11 The
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Buddha had said that avarice is [also] a heinous sin, To pretend that one
is virtuous and to publicize that one is skilled and accomplished is also
becoming a defeat (parajika). Therefore, the financial transactions must
be done only by upasikas and upasikas. But, it is sad that upasakas and
upasikas have not paid attention to this matter. It is easy to spread the
rumour that the character of monks is not spotless. It is also heard that
the gap of mutual trust between the upasakas and monks regarding
money matters is widening these days. This is a case of misunderstand-
ing, definitely not a pleasant matter. .. (pp. jii-iv)
Monks of Nepal are facing a big problem. They have no capacity to
make adequate arrangements for fellO'\' monks and Upasakas of Sri
Lanka, Burma and Thailand during their visit 10 Nepal. Providing the
facilities of boarding, lodging and transportation to the visiting monks
and Upasakas and Upasikas has remained a big problem, The monks of
Nepal are provided these facilities while visiting these countries. But, in
Nepal. the monks have to be victims of humiliation sometimes while
requesting the well-ta-do Upasakas to provide the vehicles for the sight-
seeing of the visiting monks and Upasakas ... (p. vi)
There is another reason that makes a monk's life difficult. A monk's
life is dependent on others. In the past monks could not live long without
four things, e.g., chivara [robe], pindapatra [begging bmvl], sayanasana
[bedding], and medicine. Nowadays, these four things are not sufficient
for the monks. Time has tremendously changed. Nowadays, monks have
to buy books, pens, shoes, umbrella, etc. They have to construct or
renovate viharas. The management of the above \vith the help of donors
alone has become an impossibility. The attention of upasakas and
upasikas is simply con tined to the worship of the Buddha, inviting
monks to the ceremonies like Annaprasana, bit1hday and reciting the
Paritrana after a death in the family. The monks are simply entangled in
priestly functions [and] in activities that have nothing to do with their
dharma-related works. For example, they are asked to take upasakas and
upasikas to foreign countries on pilgrimages, bring foreign goods for
them, get students admitted in schools and colleges, get jobs for their
boys and girls etc. They are even involved in the job of matchmaking.
Some [lay people] come to borrow money. T:1ose monks who do not help
them in such matters are neglect'ct. [I]f they are unable to give lectures
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due to illness or old age, they are neglected... I asked some people who
had abandoned him, "Don't you go to Mahapragya nowadays?" They
replied, "Now, there is no oppot1unity of hearing words of wisdom from
him. He is unable to give sennons. Therefore, we do not go." After
hearing so many words of wisdom, the people abandoned him when he
was in bad health. Such is the fate of monks. (pp. 56-7)
With the change of time, the life style of the monks also changed.
There are times when monks could not spend their time to please the
upasakas. It is not proper to expect that monks should live as strictly as at
the time of the Buddha. Some monks have been living a very unnatural
and unbecoming life. It is not reasonable to say that the change of time
and circumstance is responsible for the change in their character and
conduct. There are reasons for the same, too. Some persons did not
become monks after having acquired a good knowledge of Buddhism,
They also do not learn much from the Acharya with whom they stay a
year or so, nor is there a practice of teaching the same. The Acharyas are
also not strict in providing education and explaining the teachings.
They consider their job done once they perform the rite of ordaining
by giving the yellow robe. There are rnany people who became monks
simply to get the facilities of a monk in expectation of foreign visits,
respect and honour from the people, and education without spending
money. There are a very few peopl e who became monks out of
dedication for the service of the peopl e. It is still worse to become a
monk in old age.
There were fake monks at the tim e of the Buddha as there are at
present. For 20 years after the attainment of Supreme Enlightenment by
the Buddha, the number of monks were few. The number of rules were
few, too. Later, the number of monks inc'feased by leaps and bounds, The
condition of the Bhikshu Sangha worsened once the educated, lazy,
unrestrained and ignorant people became monks. The formulation of
many rules became inevitable. (pp. 57-8)
ENDNOTES
This paper draws on the research on Therava-da Buddhism in Nepal that we have
carried out intermittently between 1997 and 2004 (see LeVine & Gellner 2005).
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For comments on earlier versions. \.....c thank Richard Gombrich, Anil Shakya and
participants in a \vorkshop at Nantcrre. Paris.
I. Locke (1985: 8) points out that, though viewed by Newar Buddhists today
as Shakyarnuni Buddha. some inscriptions identify the image as Akshobhya,
the 'transcendental' Buddha who has the same earth-touching hand gesture
as Shakyamuni. This can perhaps be taken as evidence that historicist
interpretations of the nature of the Buddha. on the onc side. and Tantric or
cosmological ones, on the other. were not so distinct in the past.
2. A full set of rules of this sort can today only be observed in Kwa Baha,
Lalitpur (Gellner 1991). In other Newar Buddhist temples the god-guardian
often only carries out an elaborate ritual in the morning. and in a nod to
monastic dress. removes his shirt from his right shoulder. The fullest study
of this subject is Sharkey (2001).
3. On this rituaL see Gellner (1988) and von Rospatt (2005).
4. On traditional Newar Buddhism, see Locke ( I980). Gellner (1992. 200 I: chs
4 M7), Lev.:is (2000). and the wcbsite of the Lotus Research Institute
(www.lrcncpal.com).OnShakyatitles.secGellner(1989). On the history of
Newar Buddhism, see Douglas (2002) and von Rospat! (2000).
5. The newly re-built Dharmakirti Vihara, the headquarters of the Theravada
nuns in Nepal. combines a neoMtraditional Newar falYade with a thoroughly
modern interior. complete \.... ith marble floors.
6. They were theretore in a quite different position from the, essentially
secular, Magar ethnic activists of recent years who had decided they must
break from Hinduism but were not sure what to put in its place. Both have
ended up with Theravada Buddhism but by very different routes. The early
Newar reformists were committed to celibate monasticism and only later
came to a critique of Hinduism; the contemporary Magar activists started
with a rejection of Hinduism for political and cultural reasons, without a
fundamental commitment to celibacy, and have indeed started to train nonM
celibate priests. known as pandits, to carry out life-cycle rituals In a
Theravada Buddhist idiom.
7. For these figures, see Kloppenberg (1977: 311), Gellner (1992: 322)
Hartmann (1993: 77), and Kondanya (2001).
8. Scc LeVine & Gellner (2005: ch. 7) for details of the attempt to raise the
nuns' status by taking bhikkhuni pabbajja from the Taiwanese Fa Guang
Shan sect.
I:
DAVI N. GELLNER, SARAH LE VINE: All In the Family: Money, Kinship" 171
9. On Newar castes, sce Tomn (1984) and Gellner & Quigley (1995). In
contemporary Nepal the politics of caste and ethnicity now mean that ethnic
activists claim that the Newar are just one group, belonging to the Janajati.
The spokesmen of the low Newar castes have stated that they do not want to
be included in the Dalit (exMUntouchable) category (sec Gellner 2003).
10. Technically Manandhars were not high caste, but Manandhars from
Kathmandu had been upwardly mobile, educatcd. and oftcn wealthy tor two
or three generations by then.
11. For this and the previous sentence we follO\v the Nepali translation. A
parajika is an infraction of the monastic code so serious that the offendcr is
automatically expelled from the Sangha.
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HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT SERVICE (NDS): CREATING
'CIVIC SPACE' AND COMMITMENT TO
SERVICE IN NEPAL DURING THE I970S 1
Don Messerschmidt2
Gautam Yadama3
Bhuvan Silwal'
Introduction
During the last half of the 20'" century Nepal witnessed an increasingly
complex and dynamic mix of rising political, economic and social aware-
ness and expectations, alongside societal disruption and conflict, and
increa-singly disparate lifestyle conditions, rich and poor, punctuated by
dramatic socio-cultural changes. YeL in the midst this seeming tunnoil,
the nation's civil society and varieties of 'civic service', 'volunteerism'
and 'social action' have thrived and grown. The social and political
inclinations of the nation's youth, in particular, have had profound
impact on historic and current events, including a major role in support
of a potentially powerful, though short-lived National Development
Service movement during the decade of the 1970s. This paper documents
the rise of civic service and volunteerism in Nepal, and discusses some of
its manifestations and impacts.
Beginning in the early 1950s, as Nepal turned away from a century
of repression and stagnation and opened up to outside influences, and as
modem systems of education and political action began to develop, the
nation's students became seriously involved in causes and movements
that injected change and innovation into the social development scene.
During most of the 19705, the Nepal government through the Tribhuvan
University inaugurated a creative youth civic service program called
NOS, the National Development Service (Rastriya Bikas Sewa). First
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inaugurated in the early part of the decade, the NOS grew to enjoy
phenomenal support until the end of the decade when adverse political
concerns forced its premature closure. Despite its short life span, the
NDS is still remembered today as a model program of civic service.
The NOS is considered by many to have been a catalytic social
development experiment in the life of the nation. It was founded in
association with the New Education System Plan of 1971 (NESP). Under
that program, all post graduate students were required to dedicate one
year during their Masters degree studies to service in a rural community.
At first, the NOS was vigorously resisted by students who saw it as an
unwarranted disruption of their studies and career development, but as
the first year's participants returned to campus from the rural
communities their enthusiasm and support for NOS sparked a reversal in
student interest, and it quickly became a hallmark of development and
modernity, with strong and lasting support across the university and in
the broader society.
The NOS had profound effects upon both its participants and host
communities and, it is argued, on the development of the strong civil
society movement that arose immediately after the 1990 national
'Movement to Restore Democracy'. Since then, Nepal has experienced a
concerted effort to effect a democratic polity (with difficulty) and an
active civil society (with relative ease). Some observers believe that the
NDS experience created a certain 'civic space' in the society, which was
rapidly tilled by community-based organizations (CBOs) at the local
level, and various group-based federations, networks, NOOs and social
movements at local, regional and national levels (Biggs, Ourung &
Messerschmidt 2004), many of which have been founded on an ethic of
'civic service'.
The Cultural-Historical Context of Civic Service and Volunteerism
in Nepal
Civic service (volunteer service to society) is not new in Nepal. It is built
upon a strong cultural heritage. There's a story that every Nepali school
child knows, about charity, service and volunteerism. It describes a
village grasscutter, materially poor but rich in spirit who, by digging a
spring for drinking water created a monumental legacy for all. The story
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has been immortalized in what is probably the best known short poem in
Nepali: Ghasi Kuwa ('The Grass Cutler's Well') by Bhanubhakta,
Nepal's 19th CentulJ.' 'Pioneer Poet'. In English translation, the poem
begins:
Devoting his !~fe to cutting grass, he earned some moneJ', and.
'fvishing to he rememhered dug a well.
7he [VUSS cutter is so poor. hut what spirit,! And I.
Bhanubhakta. have done nothing H,ith m.v goodfortune.
Of wells. inns or resthouses I have made nune. All my wealth
lies at home.
And from this grass cutler, what do we learn? That it's a
shame to sit idle doing no good deed.
Digging a spring or well (kuwa, inar), constructing a fountain or
waterspout (pani dharo), building and maintaining a shady trail side
resting place (chautaro) or a resthouse (pati, pauwa), and contributing
free labor (shramadan) to public works, are all traditional acts of
volunteerism, good ncighborliness, public service, and charity, which
many Nepalis aspirc to perfonn or achieve before they die. The high
value of doing good things and serving others is captured in such tenns
as paropakar garnu ('to do selfless service for others'), swechhale
paropakar garnu ('to serve selflessly and freely, of one's own will',
'volunteerism'), and swayamsewa garnu ('to serve others of one's own
accord', 'to volunteer'; i.e., the 'act of serving'). It is only a small step
from such simple acts of duty and thoughtfulness to more expansive
forms of civic service. 5
The tradition of voluntarily serving others has deep roots in Nepal
and across South Asia. In contemporary times, disrupted and distorted by
social, political and economic strife, the origins of the volunteer spirit
and civic service are sometimes forgotten. Much of what passes for civic
service nowadays, through community-based organizations (CBOs),
local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society
organizations (CSOs) is thought by some to be new and novel. 'Except
for a few,' writes one observer, 'all the NGOs have no roots in the native
soil. They are the inventions of donor agencies' (Maskay 2000: 106).
We take a more positive view, grounded in historical tradition-that
modern civil society organizations in Nepal are founded upon a long,
strong and proud tradition of civic service, originating ages before such
tenns as 'CBO' and 'NGO' were invented. We agree with those who
point out that modem Nepalese NGOs have deep roots in temple-based
endowments and trusts such as traditional guthis (Timilsina 2000: I) and
in similar public-minded associations (sarnsthan). 'Modern NGOs of
Nepal,' writes Ghimire (2000:212) 'are basically transformed Guthis
[Trusts}, and are an outcome of the 20th century social transformation
movement of South Asia', although most have been transformed recently
towards 'a development orientation [with] global interaction and
assistance' .0
Civic Service Movements in 19th and 20th Century Nepal
The culturally ingrained spirit of civic service and volunteerism saw its
first public expression in Nepal beginning in the late 19 i1i and early 20'"
centuries, under the leadership of several prominent individuals, each of
whose pioneering spirit had great effects in generating a civic service
awakening in Nepal (Chand 1998:49). One was Tulsi Meher, a follower
of Gandhi, who has been called the 'Founding Father' of Nepal's NGO
movement. His Charkha Movement was one of Nepal's first local NGOs
(Chand 1998, Maskay 1998:75). Another was Khagendra Bahadur
Basnet, who founded the Disabled Society of Nepal. Yet another was
Daya Bir Singh Kansakar, who established a voluntary medical
dispensary called Paropakar Aushadhalaya. Kansakar, until his recent
death in 2001 at age 90 was considered one of modem Nepal's best
examples of selfless service to others (Limbu 200 I). His initial
organization was later transfonned into the well-known Paropakar
Samsthan (Paropakar Organization) consisting of an orphanage,
ambulance service, maternity hospital, and secondary school. Both
Kansakar and Tulsi Meher and their respective movements had great
effects in generating a civic service awakening in Nepal (Chand 1998:49
& 2000).
Sometimes volunteer service groups arise out of disaster events.
Nepal's original Paropakar medical dispensary, for example, was
founded during the cholera epidemic in 1948. In addition, a temporary
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~ervice. organization called the Bhukampa Sewa Dal was organized
Immediately after the devastating Nepal-Bihar earthquake of 1934 to
help cope with the eflects of homelessness and displacement. Many such
groups last only for the duration of the emergency and its immediate
aftennath.
In a recent study of development groups in Nepal, a long list of
customary voluntary and civic service groups was prepared and is
presented below. 7 In that study, a distinction is made bct\vccn 'customary
groups' (longstanding, both 'indigenous' and 'traditional') and
'sponsored groups' (established and supported by development agencies
NGOs, and the like).' The large number of customary groups on the list'
perfonn iog various functions, firmly establishes the fact that there ar~
strong tr~ditions of civic service in Nepal. Most examples predate
modern times, although there are a few that are relatively new. The list is
illustrative (not exhaustive):
I. Natural Resource Management (e.g., communal forest, pasture,
and irrigation management, etc., including resource processing
_ ban samiti is an example );
2. Agriculture, Horticulture, Livestock and Fisheries Management
(e.g., production and income generation, and temporary field
labor, etc. _ parma and nogar are examples);
3. Savings & Credit (e.g., mutual aid, rotating credit, etc.
dhikur/dhikudi is an example);
4. Education & Human Resource Development (e.g., local school
management, indigenous language preservation, non -fonnal and
functional education, etc. _ cheli-beti is an example);
5. Community Multi-Purpose & Support (e.g., settlement, hamlet
or tol management; caste, ethnic and clan affairs management
and development; also temple affairs and festival management;
funeral and graveyard management; welfare and philanthropy
guthls are an example);
6. Health, Emergency Management (e.g., community health, and
emergency response _ Bhukampa Sewa Dal, noted above, is an
example);
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7. Dispute & Conflict Management (e.g., pancha bhaladmi and
dharma panchayat)
8. Children & Youth Affairs (e.g., sanlthuli samuha and rodi);
9. Infrastructure Development & Management (e.g., trail and
bridge management, canal management, drinking water system
management, etc. khane pani samiti is an example);
10. Enterprise & Income Generation (e.g., local money raising and
entertainment ama samuha, sorathi nach and Krishna charitra
are examples); and
11. Other, Miscellaneous
Some of the voluntary organizations and movements listed above
have relatively short, ephemeral life spans, often fonned on a seasonal
basis or in response to a crisis. But a great many of them are more
pennanent, lasting many generations. Some are motivated by communal
solidarity, others by personal feelings of religious service or generosity.
Most are localized at the neighborhood level, and many are based on
ethnic group or clan/lineage identity. A few crosscut the boundaries of
class, caste, ethnicity and gender. All tend to be bound together by the
crosscutting ties of mutual friendship or interpersonal loyalty, by good
neighborliness, and by trust_a key ingredient to the survival of all self-
help groups and volunteer service societies. 'Trust', in the sense of
reliance, responsibility, confidence and authority, is the foundation stone
underlying volunteerism and, indeed, all of civil society (Fukuyama
1995; see also Brown 1999: 17ff; Wilson and Musick 1999). Virtually all
such groups or movements noted for Nepal fit the concept of 'civic
service', which we define as an organized period of substantial
engagement and contribution to the local, national or world community,
recognized and valued by society, with minimal monetary compensation
to the participant (after Sherraden 200Ia:2; see also Sherraden, Moore &
Cho 2002.)
None of the examples from Nepal listed above involve reward other
than feelings of good-neighborliness, self-esteem and satisfaction, But,
taken together, they set the socio-cultural stage upon which the Nepal
government launched the NDS in the J970s.
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Rise of Nepal's National Development Service (NDS)
The NDS was created as an integral part of the New Education System
Plan of 1971 (NESP), a central feature in the government's attempt to
modernize education and development.') An early NDS volunteer and
noted Nepalese diplomat and educator has said that the NDS 'was a great
program, with the students making such rapid changes in the villages! It
brought important political, social and economic exchange and
awareness ... ' And an international volunteer and life-long development
worker posted to Nepal has observed that 'NDS was perhaps the best
thing that Nepal ever did for rural development.. If you ever meet
people working in rural development in Nepal who seem to stand out
fTom the pack, just ask them if they were in the NDS. Chances are that
they were, and remember it as transformational in their lives ... ' These
statements indicate, first hand, how important the 19705 NDS program is
still considered in Nepal today, by Nepalese and knowledgeable
expatriates, al ike.
The Nepal experience with NDS must also be examined in terms of
its political significance, an important aspect of volunteerism in some
societies. It may not be universal but, in both the development and the
premature demise of the NDS, politics and Nepal's struggle to create a
Democracy have played significant roles. The NOS was begun on a pilot
basis in 1972, inaugurated in 1974, and enthusiastically sustained until
1979. Despite its short life, it provided a vital and significant learning
experience both for the participating youth and their host communities,
and an early breeding ground for Democracy and a vital civil society
that, by definition, accompanies Democracy. In the opinion of many, it
was an unquestionably successful student study service program (Aditya
& Karmacharya 1988, Karmacharya 1980, Pradhan 1978, Shrestha 2002,
Upadhyay et al 1989, Vaidya 1978 & 1992a, 1992b).
Inception and Design
The origins of the NDS are often attributed to the 'noble philosophy' and
inspiration of Nepal's late King Birendra (1945-2001), when he was
Crown Prince. Formal plans for a national development study service
first emerged in 1971 as an integral part of the NESP. This education
plan was intended to remove some of the defects of Nepal's older system
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ofleaming that was increasingly seen as insufflcient to meet the nation's
growing development needs. It was also designed to better prepare youth
for public service in the development of the nation, as a training ground
for the civil service.
The NDS motto was 'Education for Development' and its
vocational and development service goals were so closely linked that at
first it was considered anti-intellectual and un-academic. It appeared as a
very traditional and hierarchical structure based on a bureaucratic view'
of knowledge systems. That, and the added fact that it was mandatory, at
first aggravated some students who saw it as a system of national
conscription (not unlike military conscription) and as an unwarranted
interruption in the midst of their formal studies. Although resistence vv'as
expressed at first, after the return of the first volunteers from the field
and their convincing accounts of its importance and promise in socio-
political terms, the NOS became embraced positively as a cause celebre
among the students. Later in the decade, it was reported that 96% of
future participants sampled (i.e., incoming new students) were
enthusiastic about joining the NDS (Pradhan 1978: 174-175)10
All Masters level students enrolled in Tribhuvan University, then
the nation's only postgraduate educational institution, had to participate.
Completion of a year's service and final \vritten report counted for one of
the nine papers required to earn the degree. Service began with training
and orientation, followed by a mandatory 10 months in a rural
community (although some students stayed longer). It ended by return to
campus and submission of the final report. Assignment to remote areas
was given priority. Most students were sent out to teach, and were
typically posted together in groups of two or three. Their work was
overseen by the local school headmaster and the district education
officer, and by a supervisor who occasionally visited them from
Kathmandu.
The program's operating expenses were funded entirely by the
government, and were increased annually (see Table I). The only outside
help came from a few U.N. agencies and the Canadian IDRC who
together provided minor logistics support, consulting services, some
publications costs, a few vehicles, and some field supplies for the
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participants. Other than this, NDS was proudly promoted as a program
conceived, funded and administered by the Nepalese (Poudyal 1979:64)
in the well-established spirit of 'self-help' (on a natiunal scale).
An NDS Directorate was established in 1972, and the first two years
were a time of trial, error, correction and fine-tuning. It began with 22
volunteers who were posted to nearby rural communities on a trial basis.
The program was formally inaugurated in July 1974. and a further 212
students were sent Qut. Between 1972 and 1979 (when the program was
suddenly closed), nearly 3,000 students were involved. Altogether, 72 of
Nepal's 75 districts received NDS volunteers (Table I).
Program Objecti",cs and Activities
The plan's declared objective was 'to supply trained manpower for
national development', led by the public sector, 'with the priority to be
given, among others, to the "Promotion of active students' participation
m nation huilding'" (Vaidya 1992b: 129, quoting the New Education
System Plan of 1971; also Chand 1988: I09). The ul1\;Titten objective
was to 'make the community the classroom' (Fussell & Quanmby 1974,
in Chand 1988:109; and Poudyal 1979). Its designers wanted to assure
that higher education would reflect more than 'theoretical bookish
knowledge' by exposing young students to the realities of life and of
development in the rural areas. Each student received a modest monthly
stipend and a few field supplies. The stipend was enough to cover living
expenses in the village, not enough to live any better than the average
villager. It did not allow anything left over to save. The fonmal objectives
and a synopsis of the program are given in Table I.
The NDS objectives have been interpreted in two complementary ways.
For one, it was as an attempt to induce change in the outlook and skills of
the nation's educated youth by building upon Nepal's traditional culture
of service. For another, it was designed to affect the attitudes and
develop the skills of the rural populace, under the rubric of self-help
development and modernization. While the latter objective is not very
clearly articulated in official documents, it is generally acknowledged
that the program was all about awareness-raising among the rural poor,
assisting them to more fully utilize their local resources, and to help
instill in their lives and communities a more active participation in the
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development process and a strengthening of national unity (Vaidya
1992b: 132, NOS Staff ]988:7). Recent discussion underscores the
importance of civic service in general for its impact not only on the
server but also on the direct and indirect beneficiaries in communities
where service is being performed (Perry & Thomson 2004).
The initial plan was to field NOS volunteers in f()ur sectors: health,
education, agriculture and construction (engineering). During its short
life, however, only the education corps was mobilized. Besides teaching,
each volunteer had to complete a village profile, to link theory and
practice as well as to demonstrate academic competence and experience
rural reality. The profile's baseline data were intended to help planners
identify local needs for development.
Many NDS volunteers also worked on small technical and social
development projects in their communities. They assisted on small scale
construction works, agricultural improvements, drinking water schemes,
minor irrigation projects, bridge building, family planning, public health
education and sanitation, literacy, and the prevention of alcoholism and
gambling, for example (Pradhan ]978:273-274 & passim, Poudyal ]979,
Karmacharya 1980, Aditya & Karmacharya 1988).
NOS Impact on Both Student and Rural Communities
That the NOS program was 'successful' in several ways is widely
accepted in Nepal. Unfortunately, only two impact assessments of the
NOS exist (Pradhan 1978, Karmacharya ]980). One focuses mostly on
initial impressions of the student volunteers and their rural village hosts,
the other on economic aspects. In addition, one early NOS Director
conducted a limited cost-benefit analysis after the first few years. He
determined that the return to the nation was four times the investment
(Vaidya ]978).
Given the dearth of studies, the subject needs further analysis fiom
one or more independent sources. No studies exist, for example, of the
program's impacts on local economy, on social structure or politics, on
community organizations or the level of social capital formation, or
about the long-term social and politica] effects of involvement on the
participants themselves.
The program's impacts in these areas are largely conjectural, based
on a few brief observations at the time (Baral 1977, Fussell & Quarmby
1974, Poudyal ]979, Poudyal and Tiwari 1978, Vaidya 1978), as well as
several more recent retrospective obsen:ations (Chand 1988, Gurung
1988, NOS Staff 1988, Pradhan 1988, Shrestha & Upadhyay 2002,
Shrestha & Upadhyay et al 2002, Vaidya 1992a,b & 2002), and on
extensive interviews. Extrapolating from these sources, it appears that the
NOS served well to introduce students to rural conditions and realities, to
enhance rural education in selected villages and schools, and to bring
some of the rural populace more closely into the development dialogue.
The NOS program helped create social capital in participating
communities and schools, thus creating a better atmosphere in which to
build trust and reciprocity among citizens and between local
communities and development agencies. Similar trends have been noted
in the international literature on volunteering (see Smith: para 24-28).
Orogosz (2003:250) summarizes the link between civic service and
social capital: 'We cannot strengthen the ties that bind us as a nation
unless our civic duty is fostered by 'bridging' social capital that helps us
create links across groups. There is a 'strength in weak ties' that stretch
across lines of race, class, and religion since these weak ties allow us to
recognize our dependence on one another so we can become more than
communities of strangers'.
NOS provided just such an opportunity for bridging social capital
where students and citizens in impoverished rural communities forged
new alliances. It also raised political consciousness and the potential to
change the nature of existing and highly conservative political culture.
The new alliances, however, threatened to dismantle existing traditions,
the status quo, and old entrenched relationships between local elites and
the monarchy. This was one of the main reasons that the life of the NDS
was cut short in 1979. That it was closed before it was sufficiently
mature is considered by many observers to be one of the great tragedies
of Nepal's recent sacio-political history.
For the volunteers themselves, NDS service provided a type of
social development experience that led directly to the enhancement of
human capital. It subsequently influenced lifestyle choices and career
directions of many participants. Razzaque, Masud and Mian (1978:5)
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point out that NDS students, predom inanlly of urban backgrounds, had a
unique opportunity to grasp the country's problems and assess actual
needs in preparation for careerS in government service after graduating.
Many NDS graduates went on to become well known leaders,
academicians and professionals, including participatory development
practitioners and human rights activists. During their year long exposure
to the facts and conditions of rural life, the volunteers made new friends,
learned new skills and enhanced their own self-confidence and respect.
NDS is generally acknowledged to have raised awareness and personal
satisfaction among participants. The value of volunteering in creating
social and human capital is widely noted in the literature (cf. Smith 1999:
para 29-31).
The NDS program also impacted on villagers, district
administrators, traditional leaders and local school teachers, as well as on
university teachers and the students' parents. Its impact upon traditional
local leadership, however, was mixed and often controversial. When the
student volunteers first arrived in the villages, many of them were
perceived as a threat to the entrenched and powerful local leaders of a
system where development activities were closely guarded and
controlled, where development allocations were well-kept secrets, and
where the village elite monopolized the flow of information and largesse.
Into this traditional scene came energetic university students who
encouraged participation and practiced consultation, transparency, trust
and sharing (all deeply political), serving as good communicators,
facilitators and motivators. They encouraged locals to undertake a
number of self-help development activities. As they raised the
conSCIOusness of many villagers, the old style of closed and
unaccountable leadership came under scrutiny. As Pradhan has noted
(1988:10-12): 'The villagers would ask themselves why the NDS
students are so dedicated [toJ village development activities despite the
fact that they were not from the village .. [while, in contrast] the local
leadership did not have the same amount of dedication.. .'
Furthermore, NDS volunteer activities included campaigns against
usury, polygamy, child marriage, bonded labor, and other 'social evils'
such as alcoholism and gambling, the profits of which often lined the
pockets powerful local elites. Thus, while it threatened the existing
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power structure, the NDS experience also had the potential for significant
social and political change.
The program's impact on rural schoolteachers was also significant.
In many instances, NDS teachers brought improvement to school
administration and, by their example, promoted 'academic values' such
as holding class regularly, facilitating a proper examination system and
keeping good records (Pradhan 1988).
Among the 385 villagers and III local authorities interviewed
during Pradhan's 1978 assessment, researchers found near unanimous
support of the program." Local support was made explicit when almost
all villagers interviewed favored continuing the NDS program in future.
When asked why, they referred to the role of volunteers in disseminating
new infonnation and ideas, in raising people's consciousness by
promoting literacy, in understanding the priority needs of the villages and
pursuing appropriate development programs, and in expressing
cooperation and an enthusiastic 'voluntary spirit'. And, because they
were different ITom local leaders, as generally selfless, creative and
informative friends, the villagers did not want to lose their company
(Pradhan 1988 & 1978).
Former directors of the NDS evaluated volunteers' impacts on host
villages in similarly positive terms. The students were respected locally
as 'catalysts of reform and change'. They brought awareness to the
villages and were looked upon very positively, as people in whom the
villagers could confide and place their trust. Implicit in these
observations is recognition of the diverse and versatile qualities of the
volunteers.
Respect for Nepal's NDS program also spread internationally. Civic
service planners, leaders and administrators ITom as close as India and as
distant as the United States looked closely at the Nepal NDS as a model
program of volunteerism. Its leaders were invited abroad, to Indonesia
and the Philippines for example, to describe and discuss the Nepal
program, and give advice to others. UNESCO formally praised it, and it
was written up for a broad audience (see Fussell & Quarmby 1977,
Poudyal & Tiwari 1978, Razzaque, Masud & Mian 1978, Vaidya
I 992a,b).
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Despite the largely positive reflections on the NDS at home and
abroad, a few negative criticisms have also been voiced. The program's
inability to spur revision and improvements in university education, for
example, is noted by both Shrestha (1988) and Mishra (1988). Mishra
describes it like 'a horse that trotted briskly, often unaware of its
destination ... ' and as 'a great opportunity lost' (1988: 102-1 03). Mild
expressions of suspicion have also been discussed, that in some of the
remote districts the NDS experience may have raised unfulfi!led
expectations that, in turn, fueled the sort of rural discontent that found its
expression two decades later in the start of Nepal's debilitating Maoist
insurgency. This sort of criticism, however, can be brought against any
democratic movement, NGO or government aid project trying to address
inequities and the causes of poverty.
Amidst all the praise for NDS, one important outcome of this
national youth service program has been overlooked_the role students
played in mobilizing communities and how new alliance between
students and villagers arose as credible threats to local elites that were
aligned with the monarchy. Such threats put in motion a series of events
that are still unfolding in Nepal, a society that by any measure is
dominated by a narrow elite, and disenfranchised masses. It is important
to recognize the role of NDS in stirring the seemingly calm waters of
N I . 12epa ese socIety.
NDS and the Interplay of Students and National Politics
Government-sponsored civic service programs always operate within a
political context While the literature on volunteerism generally avoids or
neglects reference to its political ramifications, in Nepal the politics of
NDS and the national political context within which the NDS was
created, operated and closed down are important to understand. The ups
and downs of national politics, including volatile student movements,
combined with the activities of the banned political parties, various other
socio-political activism, and the inevitable difficulties and
disappointments that arose during the decade of the 1970s, were all
associated with how the NDS was viewed, and ultimately influenced its
impacts,
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To understand the situation behind the design and implementation
of the NDS the reader must forebear a brief (simplified) introduction to
the recent history of Nepalese sociD-politics. In 1960 King Mahendra
abolished the nation's first struggling multiparty parliamentary system
and replaced it with a party less Panchayat system, sometimes
characterized as a form of "guided dcmocracy,.13 Because all political
parties \\-'ere banned, there was only one official or legal point of national
allegiance and political articula-tion-the party less Panchayat system,
\vith the royal palace at its apex.
The new Panchayat system was based upon popularly elected
village and municipal assemblies (Panchayats) that articulated up to
district assemblies. At the center was the national assembly, the majority
of whose members were elected by District Panchayat members from
among themselves. Par three decades, ITom the early 19605 through the
national referendum of 1980, to the 'Movement to Restore Democracy'
of 1989-90, powerful and largely conservative Panchayat leaders called
'Panchas', and various government administrators and functionaries,
arose within the system to dominate and control both local and national
politics.
A relative insider and one of the severest critics of Nepal's royal
rule has categorized Nepal's modem style of governance in Weberian
terms as a "patrimonial system' focused on the royal palace in
Kathmandu (Shah 1982 & 1993). He describes the manner of palace rule
under the Panchayat system as a highly authoritarian style of
'peremptory command' (hukumi shashan), much the same as in
autocratic Rana times prior to the revolution of 1950-51. The populace
remained 'subjects' beholden to the king and the powerful elites, though
many were chafing to become 'citizens' under a more truly democratic
form of sovereignty.
It is not hard to imagine the Panchayat era, 1960-1990, as a time of
political turmoil and struggle. 'The regime's inability to achieve
qualitative changes in the economic conditions of the people despite its
uninterrupted monopoly of power.. added to the woes of the people
generally' (Saral 1993:41-42). Despite their being banned, political
parties existed, nonetheless_illegal and underground. There were also
several student constituencies_active, open and above ground, which
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reflected and often served as mouthpieces for the banned political parties
(BaraI1993:46).
Into this political stew, the govemment attempted sincerely but
ineffectually to create change and development, especially in the
educational sector. Within a few years of its promulgation, however, the
New Education System Plan (NESP) of 1971 was considered a failure, a
tact that did not bode well for its NDS component. While the
government's avowed goal was sweeping social and economic change
and national unity, and white some profound changes in Nepalese society
did occur, political and social life was guided from a citadel of conserva-
tism beneath which personal and political freedoms remained severely
restricted. The overarching goal of encouraging education and develop-
ment, and of broadening social perspectives, was thwarted by the very
fact of the severe constraints the leaders placed on society and politics.
It was in this paradoxical atmosphere that the NDS was launched,
surprisingly succeeded (despite the failure of the rest of the NESP), and
was summarily closed, all within little more than half a decade.
Notwithstanding the glowing accounts of local support for NDS
volunteers, many district and local leaders (the Panchas) watched with
growing alarm as student volunteers brought social and political
awareness into rural communities. A fe\v volunteers were even
reprimanded for their outspoken contempt of certain powerful, corrupt or
oppressive Panchas. The NDS was supposed to be free from politics,
political pressures and local rivalries (Pradhan 1988:4); but clearly, in the
overheated political environment of the times, political neutrality by
students in far off rural villages was very difficult to monitor or achieve.
By the end of the 1970s, social and political life in the capital,
Kathmandu, and in other cities and towns around the kingdom was also
considerably unsettled. Strikes and other confrontational civil actions
were being staged almost daily against an overriding incompetence and
corrup-tion in govemment. The Panchayat system was a failure, and the
people wanted to retum to a multiparty parliamentary democracy. On
May 23, 1979, a violent confrontation occurred in Kathmandu between a
combined force of police and army troops and an estimated 20 to 30
thousand university students. It was the culmination and expression of a
deep and growing discontent among the citizenry. The following
moming, King Birendra, in a bid to quell the unrest, made a tamous royal
proclamation, announcing that a national referendum would be held to
choose between continuing the partyless Panchayat system with suitable
reforms. or reinstat-ing the multiparty system of parliamentary
democracy (Shah 1993:51-52).
The Fall of NDS
The king's announcement alanned many Panchas and other powerful
politicos. While they did not dare speak out against the king's will, their
actions nonetheless had an immediate and chilling effect upon the NDS.
Some Panchas were convinced (with good cause) that NDS students
would try to persuade rural voters to vote against the existing system and
select the multiparty option instead. If that happened, their local power
and position would be doomed. What the Panchas least wanted was what
some NOS volunteers encouraged grassroots consultation and
ownership of development initiatives, opposing (head-on) a culture of
partisanship and ignorance of democratic principles. Although they could
not stop the referendum, the Panehas and others were able to exaggerate
the gravity of the situation (the threat to their power) and persuade some
of the very conservative decision-makers in Kathmandu to force the
university to withdraw the NDS.
Under the circumstances, King Birendra backed its closure. His
palace directive forced the NDS Director to order all NDS participants
home immediately, for their 'physical protection', it was said. In the
'official' view, NDS was closed due to funding problems, but few people
believed it. The polite reason, reported in the news media, was 'to keep
the NDS above the controversy in the context of the proposed national
referendum' (The Rising Nepal, Kathmandu, June 29 1979, quoted by
Poudyal 1979). Most informants interviewed for this study put it more
bluntly: 'Closing the NDS was basically a political decision, a political
act. ,14
Earlier, we pointed out that the NDS, as part of the new educational
plan of the 1970s, was implicitly designed to prepare the nation's youth
for public (or civic) service. Paradoxically, this was the root of its
undoing. It was created and deployed under conditions not fully
conducive to the sort of democratic citizenship that both the students and
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villagers began exercising. Once the NOS its participants experienced
realities of life in the far-flung districts of the realm, however, the
disjuncture bet\vcen state-sponsored ideal of 'Democracy' and the
democratic citizenship fostered in students and ordinarY citizens
threatened the power and privilege of the few, and eventually ;ontributed
to its dern ise.
Nepal's first serious nationwide civic service movement, was
summarily abandoned in 1979, but its positive influence on so many
lives and communities has not been forgotten. Its popularity and its place
in the psyche of the nation, never waned, though they remained in
abcy'ance. It is interesting to note that the short saga of the NDS from
first doubts and resistance, to enthusiastic support and success, to its
threat against the establishment and its overnight closure, and its role in
student and national politics of the 1970s is strangely absent from most
socio-political commentaries and recent historical analvses. If noted at
all, the mention is typically a brief post mortem (~,g" in Maskay
1998:99-100), The reasons for its absence from contemporary literature
seems clear enough. For one, much of that literature is written by
outsiders or younger scholars without historic perspective. And, for
another, the NDS was part of the failed New Education System Plan,
virtually all formal reference to which has died with the erasure of the
memories of that by-gone and (now) irrelevant plan.
A Weak Revival, 1983 to 1991
In 1983, after a three-year hiatus, the NDS Directorate was reopened at
Tribhuvan University and a 'special crash program' version ofNDS was
reinstated, It lasted until 1991, and involved several thousand more
Masters level students, But it was a tepid follow-on to the original NDS,
watered down to a three months assignment, only onc month of which
was spent in a rural community, barely enough time to prepare the
required village profile, During the interlude little remained of the
original NDS objectives, spirit, or local selfChe1p development activities
that had characterized its predecessor. This was a classic example of
redesigning a pre¥existing model but neglecting to retain its ·soul'. The
revived program was poorly planned and coordinated, and was run with
minimal supervision, monitoring or evaluation. The original NDS spirit
(rastriyatako bhavana) was gone, What remained, in the words of some
fanner NOS officials and volunteers, was a weak miniature NOS_'a
formality', 'nominal and symbolic',
Looking back on the NDS in its heyday, one former director has
made this terse observation: 'The king's people were very sensitive to the
program. The courtiers were more conservative than the king.'
Ultimately, politics prevailed, for by the late 1980s the Panchayat
system was under its most serious threat to its survival so far, and
conservative leaders and palace courtiers were on the defensive. Anti·
Panchayat sentiments were heating up, only this time they led directly
into the successful 'Peoples Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy' of 1989-90, Politically, the timing for a rejuvenated NDS
program \vas all off; the context was not right.
After the new era of Democracy began in Nepal in 1990, the NDS
died a quiet death, Meanwhile, the political unity that had won
Democracy quickly dissolved back into contending factions, With party
politics now legal and in the open, student strikes and demonstrations
subsided. But, the new Democracy suffered one crisis after another and
from 1996 onwards it was dogged by a growing Maoist insurgency in the
rural areas, paralleled by corruption and inept leadership at the center,
(And, since October 2002, there have been no local elections and local
government at the VDC level has been on hold,) All of this has prevented
political leaders and the government from moving forward
constructively, aggressively, with programs of rural development and
poverty alleviation,
But it has not stopped many well meaning citizens, some of them
former NDS volunteers imbued with the spirit of civic service, to take
advantage of both the socio-political vacuum and the new civil freedoms
that came with Democracy, to begin to form a strong civil society
movement. The 'civic space' created under the NDS was now becoming
creatively filled by a spectacular rise of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs, CBOs and CSOs), Many of them were led by or supported by
former NDS volunteers (and by others inspired by their example), Thus,
in an important sense, the notion of social capital bridging groups
(Drogosz 2003) can be expanded to one that also bridges time,
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During the decade of the 19905, the organization responsible for
registering NOGs, the Social Wellare Council (fonneriy the Social
Service National Coordination Council) recorded and certified a
tremendous surge of civic service activities. Prior to the 1990 Democracy
Movement, at a time when the Panchayat system \vas highly distrustful
of citizen movements, the council recorded less than 200 local and
national NGOs in Nepal. A decade later, however, it recorded almost
9,000 NGOs, in ten categories of which the largest was Community
Development (SWC 1999-2000).15 It was during this recent burst of
NGO and civic service spirit that the NDS was successfully rejuvenated
in a new fann.
NDS Reincarnated: The NDVS
In 1998, amidst the phenomenal growth of Nepal's civil society
institutions, the National Planning Commission decided (again) to revive
the NDS, and after a period of planning, the new 'National Development
Volunteer Service' (NDVS) was fonnally inaugurated in April 2000, in
time to join in celebration of the International Year of Volunteers 2001.
This time, a decade after the success of the Democracy Movement,
Nepal's political climate was in some respects more favorable, more
progressive. and the objectives of the new student volunteer were more
broadly conceived than earlier (compare Aditya & Karmacharya 1988,
Upadhyay et at 1989).
The first NDVS participants were fielded in a pilot program in 1998.
Since then, well over 500 volunteers have been mobilized and posted
widely across the mountain, hill and lowland districts of Nepal. Unlike
its direct predecessor, the NOS, these volunteers are not active students,
but are mostly new graduates anned with technical skills in agriculture,
engineering, solar energy, health sciences, and water management, along
with a few from liberal arts, management and planning. This emphasis on
technical expertise marks one of the basic differences between the new
NDVS and the old NDS, which was more of a rural teacher corps.
The NDVS strictly prohibits political activism and volunteers must
sign a sworn statement not to engage in political affairs of any kind.
From the perspective of the state, one of the key lessons learned from the
NDS is that overt involvement of participants in political activities, even
the expression of a political opinion, is counter productive to the
neutrality that volunteers should maintain (Shrestha & Upadhyay 2002).
Discussion and Conclusion
The case of national service in Nepal underscores the importance of
examining the social and political context into which service is
introduced. Service programs can be a source of widespread societal
change and a vehicle for expressing discontent with the status quo.
Inextricable links between civic service and democratic citizenship have
been noted in the literature, for the intent of civic service is often not
only to promote democratic citizenship but also bring social change
through new institutio-nal arrangements (Perry & Thomson 2004;
Dionne, Drogosz & Litan 2003).
If a significant consequence of civic service is to foster democratic
citizenship, then, as the NOS case suggests, it is necessary to examine the
nature and life course of service programs in repressive and
undemocratic regimes that offer very little in the fonn of democratic
expression to its citizens. In a Nepal with few opportunities to express
dissent or mobilize communities outside of the traditional hierarchies, the
NDS provided a ready-made vehicle for youth and rural poor to organize
and mount a credible threat to the status quo. While national servIce IS
not usually envisioned as a vehicle for political activism, and on the face
of it, curtailing activism seems appropriate, it is important t.o underscore
that when avenues for democratic participation are few, as m the case of
Nepal, national service programs can play a significant ro~e in
manifesting the urge to assert democratic citizenship. Therefore, In the
absence of true democratization, Nepal's first formal civic service
program was a welcome opportunity to assert citizenship rights: though it
later become a casualty of its own success in fostering the begmnlngs of
democratization.
The expectations and aspirations of volunteers to address social and
economic disparities soared directly because of their participation in
NDS. The NOS began dismantling the historical divide between the
privileged and the poor, although certainly not by design, and only
briefly. Student volunteers were able to instigate a more a~tlve
participation by ordinary citizens-the economically and SOCIally
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impoverished and excluded-in the affairs of their respective
communities. A direct challenge to local elite (a singular source of state
power) and indirectly to the stale quickly diminished the prospects of a
national service that was giving voice to an independent civil society.
NDS was quickly dismantled, but the ripples it created in Nepalese
politics and society later were foundational to the Democracy Movement
and the opening of civic space that came with it, and the still unfolding
struggle for Democracy in Nepal.
Here we want to stress that while the NDS merely threatened the
status quo, it is evident tram current development discourse in Nepal that
the dominance of an entrenched political and social elite in Nepal is still
pervasive. NOS was important in introducing the ideas of democratic
citizenship to far corners of Nepalese society that othenvise had not seen
them. Subsequent calls for greater citizenship rights and democracy were
not grassroots campaigns, but were, as Brown (1996:211-212) has noted,
purely urban: ' ... born out of a compromise between the traditional elite
and the professional middle class. The poor were not a party to the
compromise. The urban poor participated in Nepal's revolution in the
sense that they gave the leaders of the Jana Andolan [the 1990 'Peoples
Movement' ] leverage over the palace.'
The outcome has been one of continuity, where power and wealth
remain elusive to the rural and urban poor, and a narrow elite still
governs Nepal. This, however, does not diminish but only strengthens
our thesis that (a) national civic service under such conditions can foster
democratic citizenship from the grassroots, but that (b) it becomes
difficult to sustain such a program when it begins to threaten an
entrenched elite and intense scrutiny of the powerful.
We conclude with the idea that civic service is inherently
democratic, inviting citizen participation in social development,
especially when other roads to democracy are blocked. In Nepal, national
service program became the magnet for democratic participation in the
absence of other legitimate avenues of democracy. The observations of
Clotfelter (1999: 10), from an international perspective are that: 'however
politically neutral in their conception, these service programs tend to stir
up waves in the pool of politics, especially when they are funded directly
by the government... Much more prominent on the political radar screen,
though, are the actions of those recruits.'
Amartya Sen's call for expanding real freedoms of citizens and the
removal of unfTeedoms to unleash development seems appropriate even
for understanding how national service unfolds in the absence of
Democracy (Sen 1999). The case study of Nepal illustrates some of the
complexities surrounding a national service program. We contend that if
a significant aspect of service is to foster democratic citizenship, then it
cannot be divorced from the climate in which it is deployed.
.. ,Citizenship will not be strengthened if service is entirely
divorced from politics. Yes, service is essential to civil society
and it is part of what makes us citizens. (Drogosz 2003:250-
251 )
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ENDNOTES
I. For a more extensive version of this paper. describing and analyzing civic
service and youth volunteer movements in South Asia, with the Nepal NOS
case study, see Yadama & Messcrschmidt 2004.
2. Don Messerschmidt is an applied anthropologist, consultant, researcher,
writer (and former American Peace Corps Volunteer). He has authored
several dozen articles, many reports and several books on Nepal, mostly
dealing with development topics.
3. Gautam Yadama is an associate professor in the George Warren Brown
School of Social Work at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, USA.
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4. 13huvan Silwal is currently \\'ith the U.N. in Eastern Europe on assignment
to a local governance and development project in Albania. In 2001 he served
as Nepal l\'ational Coordinator tiJf the International Year of Volunteers
(lYV) program under the olliec of the lI.N. VolunteersiNcpal. lie has
considerable cxrerience as an advisor on volunteer affairs in Nepal.
including the new J'.:ational Development Volunteer Service (NDYS).
5. At the root of voluntccrism in Nepal arc the strong cultural-historical
concepts of 'service' (Ncpali: sc\t'o) and 'duty' (dharma) constituted to
promote a dharma-hascd 'good society' where the weak and the powerless
are served by those occupying a better position in lite (Dahal et a1 2002:34-
35, Menan, Maore & Sherraden 2002). There is a very thin line between the
meaning or 'servicc' that is freely given and 'duty" that is expected to be
given. Engaging in some voluntary 'servicc' to society is easily interpreted
as simply the socially expected performance of one's moral 'duty',
6. Maskay (who questions any association of t\'epal's contemporary civil
society movemcnts with past service traditions) saw it slightly differently
\vhen he wrote: "Evidence exists here and there that NGOs existed in Nepal
in the remote past. long before the written history oft\'epal .. ,' (1998:68).
7. The list is slightly modified. from hy Biggs. CJurung & Messerschmidt 2004.
It is based on their O\vn research as \vcll as an extensive literature:
Bhattachan 1996, 2000 & 2002; ehhetri & Kattcl 2004: Dhakal 1994 &
1996: fisher 19R9 & 1991: (;urung (1,) 2000: Gurung (S,M,) 2000: lashi.
Sharma & Thapa 2000: Limbu 2001: Messerschmidt 1979, 1981, 1985,
1986. 1987 & 1995: Pradhan 1983 & 1989: Pun 200 I: Regmi 2002; and
Shrcstha 1999,
8. Rhattachan (1996) designates the same as "indigenous' and 'induced', We
have adapted "indigenous'. 'traditional' and 'sponsored' from Fisher 1991.
Indigenous refers to a system (or group) developed within a local
community (by insiders), identified as locally-originated. local1y-'O\vned'
and 'customary', Traditional implies well established and accepted, usually
with some degree of antiquity, something 'old' in the eyes of the beholder,
but not necessarily indigenous, Sponsored groups are those initiated or
'induced' from outside the host community by projects, programs,
government agencies. NGOs or other outside organizations.
9. See Uiggs, Gurung & Messerschmidt 2004 for an in-depth discussion.
10. The remaining 4% were undecided due to personal or family concerns, not
in opposition to the program,
11. 'Local authorities' art; identified as persons related to NDS program. as
distinct from local leaders, many of whom \vere threatened by it. Of the 111
local leaders and 385 villagers surveyed. 100% and 99%, respectively.
expressed their Javor of the program (Pradhan 1978:275),
12. A recent assessment of the root causes of the Maoist insurgency. from
districts where Maoism first arose in Nepal in the mid-1990s, points to local
discontent with the status quo and, especially. with the neglect by the palace
and royal retainers of local needs and aspirations (Gersony 2(03), That
study, however. makes no reJerence 10 the presence of NDS volunteers
during the 1970s. Ciersony's reference to outside influences begins,
unfortunately. only wilh the implementation of a large donor-funded
development project in 1980. Thus, the likely influence of NOS volunteers
in the same districts over the previous decade was ignored.
13. For more detail on the political setting, see Baral 1993. Holtun et al 1999:
26-45, and Shah 199() & 1993,
14, In a close vote. the National Referendum resulted JI1 a win for the king's
preference to continue the Panchayat system \"ith appropriate reforms
although. in the end, it only marked time, one decade, until the popular
revolutional)' movement to restore Democracy won out in 1990.
15. By 2002 this number had risen 10 almost 14.000 t\'GOS affiliated \.vith the
Social \Velfare Council (Pyakural 2002), Not all. however, are fully
functional and professionally sound. This number does not count the scores
ofintemational NGOs Ihat also operate in NepaL many of which, along with
international aid agencies. fund much of the national and local NGO
community through which they channel specific development activities,
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